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ABSTRACT 
Cloud computing can enable an organisation to outsource computing resources to gain economic 
benefits. Cloud computing is transparent to both the programmers and the users; as a result, it 
introduces new challenges when compared with previous forms of distributed computing. Cloud 
computing enables its users to abstract away from low level configuration (configuring IP addresses 
and routers). It creates an illusion that this entire configuration is automated. This illusion is also true 
for security services, for instance automating security policies and access control in the Cloud, so that 
companies using the Cloud perform only very high- level (business oriented) configuration. This thesis 
identifies research challenges related to security, posed by the transparency of distribution, 
abstraction of configuration and automation of services that entails Cloud computing. It provides 
solutions to some of these research challenges. As mentioned, Cloud computing provides 
outsourcing of resources; the outsourcing does not enable a data owner to outsource the 
responsibility of confidentiality, integrity and access control as it remains the responsibility of the 
data owner. The challenge of providing confidentiality, integrity and access control of data hosted on 
Cloud platforms is not catered for by traditional access control models. These models were 
developed over the course of many decades to fulfil the requirements of organisations which 
assumed full control over the physical infrastructure of the resources they control access to. The 
assumption is that the data owner, data controller and administrator are present in the same trusted 
domain. This assumption does not hold for the Cloud computing paradigm. Risk management of data 
present on the Cloud is another challenge. There is a requirement to identify the risks an organisation 
would be taking while hosting data and services on the Cloud. Furthermore, the identification of risk 
would be the first step, the next step would be to develop the mitigation strategies. As part of the 
thesis, two main areas of research are targeted: distributed access control and security risk 
management.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1 CLOUD COMPUTING 
Cloud computing is a new paradigm for computing infrastructure[1][2]. While Cloud 
computing can be thought of as just one more way of implementing distributed systems, it 
is different from traditional distributed systems, as well as grid computing, as its 
infrastructure is transparent to users and programmers alike. This allows for new ways of 
selling and sharing resources altogether.  
Cloud computing offers a new economic model which enables enterprises to shift from the 
conventional way of developing their own IT departments to outsourcing their needs for 
software, platform and infrastructure. Cloud computing has been promoted as a new 
paradigm and also as the 5th utility service after water, electricity, gas and telephony [3].  
A paradigm shift is taking place in the IT industry [4]. In the past enterprises used to support 
their business by procuring IT infrastructure and then developed their software on top of 
that infrastructure. Cloud computing presents a model in which IT infrastructure is leased 
and used according to the need of the enterprise. The fundamental benefit of this model is 
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that it converts capital expenditure (CAPEX) of an enterprise into operational expenditure 
(OPEX)[5].  
We envision that this shift would enable hybrid Clouds (a combination of private and public 
Cloud) to become commonplace, realized by private Clouds interacting with a rich ecosystem 
of various different types of Cloud. We are already witnessing research being conducted to 
enable organisations to automatically externalise services and applications to trustworthy 
and auditable Cloud providers in the hybrid model[6].  
1.2 RELEVANCE OF CLOUD COMPUTING TO BT 
The paradigm shift that is taking place in the IT sector has opened up new avenues of growth. 
BT[7] being one of the largest technology company in the UK had to develop its own strategy 
to leverage the benefits of this shift. BT already has an extensive offering for customers 
requiring data centres but with the evolution of cloud computing further technological 
development was required. 
The support for this research and development work was undertaken as part of BT’s strategy 
to develop its Cloud offering. More specifically to develop the security offerings related to 
Cloud computing. BT has developed large number of patents in the different areas of IT 
which it uses to generate revenue. It invests a large part of this revenue to enhance growth 
and to add to its offerings relating to Cloud computing.  
From BT’s perspective the aim of the thesis is twofold. The first goal is to develop a novel 
scheme that would enforce access control policies on Cloud computing scenarios. The 
scheme will also ensure scalability to cater for large number of Cloud consumers and 
confidentiality of data hosted on the Cloud. We use the EU OPTIMIS[6] [8] project to perform 
evaluation of the scheme developed. The second goal is the development of the security risk 
framework for the Cloud computing platforms. This framework would provide a mechanism 
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through which risk analysis can be performed for Cloud computing scenarios. Details about 
the research plan and outcomes are given in Chapter 4.  
1.3 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS 
The Engineering Doctorate programme envisages a ‘portfolio’ of research contributions 
within a domain that are of relevance in an industrial/commercial context i.e. that will have 
or may have real-world impact.  The industrial sponsor for the Engineering Doctorate was 
British Telecom and the research presented in this thesis has been guided by current and 
anticipated problems faced in cloud security by BT. 
Initial work reviewed both the academic state of the art in cloud computing security and the 
industrial state of practice.  This allowed various research gaps to be identified.  Background 
and literature review is presented in Chapters 2 (Cloud Computing Background), 3 (State of 
the art implementations Cloud computing implementations), and 4 (Security challenges in 
Cloud computing). 
The specific research objectives addressed by the technical work of this thesis are as follows. 
1) The production of a Risk Assessment Framework with tool support for application to 
Cloud computing scenarios. This is presented in Chapter 5 
2) The provision of an effective and secure architecture and algorithms for secure video 
streaming. This is presented in Chapter 6 
3) The provision of a scalable access control framework based on an existing cryptographic 
scheme.  This is presented in Chapter 7 
4) Experimental validation of the scheme developed in Chapter 7 is put forward in Chapter 
8. 
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1.4 THESIS STRUCTURE 
In this section the structure of the thesis is presented.  
Chapter 2 puts forward the explanation of differences between Cloud computing and other 
forms of computing. The Cloud computing background and evolution chapter came from a 
joint paper written in BT titled as “Cloud Strategy Roadmap”.  
For Chapter 3, the state of the art implementations and the comparative analysis of the 
security landscape of Cloud delivery models are presented. The main objective of the 
comparative analysis was to develop a strong understanding of the Cloud computing field. 
This led to the identification of security challenges for Cloud computing. 
For Chapter 4, the review of the security challenges and the development of research gaps 
was undertaken. The identification of the research gaps setup the research direction of the 
thesis. 
For Chapter 5, the development of the Security Risk Framework was done in collaboration 
with University of Leeds where Mariam Kiran was leading the risk framework as part of the 
OPTIMIS project. Mariam’s contribution were in the form of developing the algorithm for 
risk calculation. The author’s contributions came in the form of performing the threat 
analysis and then relating those threats with the Cloud computing scenarios of the OPTIMIS 
project.  
For Chapter 6, Securing Scalable Video idea is presented. Part of this research work was 
undertaken by the researcher during his MSc at University College London. In the MSc the 
focus was on developing the authentication and confidentiality schemes for scalable video 
scenarios. In the EngD the focus remained of extending this work in Cloud computing 
scenarios and performing a risk assessment for secure scalable video. In this Chapter the 
risks were identified relating to secure scalable video in the Cloud context. The novelty in 
Chapter 6 is the development of a new risk model for the scalable video scenario.  
18 
 
For Chapter 7, the development of the scheme ACDC3 scheme from the conception to the 
design and implantation is presented. The ACDC3 scheme was verified by Francesco La Torre 
in form of undertaking via a mathematical formalisation and design review of the scheme. 
The ACDC3 is a novel scheme which fulfils the requirements of scalability while providing 
confidentiality for the Cloud computing scenarios.  
For Chapter 8, the experimental validation results of ACDC3 and Security Risk Framework are 
presented. The development of code for ACDC3 prototype, the test cases to verify the 
scheme and the comparison of the results of test cases with the standard encryption practice 
is presented in this Chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CLOUD COMPUTING BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this Chapter the aim is to formally define Cloud computing and then explain the subtle 
differences between it and previous forms of distributed computing. From an academic point 
of view it is important to take a step back and analyse the idea of Cloud computing critically 
and judge whether it is any different from other forms of computing. The subtlety that exists 
between Cloud computing and other forms of computing would then set the stage for 
further research and development in this area.  
To understand the industrial perspective, the Chapter then further leads into a discussion of  
BT’s vision for Cloud computing and how BT sees it emerging. Finally at the end of the 
Chapter we present the EU OPTIMIS project use cases. The research work in this thesis is 
based on these use cases.  
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2.2 CLOUD DEFINITIONS 
There is no consensus on how to define Cloud computing [14] but some common 
characteristics exist among many of the definitions. In this section we present the definition 
of Cloud computing that is used throughout this report.   
The most comprehensive definition of cloud computing, and the one used throughout this 
thesis, is given by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST):  
“Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a 
shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal 
management effort or service provider interaction. This Cloud model promotes 
availability and is composed of five essential characteristics, three service models, and 
four deployment models”[15], [16]. 
With respect to the NIST definition the characteristics, service models and deployment 
models of Cloud computing is discussed and explained.  
The five essential characteristics of NIST’s cloud model are:  
 On-demand self-service, which means that a user can get computing resources 
provisioned automatically without human intervention.  
 Network access, by which services should be provided over a network using a 
standard mechanism that supports multiple platforms like mobile phones and PDAs.  
 Resource pooling, which enables pooling of Cloud provider resources among multiple 
tenants.  
 Rapid elasticity, by which a consumer of Cloud services can provision resources 
rapidly and can scale in or scale out on demand.  
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 Measured service enables the monitoring, controlling and reporting of services to 
both Cloud provider and the consumer in order to ensure transparency. 
There are three service models as per NIST’s cloud definition, which are Software as a service 
(SaaS), Platform as a service (PaaS) and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS):  
 SaaS provides consumers with the capability to use applications hosted by the Cloud 
provider.  
 PaaS provides consumers the ability to develop or deploy their own applications on 
the platform. The consumer however does not control the underlying Cloud 
infrastructure like network, servers and operating system.  
 IaaS enables the consumer to provision processing, storage, network and other 
resources. Virtualisation is the key enabler technology for this service model which 
provide unprecedented flexibility to configure resources while at the same time 
enabling the provider to protect its underlying physical infrastructure [17]. 
There are four fundamental deployment models for Cloud computing as per NIST’s cloud 
definition: 
 Private Cloud is solely operated for an organization by either a third party or the 
organization itself.  
 Public Cloud is available for the general public and is owned by an organization selling 
Cloud services. 
 Community Cloud provides infrastructure which is shared by several organizations. 
Hybrid Cloud is a composition of two or more Clouds (community, private, public). 
For this research we have chosen the NIST definition of Cloud computing as we found it the 
most comprehensive definition and also it is also widely used in the other research 
literature[18][19][20]. 
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Other definitions for Cloud computing includes Gartner’s: “A style of computing where 
scalable and elastic IT capabilities are provided as a service to multiple customers using 
internet technologies” [21]. The definition from Gartner covers parts of the characteristics 
of Cloud computing but it does not contain references to on-demand services as well as any 
pay-as-you go usage model. This implies that the definition does not consider these 
characteristics fundamental to the Cloud computing model. 
Forrester defines Cloud computing as, “A standardized IT capability (services, software, or 
infrastructure) delivered via Internet technologies in a pay-per-use, self-service way”[22]. 
This definition does not cover the platform part of Cloud computing paradigm. This implies 
that it does not make a distinction between the PaaS and the IaaS. Furthermore, It is also 
not clear what they mean by “self service way”.  
The 451 Group defines Cloud computing as, “a service model that combines a general 
organizing principle for IT delivery, infrastructure components, an architectural approach 
and an economic model – basically, a confluence of grid computing, virtualization, utility 
computing, hosting and software as a service (SaaS)”[23]. An important distinction this 
definition makes is that of confluence of Grid computing with virtualization and other Cloud 
computing related technologies. This distinction is very insightful as it sheds light on the 
influence of Grid computing over Cloud computing. 
The definitions mentioned above cover many technologies and various models. We can 
clearly see that there is no consensus among them [14].  
2.3 UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF CLOUD COMPUTING 
We have provided numerous definitions of Cloud computing in section 2.2, now in this 
section an effort is made to identify the subtle differences of Cloud computing with Grid 
computing. 
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Cloud computing came forward as the natural evolution of Grid computing, although it has 
been questioned whether it offers anything new or it is just rebranding of the old 
ideas[14][1]. The vision of Cloud computing is the same as that of Grid computing, that is to 
reduce cost of computing, increase reliability and increase the flexibility by transforming 
computers into something that we buy from a third party and then pay per use[14].  
One of the major differences between the business model of Cloud computing and Grid 
computing is that the Cloud is transparent to the users and programmers whereas Grid 
follows a project oriented approach. In Cloud computing anyone can go online and get access 
to immense computing resources and pay only for the resources that they consume. In Grid 
computing the focus is project oriented. Users or a community subscribe to a Grid project to 
offer resources or consume resources depending upon their need. There is an effort to 
develop a Grid economy using Grids all over the world. The Grid infrastructure would offer 
services such as trading, negotiation and allocation of resources[24]. 
For resource management most Grids use a batch model where users submit batch jobs. 
These batch jobs are placed in queue. The jobs are executed with respect to the requirement 
specified by the user for example the job would run on 100 processors for 1 hour. The Cloud 
computing batch model is different as the jobs are run concurrently and the resources are 
shared by the users. This introduces security issues relating to data confidentiality and access 
control such as data leakage to unauthorised users.    
Cloud computing uses virtualization to achieve abstraction and encapsulation. Virtualisation 
creates the illusion that many users jobs are running at the same time by creating a fabric of 
compute, storage and network resources. In Grids each participating organization maintains 
full control over its resources (i.e by not virtualising them), therefore there is less reliance on 
virtualization compared to Cloud computing [14]. As in Grid computing an organization 
maintains full control over their resources, the security requirements that are developed to 
cater for the needs of the Grid computing differ from those of Cloud computing. In Cloud 
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computing the control is lost by the data owner, as no physical control is available when it 
hosts data on the Cloud server. This change induces security issues relating to regulatory 
compliance, loss of privileged access, data confidentiality, access control etc.  
Cloud computing differs from Grid computing in many ways. The business model of the two 
forms of computing is completely different. Cloud computing is offered on a pay per use 
model whereas Grid is offered in the form of a project. Moreover, the delivery models of 
Cloud computing (SaaS, PaaS, IaaS) differ from Grid computing delivery model which is 
focused towards computing power. These differences have their impact on security of Cloud 
computing and we discuss in more detail the threats relating to Cloud computing in Chapter 
3. 
Having explored the nature of Cloud computing and how it differs from Grid computing, we 
now explore Cloud computing from a technical perspective. 
2.4 CLOUD ECOSYSTEM 
There is no long-term qualitative market differentiation for Cloud providers. For example, 
Amazon EC2 [25] was the first to propose solutions for the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) 
but it was soon followed by major competitors like Google and IBM offering IaaS platforms 
like Google Compute[26]  and IBM IaaS[27] at almost the same price. In order for a vendor 
to make a difference, it is necessary to constantly innovate and develop its offering.  
Most of the Cloud services until now are provided by infrastructure providers (Cloud islands) 
such as Amazon EC2[25], Google App Engine[28] etc. Recently, new technologies such as 
Vsphere[29] lead a transition from incompatible solutions provided by Cloud vendors (Cloud 
Islands) to solutions that can run on several Clouds (Virtual Clouds). The assumption here is 
that different hypervisors (Vsphere, HyperV, Xen) will provide functionality to interconnect. 
The idea is that the Virtual Cloud consumes the services of the Cloud islands by developing 
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a virtualization layer on top of them and frees their customers from being locked into a 
particular IaaS vendor.   
Cloud computing is also witnessing a transition towards open source platforms such as 
Openstack[30]. Openstack offers open source software for creating private and public 
Clouds. HP has consumed Openstack to build its Cloud platform called HP Cloud[31]. More 
vendors are now focusing on Openstack offerings (Paypal, Wellsfargo) therefore starting 
new era where Cloud islands can now communicate horizontally using open source software. 
Vsphere is a product of VMWare. Although it provided API level access to a hypervisor it 
failed to gain traction from other companies, possibly for reasons of competition and lack of 
trust. Openstack seem well on course to achieve the transition from Cloud Islands to Cloud 
Horizontal Federations.  
In figure 1, we show what we can anticipate for the evolution of Cloud computing. The first 
phase was the development of ‘Data Centres’ [82] for the purpose of storage and computing. 
In the second phase we have seen the development of ‘Virtual Data Centre’ [7] that provides 
full functionality of a Virtual LAN for an organisation. A VLAN can be defined as a logical 
network that maps workstations and servers on some other basis than geography. It is a 
logical segmentation of network rather than physical one. Now we anticipate that the next 
step will be the emergence of ‘High-end Cloud Environment’ where many Virtual Data 
Centres will be federated to provide services. This will enable the creation of a market place 
for Cloud platforms and the brokers will be able to resell services to clients depending upon 
their specific requirements.  
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Figure 1: Anticipated Cloud Market Evolution 
Currently we are in the evolution process where virtual data centres are being offered by 
various vendors such as BT [7].  
The emergence of Cloud-aware application design patterns is making the development of 
Cloud based applications more convenient. Rather than focusing on programming, the 
concept is to now to focus on the idea. Furthermore the improvement of the 
instrumentation offered by the standardised interfaces of both Cloud infrastructure and 
Cloud platforms make application development and deployment more convenient.  
In the next sections we expand the Cloud scenario that we will be using for this thesis. We 
detail two use cases to further explain the cloud computing scenario. The first use case is 
that of an “Enterprise using multi Clouds”[8] and the second use case is of “Enterprise Cloud 
broker”[32].  
27 
 
 
Figure 2: Virtual Cloud Scenario 
2.5 CLOUD SCENARIO  
The purpose of this section is to describe the Cloud computing scenarios and use cases that 
will be followed throughout this thesis. The explanation of use cases and scenarios now 
(instead of, for example, before the assessment of the commercial state of the art) will give 
some context  to the research work, and to indicate some typical uses for cloud computing 
technology.  
In Figure 2, a Cloud scenario is put forward where the Virtual Cloud federates the 
infrastructure providers (IP1, IP2, IP3) by deploying a virtualization layer on top of the 
infrastructure providers. This virtualisation would be able to offer IaaS services to the 
consumer.  
The actors of the scenario are described below. 
Service Provider (Federator): The federator is responsible for creating the abstraction layer 
that would combine the resources provided by different infrastructure providers. The design 
28 
 
of the federator is such that the infrastructure provider should not be aware that its services 
are resold to the customers. To achieve this, the federator creates virtual LAN or an overlay 
network that would connect the resources of these infrastructure providers. A virtual LAN 
creates a logical network which is not based on geography. Rather in this case it would be 
based on compute or storage services put together for a consumer. This creates the 
horizontal federation of infrastructure which would enable the federator to introduce 
interdependencies between the virtual machines that exist on different infrastructure 
providers. 
Consumer: The consumer can either be the enterprise customer who can be a company or 
an individual user trying to access the federator in order to utilize Cloud services. 
Broker:  The Broker sits between the infrastructure provider and the service provider or 
between the federator and the customer. The Broker offers value-added services between 
the infrastructure provider and the federator, such as performance prediction (based on 
monitoring of historical data), security and SLA negotiation. A broker creates a governed and 
secure Cloud management platform to simplify the delivery of complex Cloud services[32]. 
The broker is explained further in the use case 2 explanation in the section 2.5.2. 
Infrastructure provider: The infrastructure provider provides services to the federator like 
storage, computing and other computing resources.  
We further extend the scenario by explaining two use cases. These use cases will then be 
used to perform the threat analysis on the scenario. The threat analysis will therefore lead 
us to identify security related issues and challenges. 
2.5.1 USE CASE 1: AN ENTERPRISE USING MULTIPLE CLOUD SERVICE PROVIDERS  
In this use case, an enterprise combines infrastructure services provided by multiple 
infrastructure providers to implement and realize an internal process. For example, the 
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process could be a one-off simulation of a complex data set that uses multiple infrastructure 
providers, e.g., Amazon EC2 for the compute-intensive tasks, NVIDIA Reality Server[33] 
Cloud service for graphics-intensive tasks and Amazon S3[34] for data storage intensive tasks 
and then the enterprise has to perform the necessary merging on the result set to generate 
the desired results. Amazon does provide services where a complete Cloud can be created 
using multiple tools through which Amazon EC2 and other Amazon services can be 
combined. However, there is absence of an interoperability layer between different vendors. 
Therefore the above description can only become a reality if NVIDIA provides an API level 
access to Amazon services. Even if that API level is present, it would still be required to 
orchestrate the whole process. This is where the service integration layer comes in as 
explained in the Figure 3. 
In figure 3, we use a virtualized services integration layer that uses well-defined interfaces 
and standardized calls between different web-service enabled applications and data sources 
to provide the loosely-coupled integration required for the completion of the enterprise’s 
process. 
The service integration layer would require an interface for services such as authentication 
of the consumers, access control to ensure access is granted appropriately and finally 
federation of multiple Clouds. This federation would require the communication interface 
through which different services from different vendors can be orchestrated.  
The multi Cloud use case is designed to realise the benefit of using different Cloud platforms 
at the same time as an integrated service. The challenge that this use case addresses is that 
of integrating different platforms. 
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Figure 3: Enterprise using multiple Infrastructure providers 
 
2.5.2 USE CASE 2: AN ENTERPRISE CLOUD BROKER 
In the previous use case the focus was on integrating the multiple different platforms. In this 
use case the focus is on developing a broker service that can negotiate price, SLA etc. on 
behalf of different customers.  
In figure 4, an enterprise approaches a Cloud broker with a given set of functional 
requirements and constraints. Depending upon these functional requirements and 
constraints the broker then picks up the best available match of infrastructure providers. 
These requirements and constraints can be cost, SLA parameters and other non-functional 
requirements like audit, compliance and security capabilities. In addition to helping in 
choosing the most suitable Cloud service for the enterprise’s needs, the Cloud broker should 
also help in integration of the enterprise’s processes and their deployment on the target 
platforms of the infrastructure provider.  
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Now the Cloud broker could in principle be doing a comparative analysis of services provided 
as in the case of use case 1. The technical challenge in use case 2 is that of performing 
comparative analysis between different IaaS providers or doing comparative analysis 
between different service providers as in the case of use case 1. 
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Figure 4: Cloud Brokerage 
The process of sorting through the services provided by different IaaS providers is a complex 
process and the Cloud broker provides additional value-added and middleware-oriented 
services to achieve its functional requirements. 
In the next Chapter we analyse the state of the art implementations of Cloud computing. A 
comparative analysis of the state of the art is also presented. The purpose is to undertake a 
thorough review of the implementations in order to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the state of the art from an industrial perspective. This understanding 
would later enable the development of further research in the area of Cloud computing 
security. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STATE OF THE ART CLOUD 
COMPUTING IMPLEMENTATIONS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 CURRENT CLOUD SOLUTIONS AND THEIR SECURITY MODELS 
This section presents current Cloud solutions and their security model. We categorise the 
solutions into: Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Software as 
a Service (SaaS). These categories are based on the Cloud service models presented in 
Chapter 2 which are based on the NIST definition of Cloud computing[35]. Furthermore, we 
also analyse the security of vendors which provide Cloud based security services, these 
services generally described as Security as a Service (XaaS). 
The reason we use this classification is because the focus of the security controls would be 
different for each service model. For instance SaaS would focus more on the web-security 
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controls whereas the IaaS would be more tuned towards protecting hypervisor and VM 
isolation. However, numerous security controls would overlap, as every provider would have 
to deploy security controls to protect customer data.  
For reviewing the state of the art implementations of Cloud computing, we use publically 
available data such research articles, security data sheets and white papers provided by 
companies that provide Cloud services.  The survey may not be able to capture a full 
understanding of the architecture of the products, as the companies do not publish all data. 
The companies that we have selected for our survey would cover the full spectrum of Cloud 
delivery models such as IaaS, PaaS and SaaS. Moreover, we have also reviewed the security 
standards (ISO, PCI etc.) that these companies conform to in order to understand the 
maturity of security controls that they have employed. 
3.1.1 IAAS 
There are currently five major companies who provide IaaS: Amazon[25][34][36], Rackspace 
[37][38], Joyent [97], GoGrid [39] and Terremark[40]. The security features that we have 
considered for our analysis are provided by these companies and are documented via 
publically available information. The companies which have been selected for this survey are 
broadly considered market leaders in the cloud computing domain. Moreover, those we are 
analysing for this survey tackle prominent challenges in Cloud computing relating to security. 
We also use some benchmark standards of IT Security to develop our analysis, these are 
Payment card industry data security standard (PCI-DSS), ISO standards, SAS standards etc. 
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Security 
Features /IaaS 
providers 
Amazon Rackspace GoGrid  Joyent Terremark 
Security 
Model 
Shared 
responsibility  
model 
Shared 
responsibilit
y  model 
Not 
mentione
d 
Shared 
responsibilit
y  model 
Not 
mentione
d 
Confidentiality 
of Data 
Allow 
customers to 
encrypt their 
own data using 
their own keys 
Encrypting 
data before 
it leaves 
customer 
premises 
using up to 
256 bit AES 
keys[41]  
Not 
mentione
d 
Allow 
customers 
to encrypt 
[42] 
Not 
mentione
d 
Hypervisor 
level security 
Using 
customised 
version of Xen 
[43] to perform 
separation of 
hypervisor with 
the guest OS 
Not 
mentioned 
Not 
mentione
d 
Yes Not 
mentione
d 
Access Control Not mentioned Access 
control 
mechanism 
RBAC[41]  Yes Not 
mentione
d 
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implemente
d 
Network level 
security 
SSL/TLS VPN[37]  VPN Yes Not 
mentione
d 
Accreditations
/ Compliance 
SAS70 type 2 
audit [44] 
SAS type 2 
audit, ISO 
17799, PCI-
DSS 
SAS type 2 
audit , 
HIPPA, 
PCI- DSS 
Not 
mentioned 
PCI DSS 
Multi factor 
authentication 
Yes Not 
mentioned 
Not 
mentione
d 
Not 
mentioned 
Not 
mentione
d 
Data leakage Amazon claims 
that customer 
instances have 
no access to 
raw disk. Data 
Leakage 
Prevention 
(DLP) is not 
mentioned in 
the 
documentation
. 
Not 
mentioned 
Not 
mentione
d 
Not 
mentioned 
Not 
mentione
d 
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Intrusion 
detection 
systems 
Yes Yes Yes Not 
mentioned 
Yes 
Table 1: IaaS Comparison 
Table 1 [25][34][36][37][38][97][39][40], shows that most of the infrastructure providers use 
the same security model: ‘shared responsibility’. In the shared responsibility model the 
security responsibility is shared by both the infrastructure provider and the user of the 
service. The reason is that infrastructure providers have control over the layers on and below 
the hypervisor. They can only provide limited level of control when it comes to the VM itself. 
Therefore the infrastructure providers take responsibility for the hypervisor and the layers 
below whereas the responsibility of the VM remains with the customer. The customer has 
generally have admin level control over the VMs therefore enabling him to access core 
services of the operating system. In some cases the IaaS allows the customer to upload its 
own template of operating system.  
Another common feature among the vendors is that they provide controls to ensure the 
confidentiality of data when stored or on the move. In order to ensure compliance, there are 
a number of accreditations that the infrastructure providers comply with. These 
accreditation provide limited security controls and none of them are tuned for the Cloud 
computing scenario. Like PCI DSS is a standard used by the payment industry, it defines the 
controls that should be in place in order to make the payment systems secure. Another 
feature that is almost common among the infrastructure providers is the inclusion of an 
intrusion detection system.  
Joyent provides special tools that can be used to provide an extra layer of security at the VM. 
Amazon is the only vendor that offers key rotation service. Key rotation enables a customer 
to change encryption keys. Customers provide a certain number of keys to perform 
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encryption; these keys are then used by Amazon to perform encryption on their data. The 
keys are revolved with respect to the time setting, for instance the first key would be revoked 
after one week. 
For the IaaS, we have analysed most of the major vendors in the market. Amazon provides 
by far the most detailed documentation with respect to security controls whereas Terremark 
only identify a few security controls for their IaaS offering. Almost all of the vendors provide 
controls relating to network level security and intrusion detection systems. On the contrary, 
no vendor mentions controls relating to data leakage prevention.  
3.1.2 PAAS 
In this section we review the solutions relating to Platform as a Service (PaaS) from the 
security perspective. The companies that provide PaaS are Windows Azure[45], 
Force.com[46][47], Google Apps Engine [28] and Heroku [48]. The security features that we 
have picked for the analysis are the ones mentioned in the documentation of the companies.  
PaaS providers 
/Security 
features  
Windows Azure Force.com Google Apps 
Engine 
Heroku 
Security Model Responsibility 
on the vendor 
Responsibility 
on the vendor 
Responsibility 
on the vendor 
Not mentioned 
Confidentiality 
of Data 
Data encryption 
is provided as 
an optional 
feature. 
Internally the 
Data encryption 
using 128 bit 
keys for 
symmetric and 
1024 bits for 
Data is not 
stored in clear 
text 
Not mentioned 
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Azure platform 
encrypts data. 
asymmetric 
encryption. 
Compliance Safe harbour Safe Harbor 
agreement, 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 
HIPPA 
Safe Harbor 
agreement, 
Sarbanes-Oxley, 
HIPPA 
Uses Amazon 
AWS [49] at 
IaaS level so 
similar 
compliance 
VM security Least privilege 
policy is in 
place. 
Customers not 
provided admin 
access to VM. 
VM and VLAN 
isolation is 
done using 
packet filtering 
Not mentioned Not mentioned Not mentioned 
Network level 
security 
SSL/TLS SSL/TLS SSL/TLS Not mentioned 
Accreditations ISO 27001 SAS70 type 2 
audit, ISO/IEC 
27001  
SAS70 type 2 
audit, NIST SP-
800-61  
Uses Amazon 
AWS at IaaS 
level so similar 
compliance 
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Redundancy Multiple 
backups are 
created 
Multiple 
backups using 
RAID disks and 
redundant 
configuration of 
servers. Third 
party services 
are acquired for 
disaster 
recovery 
Multiple 
backups on 
geographically 
distributed 
locations 
Not mentioned 
Data deletion References are 
deleted 
References are 
deleted, No 
formatting is 
done 
References are 
deleted and 
other customer 
data is 
overridden 
Not mentioned 
Access control Two models for 
access control 
are provided 
Access control 
mechanisms 
are in place 
Not mentioned Not mentioned 
Table 2: PaaS Comparison 
Table 2 shows that most of the vendors provide features for addressing security 
requirements. For confidentiality most of the vendors are using the Advanced Encryption 
Standard [50]. The key length range is 128-256 bits. SSL/TLS is the commonly used tool for 
the confidentiality of network level traffic.  
For compliance most of the vendors are also complying with bills of the parliament, acts ad 
rules like Sarbanes-Oxley[51], Data Protection Act[52] and HIPPA[53], [54]. Apart from 
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compliance there are other accreditations that the industry uses to ensure adequate security 
controls are in place such as ISO 27001 and SAS type 2 audit.  
For redundancy multiple backups are created by all the vendors and third party controls are 
put in place for disaster recovery. For data deletion, all the vendors only delete the 
references and do not perform any formatting on the data. The data is then normally 
overridden by other customer data. The references to the data are deleted but not the data 
itself, there is a risk that customers can potentially recover deleted data from other users 
using advance data recovery tools.  
Access control is also provided by most of the vendors but the level of control varies. 
Windows Azure is the only platform that explicitly mentions in the documentation that they 
deploy security controls to ensure the VLANS and VM remains isolated. Controls which they 
use are packet filtering and access control. The isolation of VLANS and VM ensures that a 
customer having control over his VM cannot penetrate into the VM or VLAN of another 
customer using the same Cloud infrastructure. 
Windows Azure also only provides confidentiality to the customer as an additional feature 
although all internal traffic is kept confidential. Windows Azure security provide adequate 
security controls to tackle the threats of identity, access management, confidentiality and 
network level security[55]. Security features relating to data leakage prevention and usage 
control threats are not mentioned. 
All data hosted by the Google Apps Engine is stored in encrypted format. Therefore 
confidentiality of data is ensured by Google. The issue of access control is tackled by applying 
access control policies such as access is given on a need to know basis. Logs are maintained 
and all activities are monitored to ensure access control policies are adhered by the Google 
staff. The access to the production environment is further controlled by a centralised access 
control mechanism.  
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Force.com provides security features similar to the ones provided by its SaaS offering which 
is Salesforce [56].  
Heroku uses Amazon AWS [48] as the underlying IaaS offering. This implies that it has the 
similar level of security controls that Amazon AWS provides. We discussed in section 3.1.1 
the Amazon EC2 related security controls which also uses AWS.  
For PaaS, we have reviewed all the major vendors in the market. Most of the vendors provide 
similar levels of security controls for data confidentiality, redundancy and network level 
confidentiality. Microsoft provides an extra level of security controls which are VM isolation 
and access control. On the contrary, Heroku do not specify security controls for its PaaS 
offering and it relies completely on the IaaS provider for security. 
3.1.3 SAAS 
We review all the solutions relating to Software as a Service (SaaS) from the security 
perspective in this section. The major companies that provide SaaS are Salesforce [57], 
Rackspace email & Apps[37], Marketo [58][59] and Zuora [60]. Marketo specialises in 
marketing automation software. Zuora provides a subscription business model to its 
customers and its services ranges from finance, commerce and billing. The companies 
selected for SaaS delivery model are leaders (ranked by Inc. 500 and Fortune 100) in their 
specific SaaS domain, this gives the analysis a thorough mix of what is available in the market 
and what kind of security services are provided by the SaaS providers. The security features 
that we mention in the analysis come from the documentation of the vendors that we are 
using. 
SaaS providers/ 
Security 
features 
Salesforce Rackspace 
email & Apps 
Marketo Zuora 
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Security model Responsibility 
on the vendor 
Responsibility 
on the vendor 
Responsibility 
on the vendor 
Responsibility 
on the vendor 
Single Sign on Supported Supported Not mentioned Supported 
Network level 
confidentiality 
SSL/TLS VPN SSL/TLS [129] SSL/TLS 
Confidentiality 
of data  
Data 
encryption 
using 128 bit 
keys for 
symmetric and 
1024 bits for 
asymmetric 
encryption 
Encrypting data 
before it leaves 
customer 
premises using 
upto 256 bit 
AES keys [61] 
AES encryption, 
customer data 
stored in 
separate 
databases 
Not mentioned 
Multi factor 
authentication 
Not mentioned Not mentioned Yes Not mentioned 
Accreditations SAS70 type 2 
audit, ISO/IEC 
27001 
SAS type 2 
audit, ISO 
17799, PCI-DSS 
SAS type 2 
audit 
Not mentioned 
Compliance Safe Harbor 
agreement, 
Sarbanes-
Oxley, HIPPA 
Not mentioned Safe Harbor 
agreement 
Not mentioned 
Table 3: SaaS Comparison 
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Table 3 shows that most of the vendors take care of the security responsibility. At the 
network level most of the vendors use SSL/TLS whereas for encryption of data the most 
common algorithm is that of AES.  
Single Sign On (SSO) is supported by most of the vendors whereas multifactor authentication 
(multiple criteria’s are used for authentication) is only supported by Salesforce. In [62], 
Armando using formal models has revealed a severe security flaw in the SAML (industry 
standard for SSO) based protocol used by Google Apps Engine that allows a dishonest service 
provider to impersonate a user at another service provider. 
For accreditations and compliance the industry standards are used by most of the 
companies, standards include Safe harbour agreement and SAS type 2 audit. Safe Harbour 
agreement enables the movement of personal data between the EU and the US. The 
companies which want to move personal data from the US into the EU region or vice versa 
need to comply with criteria set out in this standard to gain eligibility for moving personal 
data of US and EU citizens. 
Salesforce and Rackspace email and apps use the IaaS offerings from Force.com and 
Rackspace respectively who are the IaaS offerings of their sister company. For the SaaS they 
further hardened the security by providing layer of authentication and SSO. The rest of the 
security controls are the same as provided by Rackspace which we have mentioned in 4.2.1 
For SaaS, most of the security features (SSO, Multi-factor authentication, SSL,VPN) provided 
are from the perspective of web-security as most of the services are provided over the web. 
3.1.4 SECURITY AS A SERVICE (XAAS) 
In this section we analyse the security of services provided by Cloud based service providers. 
For this analysis we take into account companies which are less known and are smaller in 
44 
 
size. Moreover, we also look at the level of security provided by the market leaders in this 
area. 
The market for Cloud based security services include Remote vulnerability assessment, 
Identity & access management (IAM), Web gateways, Email gateways etc. This market is 
growing at a very fast pace and is expected to go from being $2.13 billion in 2013 market to 
$4.13 billion by 2017[63]. 
For the analysis we have selected Qualys[64] which is a market leader in providing Cloud 
based vulnerability assessment and penetration testing. CipherCloud[65] is another 
company that specialises in providing security services for Cloud and has distinguished itself 
by providing services such as searchable encryption, Cloud data loss prevention, encrypting 
emails etc. Radar Services is company that specialises in providing Cloud based Security 
incident and management solution (SIEM). The company is small in size but has been growing 
steadily. The reason we selected Radar Services was because Cloud based SIEM is an 
emerging domain for XaaS and there are not many large enterprises providing this service. 
 
XaaS providers/ 
Security features 
Qualys Radar Services CipherCloud 
Security model Shared Shared Shared 
Single Sign on Supported (SAML 
2.0) 
Not mentioned Yes with Salesforce 
Network level 
confidentiality 
SSL/TLS SSL/TLS SSL/TLS  
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Encryption  N/A Not mentioned AES 256 bit 
encryption[66] 
Key Management Supported (Keys to 
be provided by the 
consumer) 
Not mentioned Yes 
Malware Detection Yes Yes Yes 
Data Leakage 
Prevention 
Yes[67] Not mentioned Yes 
Table 4: XaaS Comparison 
For all the companies providing XaaS, it is expected that the security model is shared 
between the XaaS and consumer. The primary role of the XaaS is provide a security service 
which is specific to a domain like DLP. Therefore, the consumer would be responsible for 
ensuring that it provides appropriate access to XaaS to its systems. Moreover, if there are 
breaches at levels not scanned by the XaaS then the responsibility will be with the consumer. 
3.1.5 SECURITY FEATURES AND VENDORS 
For all three service models (IaaS, PaaS, SaaS), the documentation of companies do not 
provide detail information on the security features that are provided. Normally large 
companies like Microsoft and Google have detailed documentation available but even they 
do not provide the full spectrum of the security features applied. This is because it can reveal 
security vulnerabilities of their system which may in turn be exploited by the attackers. 
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As for the other smaller companies like Heroku, Zuora, Radar Services etc. they do not 
mention even the basic security features like data confidentiality, access control, hypervisor 
security and VM security.  
The focus of Cloud providers is shifting towards providing more advanced services for 
securing Cloud infrastructure. These services include Security incident & response (SIEM), 
Identity and access management (IAM), Cloud based SSO, Encryption as a service etc. This 
trend of providing security through a Cloud service is usually termed Security as a Service 
(XaaS). We have made an effort to cover this domain and comparative analysis of three 
companies are provided.  
The next Chapter focuses on research challenges that arise within the domain of Cloud 
computing security from an academic perspective. A thorough literature review is conducted 
which leads to identification of research gaps.  
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CHAPTER 4 
SECURITY CHALLENGES IN CLOUD 
COMPUTING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The purpose of this Chapter is to identify the research gaps within the area of Cloud 
computing security by analysing the state of the art and by categorising the research area. 
The approach that is taken to identify the research gaps is by conducting systematic analysis 
of the literature. Furthermore, the Chapter also puts forward a research agenda that is to be 
followed to fill the research gaps.  
4.1 ACCESS CONTROL IN CLOUD COMPUTING 
Cloud computing has been widely adopted by the industry (Telecoms, Banks, Government 
etc.) and according to IDC its market was worth $16 billion in 2008 and by 2018 the market 
will rise to $127.5 billion (SaaS ($82.7 billion), PaaS ($20.3 billion), IaaS ($24.6 billion) )[68]. 
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From the technological point of view even with such a large market size, Cloud computing is 
still in its infancy[69].  
Security is however a priority concern for many Cloud computing customers who make 
buying choices on the basis of the reputation for confidentiality, integrity and resilience, and 
the security services offered by a provider. This then is a strong driver for Cloud providers to 
improve their security practices and compete on security services[70]. In the previous 
chapter we showed that many vendors do not publicise their information security measures. 
The reasons for this are not clear. They might wish to keep these measures secret but it is 
also possible that they do not have a mature security model implemented within an 
organisation. However, for Cloud consumers, security remains a top concern.  
Data security for Cloud computing has been identified as one of the major research challenge 
by Zhang[71], Kandukuri [72], Shen[73], Popović[74] and Catteddu [70]. One reason why 
Cloud computing is considered such as major adoption challenge is because data security 
can be a show stopper. 
Customers do not have physical access to data that is stored on the infrastructure provider 
premises. They have to trust the infrastructure provider with respect to the confidentiality 
of the data. The infrastructure provider has to build in security controls that would ensure 
that data remains confidential when it is stored and when it is on the move.  
Cloud computing follows a multi-tenant architecture where data from different customers 
are stored on the same server. Though this model is very economical, it entails many security 
risks. Segregating data stored from different customers is very important: if not properly 
implemented, this can lead to one customer accessing the data of another customer.  
Most of the commercial offerings only delete the references associated with the data rather 
than deleting the data itself. This means that if data recovery tools are used, one customer 
can potentially recover the data of another customer. This sort of problem has been known 
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for a long time. Indeed the earliest major security standard of the 1990’s [75] identifies 
“object reuse” as a specific area of security functionality. 
Infrastructure providers should build in security controls that would ensure that even though 
the infrastructure is shared at the physical level and the software level, the data is 
segregated. Security can be a show stopper for infrastructure providers, if a data breach 
occurs this would lead to loss of confidence, therefore leading to Cloud consumers moving 
services out of that particular Cloud provider infrastructure. Sharing of hardware is a 
necessity that is required for Cloud computing however, segregation of data is a software 
requirement that would enhance Cloud consumer confidence in the infrastructure provider. 
At the IaaS level the segregation of data is even more important as customers have control 
over the virtual machine and they can install and run software. This gives them the freedom 
to attack the system; we have witnessed an attack on the EC2 platform in[76].  
Another attack on Amazon S3 happened on June 2008 when customers using the storage 
facility said that data has been corrupted and the checksum of the data was failing[77]. 
Furthermore Amazon clearly states that it delegates the risk associated with data to the data 
owner who should take precautionary measures. 
From the customer's point of view it is important that Cloud providers have mechanisms in 
place that gives them the confidence that the data stored on the Cloud is not tampered with. 
Failing to do so means that customers cannot trust that the data is securely hosted. 
One of the most important security controls that is used to ensure data security is access 
control. Access control in an enterprise is performed by using specialised software that grant 
access on the basis of roles or attributes and the security policy they hold corresponding to 
these roles. The data on Cloud platforms are stored in many different locations of which the 
customer may not be even aware.  
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The main challenge is to prove legally or technically that unauthorised access has taken place 
in the Cloud. As the infrastructure provider controls the Cloud, we need to investigate how 
a Cloud consumer can use technology to ensure that unauthorised access does not take place 
at the infrastructure provider level. This mechanism if provided to Cloud consumers can lead 
to further augmentation of confidence in the infrastructure provider. Moreover, from a legal 
perspective it would useful to register if a breach has taken place or not. This is necessary to 
comply with standards such as that of HIPPA, Data Protection Act etc. 
4.1.1 RESEARCH CATEGORISATION 
For clarity we have categorised the research papers that we have analysed as the state of 
the art with respect to access control, scalability and user revocation. This categorisation has 
been made after reviewing clusters of research activity while analysing the literature. The 
degrees of scalability and access control provided give two axes of categorisation. The 
following chart shows the categorisation, 
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Figure 5: Research Categorisation 
Figure 5, puts forward the requirement for a scheme that solves the problem of scalability and 
access control with user revocation for Cloud computing scenarios. 
4.1.2 TRADITIONAL ACCESS CONTROL 
In Discretionary access control (DAC) an individual subject can control the decision of an 
access control mechanism so that it allows or denies access to an object[78][79]. The 
approach is also known as the identity based access control, as the identity has control over 
the access control decision. DAC is widely supported by operating systems such as UNIX and 
Microsoft Windows. In Mandatory access control (MAC) the system mechanism (normally 
the operating system) controls access to an object and individual identity or subject cannot 
alter that access [79][80]. MAC depends on the correct classification of subjects and objects. 
MAC uses the Bell-LaPadula confidentiality model which has two security properties. Firstly, 
the simple security property ensures that no process may access resource labelled with 
higher classification. Secondly, the military classification property prevents processes from 
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writing to a lower classification. These two properties makes the MAC inflexible. In a system 
where there are large number of subscribers who are accessing numerous resources, to 
maintain the MAC properties require significant computing resources therefore making MAC 
difficult to scale.  
Both MAC and DAC are heavily used in operating systems. Using these models for applying 
access control for VMs via the hypervisor has already been achieved. In fact an example of 
application of MAC can be witnessed in the hypervisor sHype[81][82] [14] [15].  
Access control lists[83] are a simplified access control mechanism by which a table is created 
where an access rights list is maintained. Normally there are two columns in the table one 
containing the subject and the other containing the access rights. An ACL is linked with 
resources such as files or folders and decision with regards to access control is performed 
using these lists. ACL are usually used in centralised environments where users control their 
own file security. ACL’s are less suited in environments where the user population is large 
and constantly changing. Furthermore, ACLs are not an optimal choice when it comes to 
performing security check at runtime. Typical operating systems keep track of which user is 
running which program, rather than which files has been authorised to access[84].  The 
problems of scalability and trusted domain (owner and controller of data to be in the same 
trust domain) are shortfalls of ACL when it comes to Cloud computing. 
The basic concept of Role Based Access Control (RBAC)[85] [16] [86] is that users are assigned 
roles and permissions are associated with the roles. The users acquire access by becoming 
members of the roles. The relationship that exists between roles and permissions can be 
many to many. Similarly the relationship between users and roles can be many to many. 
Therefore the same user can have many roles and a role can be assigned to many users. 
RBAC requires the identification of roles within a system, as a role represents the authority 
and responsibility of the system users.  
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The traditional access control models implementation has focused on the assumption that 
data controller and data owner is in the same trust domain, the assumption does not hold 
for Cloud computing. The Data controller in this scenario is an organisation having 
administrative and physical control over the infrastructure hosting the data.  
In the Cloud computing environment, the main challenges faced by RBAC scheme are 
scalability, authentication, delegation of authority and trust. There are some RBAC schemes 
that have been developed for Cloud computing environments. Younis et al. [87] put forward 
a scheme which caters for some of the requirements relating to the Cloud computing 
environment. It does not, however, convincing tackle the problem of scalability.  The scheme 
AC3 that they present in the paper is based around RBAC. RBAC relies on roles, as the number 
of Cloud users increases, the number of roles augments exponentially. The inherent problem 
of scalability for RBAC is still present in the scheme which is that it becomes extremely 
difficult to manage for large number of users. 
Singh et al.[88] presents an upgraded form of RBAC for Cloud computing scenario. The 
scheme focuses on tackling issues relating unauthorised access by putting restriction on 
number of roles assigned per user. Moreover, it keeps a backup of all authorisation data on 
local stores to have redundancy.  
These approaches still do not fundamentally addresses the issue of scalability of RBAC within 
Cloud computing scenario. The issue remains that in the number of Cloud consumers rises, 
the number of roles rises significantly. Managing the roles and permissions becomes 
increasingly difficult and expensive. Moreover, this scheme relies on making backups of 
authorisation data which further makes it difficult to scale. 
4.1.3 DISTRIBUTED ACCESS CONTROL 
Breach of an access control policy may lead to the loss of confidentiality of data. As shown 
in the threat analysis in Chapter 3, loss of confidentiality of data and enforcement of access 
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control is rated as one of the most high level risks(most serious) associated with Cloud 
computing. 
A general solution to providing access control in a distributed scenario is to encrypt the data 
that is outsourced to a server or Cloud platform. The users who have the right credentials 
will then be able to access that data. This approach has been adopted by many systems [89] 
[90] [91] [92]. The problem with this approach is that it adds to the complexity because of 
management of keys and encryption of data. As Cloud computing is both transparent to 
users and programmers, it would be used in a highly decentralised environment with huge 
numbers of users. The goal is to achieve scalability and fine grained access control without 
introducing a very high level of complexity. For instance, if a system is dependent on PKI then 
it would have issues of scalability, as PKI does not scale due to technical and social issues. 
Furthermore, keeping the security policies concurrent (and ensuring consistency) when data 
is residing on many distributed platforms is also required.  
In the rest of this section, the description of the state of the art and shortcomings are 
explained. 
Kallahalla et al. [89] propose a cryptographic system PLUTUS. The system encrypts files 
stored on un-trusted servers. PLUTUS associates a symmetric key (lock-box key) with groups 
of files, which have similar sharing attributes. Each file is encrypted using a file-block key and 
then afterwards with a lock box key of the file group to which the file belongs. The lock box 
key is also used to encrypt the file block keys. When sharing a file a user only needs to reveal 
the lock-box key and then the file can be read by other users. The drawback of the scheme 
is that it does not ensure fine grained access control, as access is given on the basis of 
revealing a key.  
Another problem with the approach is that performing multiple encryptions at different 
levels makes this system extremely complicated due to necessity of the management of keys. 
The scalability of the system is proportional to the total number of file-groups. The 
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assumption is that the number of users is more compared to number of file groups which 
makes the scheme relatively efficient. In file-groups, as the number of files grows within a 
group, the easier it would become to manage the keys from a providers perspective. 
However, the bigger the group the more coarse grained the access control will become. 
Therefore for this system the problem of key management is inversely proportional to the 
granularity of access control. 
Ateniese et al. [91], presents an extension of the atomic proxy re-encryption scheme 
developed by Blaze et al [93]. The fundamental concept of proxy re-encryption is that it 
allows transforming a cipher text computed by Alice’s public key into one that can be 
decrypted by Bob’s private key. Ateniese presents a system in which data owner encrypts 
the data contents using symmetric keys. These symmetric keys are all encrypted with a 
master public key. The data owner has the private key that can decrypt these symmetric 
keys. This private key combined with user’s public key is used to generate proxy re-
encryption keys. Now the semi-trusted server can convert the cipher text into a form that 
can be decrypted by a specific user, hence allowing that user access to data. The 
fundamental problem with this scheme is that a malicious server and one user colluding 
together can reveal the keys of all the users.  
Goh et al. [90] presents a system SiRiUS, which provides end to end security over existing 
network file systems such as CIFS, NFS or OceanStore. To ensure access control it uses access 
control list (ACL) and assigns to each file a meta-data file containing the ACL. The meta-data 
file in SiRiUS incorporates entries that encrypt the file encryption key with corresponding 
user public key. This enables only the legitimate users to decrypt the file encryption keys and 
therefore access the file. Users who have the signing keys (private keys) are given access to 
write as well. The system is heavily reliant on PKI from the scalability perspective for Cloud 
scenarios the system therefore is not suitable. Furthermore the linking of ACL with the files 
means that the complexity of the system is proportional to number of revoked users. Every 
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time user revocation takes place, the meta-data file has to be updated by re-encrypting each 
entry in the ACL with the new file encryption key. In Cloud computing scenarios files with 
multiple copies would be stored at different infrastructure providers; if SiRiUS is used then 
ensuring synchronisation of access control policies would incur immense overhead therefore 
making the system infeasible. The system does not achieve fine granularity, as decisions 
about access is made on the basis of provisioning of keys only. For clarity the provider is only 
responsible for hosting and distributing the data. No processing is performed on the data 
itself by the provider. 
Vimercati et al. [92] presents a solution based on a key derivation method[94]. The 
fundamental concept is that every user is assigned a secret key and each file is encrypted 
using a symmetric key. In order to grant access to a user the data owner creates public tokens 
using the key derivation method. Using the token alongside with the user’s secret key, the 
user is then able to decrypt the file. The benefit of the scheme is that it is not dependent on 
public key infrastructure (PKI), therefore it should be highly scalable. However, due to the 
complexity of file creation and user grant revocation makes this scheme un-scalable [95]. 
Sahai and Waters [96] presented the original idea of attribute based encryption. In this 
scheme a user’s private key is constructed as a set of private key components. Each 
component represents an attribute of the user’s identity. A user trying to read an encrypted 
file can only decrypt the file if its private key has the correct access control attributes 
embedded in it.  The fundamental problem with the scheme was that it cannot be used in 
large systems due to lack of expressibility[97]. This scheme however, formed the basis for 
considerable further research work in attribute based encryption[95][97] [98]. 
Goyal et al. [97] presented an enhanced version of the Attribute based Encryption (ABE) 
called as Key Policy Attribute Based Encryption (KP-ABE). The scheme enhanced the 
expressibility of the ABE scheme by expressing the user’s private key as the access formula 
by using AND, OR, or threshold gates. Data is associated with attributes for which a private 
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key is derived. The private key is granted to users who have correct attributes. The scheme 
achieves expressibility to a certain extent but the complexity due to access attributes relating 
to that of public keys of users still make the scheme extremely complex. Furthermore, there 
is a considerable computational overhead that is associated with the scheme which makes 
it unfeasible in the Cloud computing scenario. 
With regards to distributed access control the state of the art research is based on the Key 
Policy Attribute Based Encryption (KP-ABE) scheme[97]. We therefore give some detail on 
relevant KP-ABE schemes that relate to that scheme.  
There are three major operations performed by the scheme, which are encryption, key 
generation and decryption. To understand how the scheme achieves fine granularity and 
data confidentiality simultaneously we explain below the functions of encryption, decryption 
and key generation. 
Encryption: To perform encryption the following components are required, 
 A set of attributes I which are associated with secrets  
 An access tree T to which the attributes are mapped. A tree is a Boolean expression 
which has attributes as its leaf nodes. 
 A public key PK that is used for encryption, this key is known to everyone in the 
scenario 
 Finally a message M that will be encrypted using the above sub-components 
Key Generation: To perform key generation the following components are required, 
 The access tree T, that corresponds to the set of attributes I 
 The master key MK, this key is extremely critical to the security of the scheme. If 
this key gets compromised, an attacker can easily impersonate the data owner 
 The public key PK that is known to everyone in the scenario 
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 Finally the key generation algorithm takes as input the above components and 
outputs the data consumer’s secret key SK 
Decryption: To perform decryption the following components are required, 
 A Data consumer who performs the decryption needs the SK   
 The public key PK is required 
 Finally the algorithm takes cipher text E, using the SK, the process of decryption will 
be performed. The decryption is successful only when SK relates to the set of 
attributes I in the access structure T 
Now the above scheme achieves two very important functionalities. First, by associating the 
attributes with the secret key of the user mapped over access structure T, it has achieved 
fine granularity. The second function is that of confidentiality that is achieved by performing 
encryption of that data. The scheme works well in a scenario where there is an un-trusted 
server and all the data hosted on it has to be encrypted and also fine granularity has to be 
achieved. But due to the complexities relating to computational overhead, key distribution 
and user revocation the scheme does not scale.  
4.1.4 RESEARCH GAPS 
Research Gap 1 (RG1): In Cloud computing the data is hosted on un-trusted servers; this 
feature introduces a requirement for confidentiality because the assumption is that the data 
is hosted outside the control of the data owner. Therefore, a mechanism should be in place 
that ensures confidentiality and integrity. As the data that is to be hosted on Cloud could be 
immense, there is also a requirement for fine grained access control, otherwise managing 
access to the data would not be possible. 
In Cloud computing scenario, the requirement is to have a scheme that would provide fine 
granular access control and data confidentiality. For enterprise to use Cloud computing, they 
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would need assurance that their data remains confidential and only transparent to 
authorised users. In case this condition of data confidentiality is not satisfied, it would erode 
the financial benefit that Cloud computing brings, as it would be risky (loss of customer’s 
trust, fines from regulator, monetary losses) for enterprise to use Cloud computing to host 
their data.  
From the literature review in section 5.2.2, it can be concluded that the schemes of ABE[96] 
and KP-ABE[97] do achieve fine granularity and data confidentiality. As Cloud computing is 
going to be used for a huge numbers of users, it would require that the scheme providing 
confidentiality and fine granularity of access control scale to that required level. The schemes 
of ABE and KP-ABE do achieve fine granularity but due to the lack scalability, lack of 
expressibility or computational overhead they are infeasible to be directly used in Cloud 
computing scenarios. Therefore the requirement is to have fine granularity, data 
confidentiality and scalability simultaneously. 
The problem in the state of the art is linking of fine granularity to the provisioning of 
confidentiality. In KP-ABE fine granularity is achieved using the access tree structure and as 
the attributes are linked to a certain identity, only that identity can decrypt data. This makes 
the scheme very complicated due to the management of keys, development of access tree 
structures, re-encryption and key generation. Therefore it cannot cater for the scalability 
requirements of the Cloud computing scenario.  
An important research aim is to de-link fine granularity of access control from the data 
confidentiality and to come up with a scheme that scales to a level required in the Cloud 
computing scenario. This would require development of a new scheme that takes into 
account specific access control, confidentiality and scalability requirements of Cloud 
computing. Scalable fine grained access control would be relatively simple to achieve as the 
delinking would mean that the mechanism does not have to cater for the confidentiality 
requirements also.  
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Research Gap 2 (RG2): Cloud computing should create the illusion that the configuration 
relating to encryption, decryption, management of security policies and management of keys 
is done seamlessly. This illusion forms the basis of Cloud computing and it differentiates 
Cloud computing from other forms of distributed computing. 
The challenge is to ensure that security services such as confidentiality, access control and 
integrity is provided on Cloud just as it would be provided in an enterprise with minimum 
possible user involvement (both owner and consumer).  
None of the systems that we have analysed above provide a solution that performs 
automation of configuration by which all the security related configuration remains seamless 
to the users.  
Cloud computing has the capacity to scale up and down as per the requirement of the 
business. This scaling capability is built on top of multiple domains for instance, an enterprise 
conventionally uses a single domain for its operations. But in Cloud computing it would have 
the capacity to burst to multiple domains (using broker or directly using infrastructure 
providers). This capacity has to be built in a way that it remains completely seamless to the 
enterprise users. The focus of the research gap is to deal with the issues that arise due to 
bursting. This bursting would include network level, VM level and hypervisor level security 
configurations in accordance to the security policy of the enterprise. Furthermore, this 
configuration would include security configuration negotiation (example, negotiation about 
which algorithms to use and length of the keys), management of keys, encryption, decryption 
and user revocation. 
The systems analysed provide solutions that cater for fine granularity and confidentiality. 
They do not provide a mechanism to seamlessly perform the security configurations. 
Consider the example, when a service provider wants to burst to multiple infrastructure 
providers, at the network level it would be a requirement to ensure confidentiality of data. 
A potential solution to this problem may be the use of either the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) 
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or creation of Virtual Private Network between the service provider and infrastructure 
providers. The usage for instance of the VPN technology would require configuration relating 
to keys, setting up of VPN servers at the infrastructure providers, setting up of VPN clients 
and enforcement of network level security policy of the service provider (for instance, if the 
infrastructure provider is outside of the EU, the bursting should not take place). All of this 
configuration would require the development of a component that would oversee network 
level security. This is only one requirement that relates to the security configuration relating 
to bursting. The goal here is to ensure that all of the security related requirements are 
fulfilled by a component with minimum possible involvement of the service provider. 
For Cloud computing to grow and realize the vision that we have provided in Chapter 2, it is 
imperative that this research gap is fulfilled. In case this research gap is not fulfilled the risk 
(time required for configuration, right configuration ensuring all security requirements have 
been fulfilled) that an enterprise has to take to use Cloud computing may erode its economic 
benefits. Moreover, the challenge is not only to achieve the goal of automation of 
configuration but also to achieve it at a cost that enables Cloud computing to remain a 
lucrative option.  
Research Gap 3 (RG3): None of the analysed systems proposes a mechanism by which access 
control policies that are distributed over multiple infrastructure providers are kept 
synchronised. In Cloud computing scenarios, the data may reside and pass from numerous 
platforms like Broker, Service provider and Infrastructure provider (IP). The challenge is to 
ensure synchronisation of access control policies across these multiple domains. Consider 
the following example:  
Data owner hosts its data on IP1 and IP2, where IP1 provide services to data consumer from 
Collaboration A and IP2 provide services to data consumer from Collaboration B.  Data owner 
has different access control policies for both Collaboration A and Collaboration B. However, 
the data owner wants to ensure that if the access control rights of Bob who is a member of 
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Collaboration A gets revoked, he should not be able to use collaboration B to get access to 
data. This would mean that both the access control enforcements at Collaboration A and 
Collaboration B need to be synchronised.  
A typical usage of the above example is when Collaboration A and Collaboration B are 
competing with each other. The data owner does not want to reveal the data that it is giving 
to Collaboration A, to Collaboration B and vice versa. 
Luokai Hu et al.[99] presents a novel approach towards solving the problem of 
communicating policies between different players within the Cloud computing scenario. The 
scheme proposed works in a decentralised environment using semantic web based 
technologies such as XACML. Some elements like the subject, object, action and attribute 
variables from XACML is used. This approach potentially solves the problem of semantic 
interoperability and mutual understanding on distributed access control policies when 
collaboration work is done between organisations. The problem with the scheme is that it 
does not have an automatic mechanism for resolving conflicts. Furthermore, the level of 
granularity provided by the scheme is limited as well. 
Research Gap 4 (RG4): All the systems that are analysed, user revocation is one of the most 
cumbersome processes. Every time users get revoked, new keys have to be generated and 
files have to be re-encrypted. Due to this complexity, all of the systems do not scale to a level 
that is desirable for Cloud computing scenarios.  
Yu et al[95] presented a novel approach in which the problem of user revocation was 
outsourced to Cloud servers. This was achieved by using PRE [93], which enables the 
transformation (re-encryption) of cipher text without the Cloud servers knowing anything 
about the plain text. The problem with this approach is that it introduces a huge amount of 
computational overhead. This computation overhead itself is outsourced to Cloud servers 
but this would increase the costs (time, money) of hosting data on the Cloud. Therefore 
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taking out the economic benefit that Cloud computing brings and making the approach 
infeasible. 
An important research aim is to come up with a scheme that minimises the impact of user 
revocation on data re-encryption. In the KP-ABE scheme that we have analysed in RG1, 
attributes are linked with keys in order to achieve fine granularity. The problem with this 
approach is that every time a user gets his access revoked all the files that he has access 
need to be re-encrypted. Furthermore, this introduces the issue of computational overhead 
also making the scheme infeasible.  
Consider a scenario where multiple users are having their access revoked in a very short span 
of time. This would require numerous re-encryption processes starting over the span of a 
short time. It would mean that if the time taken to re-encrypt data is longer than the time a 
user gets his access revoked than the scheme is infeasible, as if there are multiple re-
encryption processes running then there should be a mechanism to identify which data is 
encrypted with which key. As KP-ABE does not handle this complexity, it therefore is not 
feasible for the Cloud computing scenarios. 
4.2 DATA LEAKAGE PREVENTION (DLP) 
Companies pay a lot of attention to protecting the perimeter of their network by using 
firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention systems. Though the significance of external 
security is very important, it is also critical to ensure that data is not lost from inside the 
enterprise intentionally or unintentionally.  
There are products in the market which cater for data leakage prevention in an enterprise 
like GFI endpoint security [100], Symantec Data loss prevention[101] etc. There are no 
products which cater specifically for data leakage prevention in the Cloud.  
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The reason why the problem is different in the Cloud is because leakage within an 
organization can be controlled by using the above mentioned software. Such software would 
scan through end points or network points looking for violations of enterprise security policy. 
Such software cannot be used directly by customers in the context of Cloud computing, as 
the Infrastructure provider is hosting data from various different customers. The 
infrastructure provider should control the infrastructure and it should apply uniform security 
policies across many different customers’ data.  
From the perspective of the Infrastructure provider the problem is even more complicated 
as, firstly, it would want to prevent the leakage of data from happening. In case it happens, 
it is first very important to identify where and when did the leakage happened. Secondly, 
providers want to identify steps or processes by which the violation of the security policy can 
be traced. Understanding the exact requirements for data leakage prevention in the Cloud 
is still an open question. 
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) monitor an agent’s activity and determine whether it is 
acting as expected or not[102]. IDS can potentially be used to check the behaviour of a user 
accessing the data. IDS can solve problems relating to the Data leakage by analysing user 
behaviours and then reporting unusual activity in the system.   
The IDS assumes that an adversary has successfully been able to bypass the initial security 
of the system. For instance the username and password has been compromised by the 
adversary. For the IDS, the challenge is to figure out how to detect unexpected behaviour 
using previous patterns of users of the systems. The problem can be further divided into two 
categories. The first is to find out data that would show expected behaviour. The second one 
is to develop the software that would detect unexpected behaviour. 
There are two categories of IDS, network based or host based. In network based IDS[103], 
techniques are used to analyse network traffic to figure out anomalies with respect to 
expected behaviour. This is the new form of IDS compared with the host based intrusion 
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detection system. Host based IDS[104] consist of four methods for detection: the monitoring 
of logs, kernel based detection, file system monitoring and connection analysis.  
With respect to Data leakage the host based system makes more sense as the main concern 
here is to protect the data that is stored. The network based IDS can play a complementary 
role by checking for anomalies in the network. When envisioning the data leakage scenario, 
one has to consider all the potential output channels (USB drive, CD/DVD burner) associated 
with a computer. These channels can be exploited by an adversary to move information out 
of the Cloud. To counter them techniques like profiling of programs on basis of system calls 
presented in[105] can be used for intrusion detection. Two approaches are generally 
adapted when dealing with intrusion detection system.  
The first approach is that of Misuse detection[106] [107] in which systems are systematically 
scanned in order to detect previous known behaviours and actions which are deemed 
malicious or intrusive. These behaviours or patterns are usually recorded over a long period 
of time relating to a specific system. The second approach is that of Anomaly detection 
[108][109] in which the assumption is made that any unusual behaviour of the user would 
be deemed as intrusive. The advantage of Anomaly detection over Misuse detection is that 
it could even detect novel attacks as it looks for anomalies rather matching previously known 
patterns. 
From the perspective of the Misuse detection technique in DLP, the research question is to 
determine the behaviour and patterns of users not only from within the organisation but 
also from customers who are accessing that data from outside. Due to the nature of Cloud 
computing, data of many different customers would be hosted on the Cloud. The data would 
be accessed simultaneously by users and customers at the same time. In case the system 
specific intrusive behaviours are determined then it would enable the application of 
traditional host based intrusion detection systems on the Cloud platforms.  
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The approach of Anomaly detection is more novel compared to Misuse detection but its 
reliance on unusual behaviour is not enough in order to detect intrusion in Cloud. For 
example a user within an organisation can be performing legitimate tasks while moving data 
on USB or burning it on DVD/CD. In Anomaly detection, it would not be flagged as intrusive 
behaviour and therefore the attack would not be detected. This approach performs very well 
when it comes to attacks that are coming from the network by analysing abnormal behaviour 
in the network traffic for example running of a port scanner by a machine not in the LAN.  
An example of Data leakage not on the Cloud but still relevant is that of Bradley Manning, a 
US army soldier who was able to move classified data to his personal computer. He then 
later provided that data to the Wikileaks website[110]. This is an example of how easy it is 
for employees of an organisation to leak sensitive or classified data. On the Cloud the 
problem is even bigger as now the employees have access to data of not one but many 
companies or even at times competitors. 
The research question from the perspective of Cloud computing is that there are no known 
behaviours from the perspective of host based IDS specifically for infrastructure providers. 
The current state of the art is not specifically tuned to understand the behaviour of internal 
(employees of the IaaS) or external users (customers) of IaaS. Conducting research in this 
areas and coming up with user behaviours associated with the scenario would enable the 
application of traditional host based IDS on Cloud platforms. 
Providing the customers with a legal or technical guarantee that the data would not leak is 
extremely important. Unable to achieve this task would hamper the growth of Cloud 
platforms and also would enable the bigger names to create their monopoly in the market. 
This would serve as a barrier for new entrants in market place, as the customers would trust 
the large providers (Amazon and Google). Furthermore even for large providers, the trust 
would be limited and the customers would not be able to store with confidence their 
confidential information on the Cloud platforms.  
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4.3 HYPERVISOR LEVEL SECURITY 
Hypervisor creates the abstraction layer between the guest OS (virtual machines) and the 
hardware. One can also describe it as a slim version of an operating system with a focus on 
performance. The Hypervisor is responsible for managing the network level traffic. It 
redirects the traffic to appropriate virtual machines.  
A hypervisor, if compromised, can potentially lead to the compromise of all the virtual 
machines running on it, therefore inducing a very high risk. Recently some of the 
vulnerabilities of the hypervisor have been exploited by attackers. An example is the attack 
on the hypervisor of the Xbox 360 online system by exploiting a buffer overflow to gain 
hypervisor mode[111]. There are numerous other attacks recorded that have exploited the 
vulnerabilities of hypervisors[112] [113] [114]. Furthermore, there are numerous rootkit 
attacks in which slim version of hypervisors infect a virtual machine and then gain control 
over it. These systems include rootkit Bluepill[115] and VMBR [116].  
In [117], Khalid identifies that due to a smaller code base and relatively low  complexity the 
VMs were considered less vulnerable in the past.  In fact they were recommended for use to 
add further security. However, advances in rootkits and other malware have raised the levels of 
risk associated with VMs. There are two broad categories of security when it comes to VMs. 
The first one is the security of the VM. In this category research work is conducted to ensure 
that the VM remains secure. In the second category (VM for security), the research work is 
conducted to find out how VM can be used to secure systems. The first category is the focus of 
the work in this thesis.  
The integrity of VMs is considered extremely important, as this ensures the security state of 
the VM. In case the integrity cannot be ensured this would raise a huge question mark on 
overall security of the VM. VMs in Cloud settings are used by various consumers and it also 
holds software that is being constantly updated, therefore ensuring the integrity of the VMs 
is not straight forward. Furthermore, existing security measures relating to VMs focus 
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primarily on securing the data present within the VMs. There is a huge security requirement 
to develop controls to ensure confidentiality and integrity of the VMs itself. 
Jinpeng Wei et al. [118] presents a framework for managing VMs, this framework provides 
two benefits, first it reduces the risk relating to unauthorised access by employing access 
control mechanisms. Secondly, it applies filters to remove unwanted information within the 
VM. The filters mitigates the risks relating to publishing of unwanted information.  
Karger [119] and Sailer[81] presents various security architectures that can be used to secure 
the hypervisor. These techniques include usage of access control mechanism that allows for 
the compartmentalisation of the hypervisor. These techniques are focused towards coming 
up with an architecture that makes the hypervisor secure, whereas none of the architectures 
identify the security vulnerabilities that would come up when providing API level access to 
the introspective layer of the hypervisor.  
In [119] Karger, explains that there are two approaches to ensure the security of the 
hypervisor:  complete partitioning and isolation of resources of the VMs at the hypervisor 
level; and sharing of hypervisors, where I/O, memory and other resources are shared 
between the VMs. 
The approach of complete isolation is not useful, as the reason for using Cloud infrastructure 
is to provide cheap access to computing resources. In this approach only a small number of 
VMs can be provisioned for a single machine as resources cannot be shared between the 
VMs. This approach may only be useful for cases where there are large mainframes and the 
users want complete isolation of VMs. Relatively the security of the hypervisors would be 
high in this approach because of complete segregation of resources. Giving access to the 
introspective layer of the hypervisors in this case would be less risky. An adversary who gains 
control over one partition of the hypervisor would not be able to infect the other partitions due to 
the segregation.  
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 The second approach (sharing hypervisors) suits the Cloud scenario presented in section 2.4. 
Securing this approach is a much bigger challenge. Sailer[81][8] presents an architecture 
(sHype) which secures a Xen hypervisor using mandatory access control. The approach has 
little performance overhead.  The hypervisor sHype is advancement of Xen hypervisor; it 
controls all VM communication and secures the communication by using formal security 
policies. The sHype is designed to support security requirements like access control between 
VMs, isolation of virtual resources and resource control.  
sHype does not provide an API by which a programmer can update the security 
functionalities that are provided. The reason most probably is that, an adversary may exploit 
the API to infect with malware. As for VMware, the company provides API level access to its 
hypervisors. This enables developers to deploy customised software to tackle malware, 
Trojans and viruses. This functionality provided by VMware would enable the development 
of innovative security products for Cloud platforms. 
Another interesting challenge would be to apply the usage control model [13] to secure the 
access to data by VMs in the hypervisor. In sHype, a mandatory access control (MAC) 
mechanism is used. The MAC uses a security policy to ensure that the system security goals 
are accomplished regardless of system user. This is primarily because MAC is designed to be 
used by operating systems.  
MAC depends on objects and subjects to identify access. The control of access remains with 
the operating system, therefore this setting would not work with Cloud computing as in 
Cloud there are multiple VMs and multiple hypervisors.  
4.4 HYPERVISOR BASED INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (IDS) 
Our analysis in the previous sections has identified the introduction of malicious code as one 
of the most serious security threats. There are numerous techniques for anomaly detection. 
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Three techniques are widely used for detection of malicious code,namely static analysis, 
dynamic analysis and manual analysis.  
Static analysis[120] [121] [122] analyses the program code without executing the code. 
Though this technique is exhaustive, a benefit of this technique is that it consumes less time 
and covers all of the code compared to the dynamic technique. Static analysis primarily 
depends on tools that provide information about control flow and data flow. This 
information is primarily obtained from source code. There are products like Checkmarx Code 
Analysis [123] which provide this functionality to analyst to find vulnerabilities. In static 
testing there are no runtime request send to web applications and therefore runtime 
information is not analysed. 
Dynamic analysis analyses the code at runtime and only that part of the code is analysed that 
executes during runtime. Dynamic analysis is normally performed on virtual machines, as 
using standalone machines would mean having to reinstall the operating system after every 
test. The advantage of this technique is that it is non-exhaustive and only the code executed 
is analysed[124]. There are products such as Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner [125] which 
enables an analyst to perform vulnerability assessment on web portals. Major vulnerabilities 
that are identified by this technique are cross site scripting, SQL injection etc. 
The two techniques though are completely different but can be used in conjunction to 
complement each other [126]. Moreover, manual testing is another technique that is used 
by analyst to identify vulnerabilities. Manual testing is done by experts to compliment the 
automated tools that are used for penetration testing. Kali Linux[127] provide tools that are 
used by experts to perform manual testing.  
The static and the dynamic analysis are both performed on code that is either running or 
present on a machine or VM that the analyst has control on. The analyst performs the 
analysis using the widely available tools and techniques relating to the static or dynamic 
analysis. This approach and tools cannot be used directly in Cloud computing scenario where 
71 
 
it would be desirable from the hypervisor level which is owned by the IaaS to run analysis on 
VM which is owned by the customer. Although the security responsibility of the VM remains 
with the customer, from the IaaS perspective it would be highly desirable to ensure and 
provide extra level of security to the VM. For instance a VM infected with malware may not 
be able to recover to its un-infected state. The hypervisor should in this case perform an 
analysis to first identify a malware and then counter it. 
A research challenge is to come up with an analysis technique by which the malware patterns 
in the virtual machines can be analysed from the hypervisor level. In case a malware infects 
a virtual machine, then the malware has the same level of access rights as the guest OS. In 
case of the hypervisor, if the VM gets infected than the hypervisor can potentially detect and 
delete the malware without infecting itself.  
This research can lead to a novice technique where patterns on the VM can be analysed from 
the hypervisor level. The major benefit of the technique would be that when performing the 
analysis the hypervisor will not get infected itself. Furthermore, it would enable IaaS 
providers to provide the customers with an added layer of security for their VMs. 
A virtual machine monitor (VMM) [128][92] is a light software that runs directly on the 
hardware of a machine. The VMM virtualises all hardware enabling the virtual machines to 
transparently consume the resources of the physical machine. Hypervisors are closely linked 
with VMM [129] and often the term is interchangeably used.  
In [130] Garfinkel  describes a system (Livewire) by which the monitoring of VMs can be done 
by using VMM. Furthermore it also enables the limited detection of malware at VM. The 
system is based on the technique Virtual machine introspection (VMI). VMI is used to inspect 
the activities performed by a VM, by using the knowledge of OS level semantics. This 
knowledge enables the interpretation of events on the VM from the VMM level. Livewire is 
developed on top of the closed source hypervisor VMware[131]. 
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Intrusion sensing and introspection system (ISIS) [132] uses a different approach compare to 
Livewire, as it is developed as a component that can be added to a hypervisor system. In 
Livewire the hypervisor itself was extended. ISIS is built on a User mode Linux system in 
separate kernel address space mode (SKAS). ISIS use a system call Ptrace that enables one 
process to monitor and control another process. Ptrace also provides the ISIS the capability 
to modify kernel code at runtime. 
Livewire puts hooks on the VMM. ISIS puts hooks on the guest operating system kernel. 
However an attacker who has access to the kernel code can remove the hooks placed by ISIS. 
Both ISIS and Livewire are susceptible to attacks where an attacker modifies the code of the 
kernel without triggering an intrusion sensor [132].  
Both these approaches focus on monitoring and detection of intrusive patterns. They do not 
provide the capabilities of intrusion prevention, spreading and deletion of malware. A 
Prevention capability would require the identification of malware at the network level 
before it infects the VM. Spreading of the malware is a complicated problem, as it requires 
a mechanism by which the hypervisor stops the spreading of malware from one VM to the 
other, by blocking the network traffic. 
From our use cases (explained in Chapter 2), we deduce that the outsourcing of IT 
infrastructure to Cloud platforms would mean that different customers would be using VM 
running on the same hypervisor. From the perspective of the infrastructure provider it is very 
important to ensure that malware is detected well in time and that if one VM gets infected 
the malware does not spread to other VMs. 
We know that an attacker can modify the kernel code of the guest operating system which 
would disable systems such as ISIS and Livewire before they detect the attacker. The 
research challenge is to ensure that an attacker who has access to one VM does not spread 
malware to the other VMs on the hypervisor. Another challenge would be the understanding 
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of attack patterns. Knowledge of the attack patterns would increase the accuracy of the 
detection, therefore decreasing the number of infections. 
4.5 RISK MANAGEMENT 
The hosting of data on Cloud platforms and using computing services from the Cloud brings 
new challenges. The risks that a Cloud consumer is exposing itself to is different than 
scenarios where data and processing requirements are consumed locally. 
Furthermore, for the Cloud provider the requirement of provisioning appropriate resources 
at a certain point in time is also very important. The risk of not having enough resources  at 
the disposal of the Cloud provider can potentially cause major disruptions for its customers. 
This would mean loss of reputation and potential loss of business as well. In [133] a 
mechanism is developed using Bernouli’s theorem which is primarily used in the financial 
sector to predict liquidity (resource bank) risk. For Cloud computing the prediction about the 
resource bank becomes very important. The model proposed is quite interesting from the 
perspective that a Cloud provider can potentially predict the resource related risk that it is 
getting into and then can plan appropriately. 
In [134] a risk analysis is done for the hybrid Cloud model. The use of public Cloud is cheap 
but it comes with its security risks whereas the use of private Cloud is expensive, however, 
the security risks are much less. Therefore, a lot of the companies are opting for hybrid 
Cloud. In a hybrid Cloud setting, the companies would normally opt for private Cloud for 
critical data or services. At the same time they have the option to burst to public Cloud if the 
requirement exceeds the available supply. The paper analyses 21 different risks for the 
hybrid setting and then propose countermeasures. The paper however does not 
quantitatively measure the effectiveness of proposed countermeasures.  
From the analysis of the state of the art we deduce that there are open questions to be 
addressed on business driven risk associated with Cloud computing. There is requirement to 
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develop a framework that would take into account the security risk associated with Cloud 
computing platforms. This framework can enable a consumer to trust the Cloud provider 
more and therefore can lead to better adoption of Cloud services. 
4.5.1 RESEARCH GAP 
Research Gap 5 (RG5): The challenge of mitigating risk associated with hosting data on the 
Cloud or using Cloud services in general is a major cause of concern for enterprises moving 
to Cloud. To mitigate such risks there is a need to undertake research for the development 
of a risk framework for Cloud computing from a security perspective. This framework would 
enable the mitigation of risks associated with Cloud platforms.  
The requirement is there to develop mechanism through which the risk framework can 
gather information about different security controls such as firewall configuration, intrusion 
preventions system logs, traffic analysis etc. and then relate them with different risks such 
as hacking, data theft, denial of service etc. 
Furthermore, the requirement is also there to classify different threat categories. In order to 
raise the correct level of alert it is pertinent to first rate different threats and classify them 
appropriately. For the classification of risks, one needs to either develop a new threat 
analysis mechanism for Cloud computing or use the existing ones and tune them with respect 
to Cloud scenarios. 
Research also needs to be conducted in the area of mathematically calculating a risk, this 
calculation would then lead to raising the alert or not. For instance, if the firewall logs show 
that there might be a contamination, should this be treated as an alert, has the threshold for 
raising the alert breached or not. In a lot of other security software, so many alerts are raised 
that it is not humanly possible for the system administrator to study each of them and then 
act appropriately.  
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Therefore the next challenge would be to take actions based on the level of alerts that have 
been raised. In case the threat level has been raised and a risk is about to mitigate like denial 
of service. The risk framework could potentially switch part of the traffic to backup server to 
maintain quality of service at a decent level.  
The researcher has contributed to the ENISA paper on Cloud Security titled as ‘Cloud 
Computing: Benefits, Risks and Recommendations for Information Security’[70]. Moreover 
he has also participated in developing security controls for different certification of Cloud 
Security Alliance[135]. This research work has enabled the researcher to develop the ‘Cloud 
Security Framework’ which is detailed in Chapter 5. 
4.6 RESEARCH AGENDA 
In this section tools, technologies and models are discussed that  will be used to fill the gaps 
introduced previously. 
 
To fill the gap introduced in RG1, we  survey  secret sharing schemes such as Shamir’s secret 
sharing [136] and decide which ones are suitable. The fundamental requirement is that the 
scheme should be able to scale and offer fine granularity.  
In order to achieve the aim of automation of security services in Cloud computing scenarios 
as mentioned in RG2, there is a need for the development of a prototype that would simulate 
this automation. In order to achieve this task, work has started on understanding the current 
state of the art solutions relating to access control. One of the suitable solutions would be 
selected and it would be extended. In case none of the solutions is deemed useful to achieve 
our task then the development of a new tool that would simulate the automation would take 
place.  
For RG3, the challenge of synchronisation of access control policies is a new one and there 
is hardly any research work that has been conducted in this area. We therefore propose to 
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extend the scheme that we develop for achieving fine granularity and scalability in order to 
achieve concurrency.  
For RG4 all the systems that are analysed in section 5.2.2 that achieve fine granularity in 
distributed access control scenarios are built upon attribute based encryption (ABE).  The 
problem is that the ABE inherently induces cumbersome problems of user revocation and 
key management. Therefore it is proposed to take a step backwards and to approach the 
problem of fine granularity and user revocation for Cloud computing scenarios with a 
completely new approach. 
For RG5, the requirement is to first undertake a detailed threat analysis for Cloud platforms 
based on different Cloud scenarios such as the ones presented in Chapter 2. Once the threats 
relating to Cloud computing have been identified, it is then pertinent to develop a framework 
than can accurately raise alerts for threats that are going to or are materialising. 
4.6.1 RESEARCH OUTCOMES 
What follows are the proposed research outcomes for this thesis: 
1. Development of a scheme that would enable the enforcement of access control 
security policies on Cloud platforms ensuring scalability and confidentiality. This task 
is relevant to the research gaps RG1 and RG4. 
2. To deploy the tool for a project (OPTIMIS or Internal BT project) to perform security 
evaluation of the scheme with respect to the relevant case study. This task is relevant 
to the research gaps RG1 and RG4. 
3. Design and development of a security risk framework to analyse the risks associated 
with the Cloud computing platform. This task relates to RG5. 
4. Development of a security risk framework tool that would ensure the risk analysis 
could be performed for Cloud platforms. This task relates to RG5. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A SECURITY RISK FRAMEWORK FOR 
CLOUD COMPUTING 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This Chapter puts forwards a Security Risk Framework relating to the security challenges 
posed by the management of risk for Cloud computing environments. Furthermore, for the 
Security Risk Framework a detailed threat analysis of Cloud computing across its different 
deployment scenarios (private, bursting, federation or multi-Clouds) was undertaken. This 
Chapter fills the research gap 5 presented in Chapter 4.  
We also present a risk inventory which documents the security threats identified in terms of 
availability, integrity and confidentiality for Cloud infrastructures in detail for future security 
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risks. We also propose a methodology for performing security risk assessment for Cloud 
computing architectures presenting some of the results. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
In Chapter 4, we have identified a research gap relating to the development of a Cloud 
specific risk framework. In this Chapter we are addressing this research gap by proposing a 
Cloud based risk framework.  
Section 5.2 explains the motivation and presents the background for the security issues that 
need to be addressed in Clouds from the perspective of risk management. Section 5.3 puts 
forward the methodology adopted for developing the risk framework. Section 5.4 provides 
a systematic approach to threat analysis based on standard threats for distributed systems, 
adapted for Cloud computing. Initially the Threat and Vulnerability Assessment tool (T&VA) 
was used to identify threats and vulnerabilities in different Cloud scenarios. The data used 
to perform this analysis came from the Information Security Forum (ISF) and public data 
specific to Cloud computing security. Secondly the CORAS risk modelling methodology [9]–
[11] coupled with Information Risk Analysis Methodology (IRAM) to complete the risk 
assessment. Section 5.5 puts forward the high level analysis of each threat for the risk 
framework, and sections 5.6 and 5.7 explain the part of the risk framework where risk is 
evaluated and treated respectively.  
This research is exploited into a risk model for security and presented in Section 5.8 with an 
evaluation of the suggested methodology. The results have been based on the 
implementation work carried out in an EU-project OPTIMIS presenting analyses across 
different deployment scenarios.  
Finally Section 5.9 presents the conclusions of the risk modelling methodology and future 
research directions to adopt using it. 
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5.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MOTIVATION 
Computer and information security are concerned with ensuring the availability, integrity 
and confidentiality of information. Availability is concerned with the information being 
accessible when needed, whereas integrity refers to not allowing data to be modified 
without being undetected. Confidentiality is concerned with the disclosure of data to 
unauthorized personnel. Each of these aspects covers an integral part of security aspects of 
the infrastructure. In Cloud computing, security is one of the highest concerns as it can make 
or break deals by either convincing organizations to use or deferring its use on security 
concerns. Others [137] have identified policies and control, knowledge and performance 
management by using risk, audits, SLA monitoring and protection policies for Clouds. Threat 
analysis is a preliminary investigation to identify threats relating to cloud computing 
scenarios. Figure 6 depicts an example of the process relating to threat identification and 
protection. The protection techniques could be the deployment of a Firewall or IDS/IPS 
implementation etc. 
80 
 
Identify the threat 
(like data leakage)
Analyse the threat 
and vulnerabilities
Risk Assessment
Take corrective 
actions. Apply 
security mechanism 
(IDS/IPS, Firewalls 
etc)
 
Figure 6: Process for Security Threat Analysis 
The different Cloud deployment scenarios raise different kinds of threats depending on how 
the service executes on the infrastructures. These have been depicted in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7: Cloud Scenarios. (Private involves one deploying and one operating provider, 
Bursting - the operation provider can burst to another provider, Federation - a team of 
providers work together, Multi - the service can be deployed on a number of providers, 
acts as a broker) 
In the Cloud scenarios we present, there are two primary providers: operating provider and 
deploying provider. The deploying provider is responsible for deploying the Cloud services 
like deploying the hypervisor, operating systems, virtualisation and physical server 
deployment.  
The operating providers have their Cloud implementations deployed in the operational 
phase. The deploying provider would normally consume the operational providers in 
different scenarios like multi Cloud, federation, bursting and broker. 
5.3 METHODOLOGY 
This section presents the stages of risk relating to the operational and deployment phases of 
Cloud scenarios. The risks relating to security from operational and deployment perspective 
are different.  
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In the operational stage, the risks largely relate to security vulnerabilities present within the 
toolkit API’s and other portals which are exposed to the external parties. To mitigate this 
risk, dynamic and manual testing on the API’s and end points which are vulnerable should 
be undertaken.  
Risk analysis can be considered at various phases of interactions in Clouds (Figure 8). Each 
provider involved in the Cloud will have security concerns from their own point of view 
towards the others in terms of trust, service risks or legal issues. They might consider the risk 
of working with other providers or may have specific security demands that need to be 
honoured. These assessments also depend on the Cloud deployment scenarios - private, 
public or hybrid.  
 
Figure 8: Risk Assessment Lifecycle during Service Deployment/Operation[138] 
These concerns can also be refined depending on the stage of the Cloud lifecycle – 
deployment or operation. Risk needs to be assessed at service deployment stage for initial 
placement of services on Cloud providers, and the service operation, where Cloud resources 
and data are managed by the Cloud provider to fulfil the Service Level Objectives. During 
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deployment and operation stages, risk needs to be constantly monitored in order to prevent 
any additional costs to be incurred to the end-users and Cloud providers.  
The risk analysis methodology was developed as part of the OPTIMIS project, it was then 
used by different researchers to identify risks and mitigate them. However, the focus of this 
work remains primarily on information security. The reason why the methodology is 
mentioned here is to explain the process that was adopted to identify, assess, manage, plan, 
resolve and monitor risks. 
The monitoring part primarily includes running vulnerability assessment exercises on 
deployed and operational infrastructure at regular intervals to ensure that threats are 
mitigated. 
A number of stages have been identified for performing a complete risk assessment on 
Clouds by considering core risk assessment approaches as explained below: 
5.3.1 HIGH LEVEL ANALYSIS OF THE SYSTEM 
An initial high-level analysis of the deployment scenarios helps identify the actions and assets 
involved at the different stages in the Cloud. Generally security needs to be assessed before 
deployment of the service to check for security concerns of the other provider or if service 
level agreements (SLAs) demand certain security aspects to be met. During the operation, 
security concerns are monitored while the service is executing. 
5.3.2 IDENTIFYING THE ASSETS INVOLVED 
There are various assets involved either at the deployment or operation stage such as the 
SLA or customer data. These can be monitored in relation to the specific threats in the 
environment. To identify the relevant threats with respect to the scenarios of Cloud 
computing, we must undertake a comprehensive threat assessment. 
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5.4 THREAT ASSESSMENT 
In this section a detailed threat assessment is performed for the Cloud computing 
scenarios.  
5.4.1 METHODOLOGY 
Threat modelling is a systemic approach by which threats for and vulnerabilities of a system 
are identified [139]. We have chosen the Information risk analysis methodology (IRAM) 
coupled to the Threat and vulnerability assessment tool (T&VA)[12] to carry out threat 
modelling, because these already contains a threat model for distributed systems and 
software in general. We refined this model to adapt it to Cloud applications.   
In this approach we start with a classification of threats. We are using two sources of 
information for gathering information on attacks on IT systems. The first one is the 
information security forum which provides data about attacks on IT systems. They also 
provide the frequency of attacks and the year when the attacks took place. The second 
source is public data on attacks on the Cloud platforms Amazon EC2 and Google Apps Engine 
[28]. This contains articles, white papers and research articles. 
We combine these threat lists with additional threats identified within the scenario and the 
use cases that we presented in the previous section. 
For vulnerability assessment our approach is the same as for threat assessment. The only 
difference is that, because the use cases are not currently deployed, some information may 
be imprecise. This forces us to make a few assumptions about the vulnerabilities. We indicate 
those in the text. 
The T&VA tool provides a standard list of threats relating to IT systems, we have taken the 
threats from this list relevant to the use cases that we are working on. We have further added 
threats which are introduced due to the differences between Cloud computing and other 
85 
 
forms of distributed computing. The threats are Data Leakage, Usage Control and Hypervisor 
level attacks. We classify the threats into the following six categories: External attacks, Theft, 
System specific threats and abuse, Service interruption, Human error and System 
malfunction. These threats have been shortlisted from the threat list provided by the 
Information Security Forum.  
5.4.2 EXTERNAL ATTACKS  
We have identified twelve threats in this category starting from the ‘Carrying out of Dos 
(Denial of Service) attack’.  Amazon’s public Cloud offering EC2 came under DoS attack[140] 
that left part of its infrastructure unavailable for almost 16 hours. For the scenario that we 
are using the deployment of Cloud would be either publically available or use public 
infrastructure.  This threat is clearly of high relevance to the cases that we have presented.  
The second threat that we have identified is that of ‘Hacking’. Using audits such as that of 
SAS type 2 audit [44] and ISO 27001 [141] most of the current deployments introduce 
security features in the system that makes them harder to hack. Similarly we were not able 
to find any Cloud specific attacks with respect to hacking. But due to the nature of Cloud 
computing as a distributed system it remains susceptible to hack attacks. 
The third threat that we have identified is that of ‘Undertaking malicious probes or scans’. 
An attacker can use the publically available deployments of Cloud platforms to run scans and 
exploit network level vulnerabilities.  The ISF database shows a three-fold increase in this 
kind of attack between 2005 and 2009. 
‘Cracking password’, ‘Cracking keys’ and ‘Spoofing user identities’ threats remain relevant to 
the use cases as these threats can lead to the loss of confidentiality and integrity. Though 
the likelihood of these threats becoming vulnerabilities remain low according to the ISF 
provided data. Spoofing user identities can potentially be a challenge in the use cases that 
we have described especially the Cloud broker one (use case2); as multiple enterprises using 
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the broker to access infrastructure provider services requires the development of technical 
and legal safe guard for the protection of identities. The extension of an enterprise’s identity 
management system to a broker and to the infrastructure provider can open up a lot of 
security related issues.  We have already witnessed an identification of a severe security flaw 
in the Google Apps Engine which can be potentially exploited by a dishonest service provider 
(broker) to impersonate a user [62].   
‘Modifying network traffic’ and ‘Eavesdropping’ threats are classified by the ISF as very low 
level. We believe that due to the distributed nature of Cloud computing and multi layered 
deployment model, it would be easier for an adversary to exploit these threats. 
‘Distributing computer viruses’, ‘Introducing Trojan horses’ and ‘Introducing malicious code’ 
threats lead to the infection of Cloud platforms. In [142] attack services are defined in which 
Cloud platforms can be infected with malicious code. In [115] a malware is developed by 
which a very thin level hypervisor infects a virtual machine. This hypervisor is called Blue Pill 
and it can then be used to control the VM. The attackers claim that the malicious code 
remains 100% invisible to the VM and it does not exploit any vulnerability of the operating 
system it infects. 
In [76], we have witnessed that Amazon EC2 Cloud is used by an adversary to distribute spam 
which led to the banning of EC2 related IP addresses by anti-spam groups. We have identified 
‘Distributing Spam’ as one threat and according to the ISF database the SPAM related attacks 
are on the rise. In both the Cloud broker and Cloud burst use cases, an enterprise acting as 
an adversary can use the infrastructure provider’s resources to launch SPAM attacks. 
5.4.3 THEFT 
Cloud computing supports a notion of multi-tenant architecture, in which multiple users 
consumes the same computing resources. This can lead to the theft of data by an adversary. 
The threat ‘Theft of business information’ by either an internal employee or by a competitor 
87 
 
is very relevant to the Cloud brokerage use case as multiple enterprises will be using the 
broker and infrastructure provider to host  their enterprise related data. Google in its 
security data sheet[143] mentions that only references to the data are deleted rather than 
data itself. A potential adversary can use advance data recovery tool to recover data owned 
by other customers.  
The next threat that we have identified is the ‘Theft of computer equipment’. The likely hood 
of this threat being exploited is low from the data provided by ISF database. Companies like 
Salesforce [57][56] employ high end physical security measures to secure their data [57].  For 
our use cases is extremely useful to understand the physical security measure deployed by 
the large vendors and therefore lowering the risk. 
5.4.4 SYSTEM MALFUNCTION 
The ISF database classifies the threat of ‘Malfunction of software’ as high. Most of the Cloud 
software like CRM for Salesforce or Cloud APIs for EC2 are extensively used. Therefore a bug 
in anyone of them can have a very adverse consequence.  In our use cases we will consume 
APIs provided by these infrastructure providers therefore we should take into account 
necessary control to mitigate this risk. 
Malfunction is a mechanism, the threat that we are identifying in this section is the leakage 
of information due to system malfunction. 
The next threat in this category is that of ‘Malfunction of computer network equipment’. The 
likelihood of this threat materialising is high but as our use cases will deploy multiple backups 
of computing resources the impact will be low.  ISF classifies this threat as one of most 
frequent. 
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5.4.5 SERVICE INTERRUPTION 
One of the Amazon data centre was hit by lighting that led to suspension of part of their 
service [90]. ‘Natural disaster’ meaning earthquake, fires, extreme weather and flooding that 
can lead to the interruption of service. In both our use cases the dependence on 
infrastructure providers is high and therefore the interruption of service can take place. 
‘System overload’ means excessive system activity leading to the degradation of 
performance or failure. We have witnessed in[140] that the website Bitbucket that was 
hosted on the EC2 become unavailable due to a DoS attack. Although Cloud computing offers 
theoretically unlimited amount of computing resources but it still depends upon how you 
have configured your website and which availability zone the website resides in. On the 
contrary Wikileaks [144] used EC2 platform to host their website to protect against DoS 
attacks, as they were willing to pay for a high end package which means that even if their 
website is attacked it will still not become unavailable. In use case1 interruption in service 
can be picked up quickly as the enterprise is interacting directly with the infrastructure 
providers.   Use case2 would be difficult as an interruption in service can be either at the 
infrastructure provider or at the broker end. The problem becomes more complicated, as it 
is difficult for an infrastructure provider to determine whether there is genuine peak in 
demand or a Dos attack as they both may create similar patterns. 
 
5.4.6 HUMAN ERROR 
‘User error’ threat means mistakes made by users of the system. Infrastructure providers 
like EC2 have designed their system to be automated and there is hardly any human 
intervention, however they have no control over how users from enterprise or broker may 
use the system. ISF classifies this threat as high, although in the past few years the frequency 
of errors have come down but it still remains a high level threat. Google Apps Engine in its 
89 
 
SLA promises 99.9 percent for data availability but does not take responsibility for data loss, 
as most of it is because of human error [145]. Furthermore, the IT policy compliance group 
suggests that 75 percent of all data lost is due to user error [146]. ‘IT network staff errors’ 
means mistakes made by users who are responsible for maintaining and operating the 
system. ISF classifies this threat as very high. 
5.4.7 SYSTEM SPECIFIC THREAT TYPES 
‘Data Leakage’ is defined as the unauthorised transmission of data (or information) from 
within an organisation to an external destination or recipient. This may be in electronic form 
or by means of a physical method [147]. This threat becomes more critical in Cloud 
environment as now enterprises who are hosting their data on a Cloud have no control over 
the infrastructure provider‘s infrastructure. Therefore previously the threat was that it could 
be stolen by an internal employee but now it could be an internal employee or staff of the 
infrastructure provider. Even worse it could potentially be a competitor using the same 
infrastructure provider who is able to steal the data by using advance data recovery tools. 
For both our use cases this threat is high but it is more critical in the use case2 as data or 
identities can potentially be stolen at the broker level also.   
‘Usage control’ is a generalization of access control to cover obligation (requirements that 
have to fulfilled by the subject for allowing access) and conditions (subject and object 
independent environmental requirements) [13]. In Cloud specific environment where data 
from multiple enterprises may reside in the same Data centre, it is pertinent to build controls 
that would ensure that not only access to data is controlled but also that environmental 
factors are taken into account before allowing that access. Data will also be accessed by 
applications and regulating that access may require fulfilment of requirements from the side 
of the subject. A requirement from the enterprise can be that they want complete isolation 
of their data from any access from roles or applications that are being used by other 
enterprises. We classify this threat as medium as we have witnessed an attack in which 
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Google Docs marked as collaborative data from some users which led to disclosure and 
amendment of that data[148]. 
‘Hypervisor level attacks’ enable an adversary to exploit vulnerability at the virtualisation 
layer that is running underneath the virtual machines. There are numerous attacks that have 
been recorded at the hypervisor level ranging from the injection of malware to the hijacking 
of a VM by a thin undetectable hypervisor [149][115][150][151]. Therefore we have 
classified this threat as high. 
5.4.8 VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT 
The vulnerability assessment is based on four methods of analysis which are; the control 
analysis, environmental analysis, system analysis and technical analysis. For the technical 
analysis, we didn’t have the data available to conduct such an analysis, as our system is not 
currently deployed. The tool is organised in a manner that asks the user questions with 
regards to the deployment of the system, since our system is not deployed therefore we 
have answered the questions by using publically available data about similar deployments 
and by also making assumptions.  
For control analysis, we have covered a wide range of questions ranging from the creation 
of comprehensive security policy to the security related training of staff. There is a specific 
set of questions that relate to each vulnerability. Refer to Appendix B for the threat and 
vulnerability assessment report.  
Environmental factors affect the vulnerabilities of a system, these external factors includes 
economic growth, legislation, regulation and political stability etc. Compliance with 
regulation is one of the major environmental factors that we have identified. To prevent 
fraudulent activities, most of the developed nations have passed their own laws and 
regulations to protect data and ensure privacy. These laws are not specific to Cloud 
computing but they influence Cloud computing in many different ways. These laws vary from 
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country to country. For example in the United States the ‘sectoral’ approach to data 
protection legislation is preferred while EU follows the overarching government 
regulation[152][153]. We have also taken into account economic factor, such as the growth 
of sales of the Cloud related products. We have classified the vulnerability of the Cloud 
systems to be low if these systems are present in countries which have strict compliance 
laws in place.  
Vulnerabilities are not only affected by the weakness of controls but also ISF information 
security status survey suggest that characters such as complexity, number of users accessing 
the system and connectivity to the internet can increase the likelihood of a system 
experiencing an incident[12]. Most of the Cloud computing infrastructure use the internet 
to provide services to its customers and infrastructure providers such as Amazon experience 
high level of connectivity to their systems therefore increasing the chances of vulnerability 
being exploited. The complexity depends upon use case, for instance the level of complexity 
will be high in usecase 2 involves more actors and several levels of interaction. As for use 
case1 the interaction would mainly be between the enterprise and the infrastructure 
providers. 
For the overall ratings we have taken where possible the average of the results that came 
out from the analyses. 
5.4.9 RESULTS OF THREAT ASSESSMENT 
The final stage in the threat assessment process is to undertake an information risk rating. 
The information risk rating requires input from the analyst about the priorities that should 
be set for the assessment. For instance, threats relating to confidentiality would be higher 
than threats related with integrity. This information risk rating would then give scores to 
threats depending upon this input. 
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To create the information risk rating, we classify the threats of confidentiality as high, 
availability as medium and integrity as low. We classified confidentiality as high because loss 
of confidentiality can have a severe effect on trust and image of the provider. Moreover loss 
of confidentiality, can convert low threats like theft of business information is to very high 
because loss of unencrypted data is a more severe risk than loss of encrypted data. 
Loss of availability is relatively classified as medium compared to loss of confidentiality. The 
reason being that the impact was not as severe, for instance the Bitbucket website 
experienced a DoS attack on EC2 infrastructure [85] that led to suspension of their service. 
But they kept using EC2 after that, they have also reported further attacks on their website 
but are still using EC2[154].  
One of the reasons could be that, the kind of computation power provided by infrastructure 
providers like Amazon requires a lot of investment. Enterprises are better off using 
infrastructure provider’s resources rather than deploy their own. For instance, Wikileaks 
recently used the Amazon EC2 Cloud to host their website, when it was constantly attacked 
using DoS [155]. Later under USA government pressure the EC2 platform stopped hosting 
the website. This shows that if properly configured and enough resources are provisioned by 
an infrastructure provider then it is difficult to bring down a website using DoS attacks. 
We classified integrity as low because relative to confidentiality and availability the impact 
is much lower. Loss of integrity can be because of many reasons like software error, user 
error, and equipment failure and also due to an adversary changing the data. From the 
recorded attacks on Cloud platforms, we have only witnessed a reported incident relating to 
integrity. It was not very clear, what the actual reason of the integrity checksum failures was 
in the attack[156]. Furthermore, the VM uses in the Cloud scenario are started, restarted 
and redeployed on different infrastructures. Therefore, it further enhances the chances of 
them losing integrity due to errors. 
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Table 5 lists the various threats identified along with the stage of the Cloud lifecycle these 
threats may be active. The table also includes the classification of the threats in 
confidentiality, availability and integrity using the information risk rating. 
Table 5 has 5 columns, Column 1 provides an indication of the category of threat under 
consideration. These threat categories are obtained from the IRAM tool. Column 2 indicates 
the specific threat under consideration. This column also mentions the words AIC where A 
stands for availability, I for Integrity and C for confidentiality. Wherever the abbreviations A 
is mentioned it means that the threat only relates to availability.  Same is true for integrity 
and confidentiality. The column 3 indicates the stage of the Cloud deployment whether it is 
operation or deployment stage. The column 4 mentions the asset involved like ‘customer 
data’.  
The Cloud deployment scenario is column 5 relates to different scenarios like bursting, 
federation, multi Cloud etc. Column 6 mentions the priority that is linked with the asset. Now 
this priority has been declared in section 5.4.9. The assets relating to confidentiality are high 
priority (4 or 5), assets relating to availability are medium priority (3 or 4) and assets relating 
to integrity would have low priority (1 or 2). Column 5 is relating to likelihood which is the 
possibility of risk materialising. The likelihood rating has been added by the researcher 
himself using his own knowledge of the domain. No metrics exist that provide likelihood 
ratings of Cloud computing scenarios. 
There maybe cases were the priority of an asset would be high because it impacts 
confidentiality but the likelihood of a threat actually materialising would be low. The risks 
which have high priority and high likelihood are the one which have the highest impact. 
The threat numbers  (T1, T2, T3,…) in the table are those used by the IRAM tool. Some of 
the threats recognised by the IRAM tool are not relevant to Cloud computing scenarios and 
have been omitted from our considerations.  However, IRAM’s numbering convention has 
been maintained.
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Threat 
Categor
y 
Threats  (threat id) 
{Threat classification – 
Availability (A) 
Confidentiality (C) 
Integrity (I)} 
Stage of 
Cloud 
(Deployme
nt/Operati
on) 
Assets 
involved 
Cloud 
Deploy
ment 
Scenari
o 
Priority 
(1 is 
low, 5 
is high) 
Likeli
hood 
(1 is 
low, 5 
is 
high) 
External 
attacks 
Carrying out of Dos 
(Denial of Service) attack 
(T1) {A} 
Operation Customer 
data, 
infrastructure 
of the provider 
All 4 3 
Hacking (T2) {I,C} Operation Customer data 
or service 
All 3 1 
Undertaking malicious 
probes or scans (T3) {I,C} 
Operation Hypervisor 
code 
All 4 2 
Cracking password (T4) 
{A,I,C} 
Operation Customer data 
or service 
All 3 1 
Cracking keys (T5)  {A,I,C} Operation Customer data 
or service 
All 3 1 
Spoofing user identities 
(T8) (A,C) {A,C} 
Operation Customer data 
or service, all 
services 
All 3 1 
Modifying network 
traffic (T9)  {I} 
Operation Software, 
connections, 
service 
(runtime) 
All 2 2 
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Eavesdropping (T10)  
{I,C} 
Operation Software, 
connections, 
service 
(runtime) 
All 2 1 
Distributing computer 
viruses (T11)  {I} 
Operation Software, 
connections, 
service 
All 3 1 
Introducing Trojan 
horses (T12) {I}  
Operation Software, 
connections, 
service 
All 3 1 
Introducing malicious 
code (T13)  {C} 
Deploymen
t and 
Operation 
Software, 
connections, 
service 
All 3 3 
Distributing Spam (T15) 
{A} 
Deploymen
t and 
Operation 
Mailing lists All 1 4 
Theft Gaining unauthorized 
access to systems or 
networks (T16) {A,I,C} 
Operation Customer data 
or service 
All 5 4 
Theft of business 
information (T27)  {A,C} 
Operation Customer data All 4 2 
Theft of computer 
equipment (T29)  
{A,C} 
Operation Customer data All 1 2 
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System 
malfunct
ion 
Malfunction of software 
(T34)  {I} 
Operation Toolkit, all 
services 
All 1 4 
Malfunction of computer 
network equipment 
(T35) {I} 
Operation Toolkit, all 
services 
All 1 5 
Service 
interrupt
ion 
Natural disaster (T40) {I} Deploymen
t/Operation 
Customer data All 1 3 
System overload (T41) 
{A,C} 
Operation Customer 
data,  
All 4 3 
Human 
error 
User error (T42) {C} Deploymen
t/Operation 
Data All 5 3 
System 
specific 
threats 
and 
abuse 
Data Leakage (T50) {I,C} Operation Data  All 5 3 
Usage control (T51) Operation  All   
Hypervisor level 
attacks(T52) {A} 
Operation Data All 3 2 
 Data ownership (T53) {I} Deploymen
t 
Data All  2 
Data exit rights (T54) 
{I,C} 
Deploymen
t 
Data, SLA All 4 3 
Isolation of tenant 
application (T55) {I,C} 
Deploymen
t and 
Operation 
Data All 5 2 
data encryptions (T56) 
{A,I,C} 
Operation Data All 5 3 
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Table 5: Threats Identified in the Various Use Cases and their Details                      
Data segregation (T57) 
{A,I} 
Operation Data, 
programs 
All 4 2 
Tracking and reporting 
service effectiveness 
(T58) {A,I} 
Operation Data, Hosted 
VMs 
All 5 3 
Compliance with laws 
and regulations (T59) 
{A,I} 
Deploymen
t and 
Operation 
Data All 3 2 
Use of validated 
products meeting 
standards (T60) {A,I} 
Operation Data All 3 3 
Guest virtual machines 
(T61) {A,I} 
Operation Data All 1 3 
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5.5 HIGH-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF EACH THREAT 
Each of the threats can be further analysed in terms of who causes them and the incidents 
leading up to them, which can then be prioritized depending on this information. This 
also helps measure the impact of the security risk on the service and the providers. Figure 
9 depicts an example of the hacking threat and its related asset and vulnerabilities.  
 
Figure 9: Analysing the Threat Hacking 
5.6 RISK EVALUATION 
Depending on the priority of the assets and likelihoods of the threats occurring, the 
threat items can be plotted into an evaluation matrix to document their occurrences. 
Table 6 depicts this in relation to the threats identified in Table 5. 
Table 6 puts forward the consequences of a threat materialising and the impact that it 
would have consequently (Insignificant, Minor, Moderate, Major and Catastrophic). For 
instance take the example of T16, this threat has a very high likelihood and if it 
materialises the impact would be catastrophic. The reason for this is that it impacts 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of the system. Similarly if we analyse the threat 
T15, the likelihood of it materialising is high but the impact is insignificant. This threat 
relates to the distribution of spam therefore the impact on confidentiality, integrity and 
availability is low. 
The likelihood and impact rating is set using the data collected. The impact also denotes 
the affect the threat will have on the business such as loss of confidentiality can cause 
loss in trust having the highest impact (Table 7).  
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 Consequence 
Insignificant Minor Moderate Major Catastrophic 
Likelih
ood 
Rare  T40 T10 T2,T4,T5,T8, 
T11, T12 
  
Unlikely T29 T9  T3,T27  
Possible T41  T13 T1,T50 T51, 
T52 
Likely T15,T34    T16 
Certain T35     
Table 6: Risk Evaluation Matrix 
 Likelihood rating 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s 
i
m
p
a
c
 Very Low Low Medium High Very High 
Very 
High 
     
High Confidentiality  
Mediu
m 
Availability 
Low Integrity 
Very 
Low 
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Table 7: Range of Threats for Confidentiality, Availability and Integrity 
    
Threats belonging to confidentiality are classed as high because these have severe effect 
on trust and the provider's image. Loss of confidentiality can also convert low threats like 
theft of information to very high. For instance losing unencrypted data is a more severe 
risk compared to loss of encrypted data. 
Loss of availability is relatively classified as medium compared to loss of confidentiality. 
This is because enterprises are better off using infrastructure provider’s resources rather 
than deploying their own because of the investment involved. Examples include 
Bitbucket website continuing the use of EC2 even when further attacks are recorded. 
Integrity is classed as low because relative to confidentiality and availability the impact is 
much lower. Loss of integrity can be because of software error, user error, equipment 
failure and also due to an adversary changing data. From the recorded attacks on Cloud 
platforms [28], it is difficult to find the reasons for the threats, additionally the VMs can 
also be restarted and redeployed on different infrastructures to counteract these threats.  
5.7 RISK TREATMENT 
Once evaluated, the risk mitigation strategies can be generated in terms of the actions 
taken to resolve them. These can be to accept, treat or outsource the risk. For instance, 
in a situation of multiple log-ins, the system logs can be scanned to detect this. Once 
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observed the system administrator can be made aware to take appropriate action on the 
user account. 
5.8 IMPLEMENTATION 
Security risk assessment needs to be done at the service deployment and operation 
stages of the infrastructure provider's (IP) Cloud lifecycle. Figure 10 and 11 describe the 
architectural details of the risk components involved at deployment and operation stages 
of the Cloud lifecycle.  
 
Figure 10: Security Risk Assessment at the Deployment Stage of the Cloud  
At the deployment stage, the risk assessment tool will read inputs from the risk inventory 
which documents all the threats, the vulnerabilities, assets affected and their likelihoods. 
The risk inventory is based on the threats collected in Table 4. Our risk calculations will 
use the priority and likelihood values from Table 5.  
We now briefly explain the risk calculation algorithm used by the assessment tool. 
Suppose that both A and B are events; (B|A) is the likelihood of event B given event A has 
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occurred. For example, suppose that event B represents ‘data leakage’ and event A 
represents ‘network intrusion’. If we know that ‘network intrusion’ has taken place, (B|A) 
is the likelihood that data leakage will occur. These dependencies are defined by the 
Bayesian theorem. 
The risk calculation algorithm is given below: 
Security_risk_deployment (usecase) 
1. Calculate the total number of threats recorded at deployment stage = N 
2. For each threat:  
           a. Calculate likelihood of event B when event A has occurred = L= (B|A) / 5.0 
           b. Calculate relative priority of asset under threat =RP = Asset Priority / 5.0 
           c. Calculate likelihood of event B regardless of asset under threat and event A = (B) 
           d. Calculate risk index of threat = R = L * RP / (B)   
3. Calculate security risk  = SR = Sum (R) / N = Sum of risk indices of all threats divided by 
number of threats found 
 
Based on rules of Bayesian dependencies, the probability of each threat affecting the 
particular assets can be calculated. For each threat the risk index is calculated by firstly 
finding out the likelihood of an asset affected 2(a). We already know that the likelihood 
stays between 1 and 5.  
2(b) is relating to the asset priority of the asset under threat. As explained before the 
priority is dependent on confidentiality, availability and integrity where confidentiality is 
high, availability is medium and integrity is low. We already have data for priority which 
is coming from Table 5.  
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Step 2(c) of the above equation is the likelihood of event B without taking into account 
the asset. The assets could be customer data or hypervisor code etc. This likelihood is 
independent to other events for instance from Table 5 we can deduce that the likelihood 
of “Carrying out a denial of service attack” is 3. 
2(d) puts forward the risk associated with this threat. This is done by multiplying the 
likelihood of event B given event A along with the priority of the asset under threat, to 
get the impact. We now divide the impact with the likelihood rating of the threat.  
To give an example, the likelihood of customer data being compromised could be 4 as 
per Table 5. Then ‘L’ = 4/5 = 0.8. Similarly, we then take out priority of the asset which 
for instance in this case would be RP = 4/5 = 0.8. Multiplying this number with ‘L’ and 
dividing it with likelihood of event (B) gives us the risk index of the threat. 
Once we have calculated the risk indices of all the threats occurring, we can then sum all 
of these threats together to come to a number. For instance, we come to the number 5. 
In case our system finds 4 threats at the time of deployment then security risk for the 
system would be 5/4 would be 1.25. Risk in this scenario is calculated as a threshold 
factor rather than a probability. This threshold factor enables us to take decision on 
taking a mitigation action or not. 
As long as the security risk remains more than 1 take no action. The action is taken by 
admin of the Cloud who is alerted in case a threat is going to be materialised. If it becomes 
less that one, it means that an alert should be raised, mitigation action needs to be taken 
place. This is the deployment stage so if the risk is less than 1 then we should address the 
threats before we move on to the operational stage. 
We developed this mechanism using our experience as at times there are threats which 
are false alarms. In case the number of threats found is too high, the Security Risk would 
become less than 1 and an alarm would be raised. 
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Figure 11: Security Risk Assessment at the Operation Stage of the Cloud  
However, at the operation stage, along with the calculated security risk for this stage, the 
risk assessment tool will be interacting with the monitoring database and additional tools 
like the network and historical database to monitor if certain threats are becoming live.  
The historical database can contain details of previously recorded threats that have 
occurred in the past. The network can include intrusion detection systems and logs which 
can be parsed to find out if certain events have been recorded [103].  
We now continue with the description of the algorithm with the focus on the operations 
stage. We have taken the value of security risk (SR) from the deployment stage algorithm 
and will consume it in the operations stage algorithm to deduce relative risk (RR).  
Security_risk_operation(usecase) 
3. Security risk = SR (Calculated at deployment time) 
4. For each threat to be monitored: 
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     4a. Read monitoring inputs 
     4b. If (event found == true) Event count ++ 
5. Calculate Event Rate = ER = Event Count / Time Monitored 
6. Calculate relative risk = RR = ER / SR 
7. If RR <= 1 do nothing, If RR > 1 apply mitigation strategy 
In the operational stage presented above, the security risk (Step 3) was calculated during 
the deployment stage and now we are using is in the operational stage. In step 4, the 
monitoring inputs like the dynamic analysis being run on operational end points will point 
to potential threats evolving. Step 4b is a counter which increments every time a 
potential threat is being found. Step 5 calculates the total event rate, which is the total 
number of threats found divided by time monitored (time is in minutes). For instance, if 
5 threats were found in 2 min this will give us the value 2.5. For relative risk we already 
have the value of security risk which was 1.25. Now if we calculate relative risk, RR comes 
out to be 2, therefore a mitigation action is required. 
Depending on the value of relative risk (RR), the components can make a decision 
whether to accept or apply a mitigation strategy stored in the risk inventory to 
compensate for the risk. The risk is mitigated during the same time period.  
Figure 12 shows the output of 20 simulated samples collected while executing the risk 
model during the operation phase. Depending on the event rate per sample the relative 
risk can be calculated according to the algorithm step 6. If the relative risk is less than 1, 
the software can choose to accept the risk but if higher, the mitigation strategy will get 
activated which may ask for human intervention as the risk is going high. It is pertinent 
to mention here that relative risk is not calculated as a probability but rather a threshold. 
It is a relation that exists between security risk calculated at the deployment stage and 
event rate found at the operational stage.  
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Figure 12: Calculating Relative Risk using Samples and Event Rates. An Action is 
taken when Relative Risk is more than 1 
The figure above shows the relative risk where the value goes over 2. As we have 
explained before the risk is not calculated in the traditional manner. We calculate RR to 
understand the co-relation between potential threats occurring compare with a specific 
threat. For this we set the threshold of 1 whenever the value 1 is breached there is 
requirement to take action. These calculations should not be taken in the traditional 
sense that risk cannot be more than 1. The data for the above calculation originates from 
a simulator which was run for the OPTIMIS project. The simulator calculated the values 
using the formulas explained above.  
The simulator was implemented using Java code, it was part of the ‘Security Risk 
Framework’ for OPTIMIS project. The simulator has four main parts, the first one is the 
monitoring database. The monitoring database is used to hold information relating to 
potential risk coming up in the assets relating to the OPTIMIS toolkit. These assets are 
networks, computers, servers etc. 
The second part of the simulator is the risk inventory where all the vulnerabilities, threats 
and assets are registered. This part of the simulator provides the risk framework the 
ability to find out which are threats are related to which assets. 
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The third part is the historical database which provides information about threats and 
their severity from a historical perspective. For instance, the threat of ‘data leakage’ is 
high and the likelihood is high as well. This information will be used to calculate the 
impact. 
The fourth part of the framework is the code which runs a Linux server. It orchestrates 
the whole process that has been explained before. The details of the code refer to the 
index for code of the ‘Security Risk Framework’. 
5.9 CONCLUSION 
From the threat analysis performed, we have shown that the information security 
principles of integrity, confidentiality and availability are most relevant to the Cloud 
related scenarios. The information risk ratings performed shows the loss of 
confidentiality is rated as the highest level of risk followed by availability and integrity.  
The risk model presented here allows monitoring threats based on the events being 
logged by the detectors leading to a calculation of the relative risk. However, a fine 
grained analysis needs to be performed on threats which are difficult to detect via certain 
events or have a cause and effect relationship to other threats. These may be more 
specific to confidentiality or integrity classifications of the threats. Further future work 
includes testing this system on a Cloud platform with monitoring agents installed which 
will log certain threats when they occur. This will then be extended to work on determine 
threats which may be eventually seen based on the data being collected and difficult to 
determine directly from the events. Finally, the results from the testing and evaluation, 
advocate that the risk model does correctly assess and prioritize the risk. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SECURING SCALABLE VIDEO IN THE 
CLOUD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
Scalable video using Cloud computing is a potential solution for the distribution of media 
content to a large number of users. This may occur over a heterogeneous network 
connected to devices with different capabilities and diverse set of users.  Although some 
of the problems are well known and understood in information and network security, 
there is still a need to improve the existing solutions to produce a solution that is both 
adequately secure and efficient in highly distributed and scalable environments. In this 
Chapter, we describe such improvements using a Cloud computing scenario where video 
content is made available through a Cloud platform.  
The author has published a patent [157] which explains in detail the authentication and 
encryption of scalable video in the past. The patent came out of MSc thesis submitted by 
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the author at the University College London. This work is an extension of the prior 
research work.  
When put on an Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) Cloud video content should then be 
viewable by different consumers using different levels of bandwidth and security 
requirements depending on their identity. This requires a mechanism through which a 
Cloud service could be authenticated and encrypted by end users. This Chapter describes 
the novel solution of securing scalable video in the Cloud discussing the various threats 
for video distribution and how these can be made more secure in terms of confidentiality, 
availability and integrity, particularly through source authentication and encryption. 
Scalable video is a form of distributing media, as Cloud computing paradigm is built 
around large number of users accessing a centralized service, the scalable video scenario 
fits very well within the Cloud computing paradigm. In this case, where the broadcast 
medium is a video, it is imperative that the data owner ensures the authenticity, integrity 
and the confidentiality of the broadcasted video. This requirement does not only conform 
to the basic compliance requirements but is also necessary to get any economic return 
on the video that is broadcasted to prevent any copyright violations.  
Presently, it is increasingly popular to broadcast media such as pay-per-view or 
subscription video over the Internet but this lead to various security problems. One main 
practice to secure the video is broadcasting it as encrypted files. This allows only the 
paying subscribers to access the video, and the non-paying parties not being able to view 
the content. Conventional encryption techniques, such as those used for satellite 
broadcast TV, are often based on the premise that each subscriber is likely to be a long 
term subscriber and may invest in new hardware such as a set top box to subscribe to 
encrypted channels. In such circumstances it may simply be possible to provide a shared 
encryption key to each subscriber, changing the key at regular intervals.  
However, there are new problems arising with models of Internet video distribution 
where subscribers may wish to subscribe quickly to watch a single video and then 
unsubscribe immediately thereafter. For considering subscription services, it is desirable 
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for the provider of the encrypted video system to prevent any former subscribers from 
being able to decrypt the video with any past distributed keys provided during their 
subscription periods. It is also imperative that non-subscribers do not have access to the 
broadcasted video.  
Key chains can be used as security tokens for accessing data. Various methods can be 
used to process key chains such as TESLA[158] that can interlink keys in a manner where 
the last element authenticates the first element of the next key chain. Digital signatures 
are only used at the start of the first key chain, with all subsequent chains interlinked in 
such a way that using digital signatures at the start of the each key chain is not required. 
This Chapter discusses the various threats involved for video distribution from the 
perspective of using Clouds to distribute scalable video. It focuses on the three aspects 
of security- confidentiality, availability and integrity – showing how these can be 
influenced in these scenarios discussing each in detail.  
This research work in this chapter is focused around the research gaps of RG1 and RG4. 
The RG1 research gap is to do with providing scalability and confidentiality in Cloud 
computing scenarios. Also this work links up with the research gap RG4 which identifies 
the problem of user revocation in Cloud computing scenarios. 
6.2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
To cater for the needs and capabilities of end users over various heterogeneous 
networks, scalable video is a potential solution for the distribution of media content. 
Scalable Video packets are divided into two parts. The first part is called the base and 
contains video information that is of low resolution and quality. The second part is called 
the trail. This part has video packets which are used to enhance the resolution and quality 
of the video. 
Broadcasting of video is carried out by a video server with scalability servers appearing 
between the video server and the end-users. The job of the scalability servers is to 
truncate the trial part of the video packet with respect to the bandwidth requirements 
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and the capabilities of end-users. Trial truncation decreases the quality of video received 
by end-users. 
Previous work for scalable video has looked at encryption, key distribution protocols and 
authentication in video scenarios. Apostolopoulos et al. [159] have discussed a 
mechanism which encrypts scalable video packets. In [160], the focus of their work was 
to find the most efficient symmetric encryption algorithm with which video packets could 
be encrypted. The authors analyzed AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) and Triple DES 
(Data Encryption Standard) showing that for Triple DES, the overhead is between 2-2.5% 
and for AES it is 7%. [161] presents an idea of progressive encryption also using scalable 
video. Even if intermediary servers truncate scalable video packets, decryption will still 
be possible. The BIBA signature scheme [157] works by using self-authenticating values 
that are linked with a public key. So given a public key, it is not possible for an adversary 
to compute the self-authenticating values also known as seals.  
However, in all of the prior work no explanation is given on how the keys will be 
distributed in a scalable video scenario for encryption. Additionally various assumptions 
are made such as assuming the sender and receiver will already have the keys for 
encryption. Blakely[162] has discussed the concept of secret sharing among various 
users. An example explains the m-out-of-n threshold secret sharing scheme which allows 
for a secret message M to be distributed as a selection of n shares {s1,…,sn}. This allows 
two properties to be achieved (i) any collection of m shares is able to reconstruct the 
secret message M; and (ii) Any subset of (m - 1) or less shares reveal no information about 
M. 
 
6.3 TESLA 
TESLA (Timed Eﬃcient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication) is the protocol used for 
authentication having low communication and computational overhead, scaling to large 
number of receivers. Its main advantage is the use of key chains. TESLA [158] uses the 
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initial part of the authentication key by securely sending it and then subsequently the 
rest of the keys are authenticated. 
The main idea of TESLA is that one uses a symmetric key to compute a MAC value at a 
time when they alone only know the key. In the next time slot the key is made public to 
all other parties who carry out the authentication. In this way, parties carrying out the 
authentication know for sure the true identity of the user which computed the MAC. 
Without this time delay, everybody would have the symmetric key and could have 
computed the MAC. 
In TESLA, the users who receive a message at time i and the key at time i+1, need to be 
able to verify that the key they received at time i+1 is a valid key that belongs to the user 
that has sent it. For this they use key chains. The sender starts by generating a random 
key km. From this a chain of keys is computed by applying a hash function h.  
The end of the chain (k0) is distributed to all the receivers in a secure manner, such as by 
using digital signatures. The security of the protocol depends upon the last part of the 
key chain which is k0. At time t=1, the sender sends k1 (which was used to compute a 
MAC in time slot 0) to all the receivers, they verify that it is the correct key by verifying 
that h(k1) = k0.  
In this case, they are assured that k1 is indeed the correct key. This continues for all the 
keys, until the root (km) is used, and a new key has to be generated and distributed.  
Using one way chains is advantageous for authenticating a packet without much 
overhead in terms of computation and bandwidth usage. 
 
6.4 SCALABLE VIDEO 
As seen from [163] scalable video enables the recipient of the video to reconstruct lower 
quality video from lower bits. The packet of the scalable video has got two parts, base 
and trail. The more the trail part is truncated the lower the quality of the video is. If only 
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base part is received then the quality of the video is lowest. This enables recipient of the 
video with different network limits to receive the same video but of different quality.  
6.5 SECURITY ISSUES ON THE CLOUD IN GENERAL 
To overcome the hurdles of security, the UK government has proposed to promote the 
use of open source software as part of its G-Cloud program for delivering ICT to emerging 
suppliers [164]. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) group has 
proposed a list of security risk and mitigation for a lifecycle to be followed for performing 
risk assessment[165] discussing the certification and accreditation for threats in 
accordance with the government laws analysed per stage with a detailed analysis [166]. 
For a scenario of subscription services, it is important that the broadcast video will only 
be transmitted in an encrypted manner. This work only considers the base component of 
scalable video packets as being encrypted. This allows for a simpler system with less 
information being encrypted whilst still providing the system with the security 
requirements. This is because without the decrypted form of the base layers no video 
could be obtained from the trail layers alone. 
6.6 THREATS AND ASSETS THAT NEED TO BE PROTECTED 
 
Figure 13: Security Triangle 
Security can be broken into three main aspects (figure 13) which cover it, namely – 
availability, which means data is available when needed, integrity, which means the data 
is not modified without being detected and confidentiality for the disclosure of data to 
unauthorised parties. Unlike normal grid computing, using Clouds presents additional 
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threats to be considered for security reasons. For instance, data access is not a huge 
threat on grids, but in Clouds, because the data is hosted geographically at different 
locations, this is an important factor. This is particularly relevant in terms of video 
broadcasting as videos can be delivered as similar files on the Cloud. Therefore the main 
hub holding the video data needs to consider the geographical location and the access 
rights to it, for safety of the data. Various authentication models can be introduced to 
make each threat more secure as a mechanism to overcome them. Khan et al. [138] have 
discussed the six main categories of threats that can summarise all the kinds of threats 
that Cloud Computing faces summarized in Table 8 [167]. 
Clouds involve a three stage process namely – pre-deployment, deployment and 
operation. 
 
Figure 14: Service Lifecycle for Scalable Video  
Distributing video over the Cloud involves a number of stages (figure 14). During the pre-
deployment stage, the video is set up on the video server and encryption keys are 
generated with user subscription being set up. During deployment, the keys are 
encrypted and sent across.  
 
Threat Category Specific to Cloud scenario 
External attacks  
 
Threats to Confidentiality, Integrity and 
Availability. Includes all kinds of threats for public 
use. Examples include hacking attacks. 
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Threat Category Specific to Cloud scenario 
Theft 
Threats to Confidentiality, Integrity and 
availability. Cloud computing supports multi-
tenancy using same resources which causes threat 
to data hosted on the infrastructure.  
System 
malfunction 
Threats to integrity. Some software used 
extensively on Clouds has bugs or malfunctions. 
Service 
interruption 
 
  
 
Threats to availability, integrity and 
confidentiality. Unavailability of service or data 
due to DoS attacks. Natural disasters can cause 
this as well. 
 
Human error Threats to confidentiality. No control on how 
vendors use the system. This is difficult to control 
and may not directly apply to video distributing. 
System specific Specific to user. May not apply directly to video 
broadcasting. 
Table 8: Threats Categories 
 
Table 11 discusses in detail a full list of threats that should be monitored in terms of video 
distribution. The values for likelihood and priority of the assets were taken from the IRAM 
tool which has been used previously for Cloud computing scenarios. Learning from the 
past experience of undertaking risk assessment of Cloud scenarios priorities were set. 
Depending on the priority of the assets, the likelihood (Table 9) and the priority of the 
threats can be assessed. This can produce a likelihood and impact rating. The impact 
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shows how this threat may also affect the business of video distributions (Table 10). More 
information on this analysis is provided in section 6.10. 
 
 Consequence 
Insignifi
cant 
Minor Moderat
e 
Major Catastr
ophic 
Li
ke
lih
o
o
d
 
Rare   V5, V12, 
V9, V11 
V2,V4, 
V10, V6 
V18  
Unlikely V15, 
V19 
V7  V14, V21, 
V22 
 
Possible V17  V20 V8, 
V13,V23 
 
Likely V16    V1 
Certain      
Table 9: Risk Evaluation Matrix 
 Likelihood rating 
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 Very 
Low 
Low Medium High Very 
High 
Very High      
High Availability  
Medium Confidentiality   
Low Integrity   
Very Low      
Table 10: Range of Threats for Confidentiality, Availability and Integrity 
Some of the threats which do not apply to the video broadcasting scenario, from the 
general Cloud Computing scenarios are as follows: 
 Isolation of tenant application. Affects integrity, confidentiality and does not 
apply to video broadcasting.  
 Data encryptions. Applies to all three availability, confidentiality and integrity 
and is already covered in the key authentication process during the pre-
deployment process. 
 Data segregation. Affects the availability and integrity also does not affect 
broadcasting issues. 
 Tracking and reporting service effectiveness can be given by customer review 
and end-user experience affecting the credibility of the server. 
 Compliance with laws and regulations of copyright issues, contract breach. 
Affects the confidentiality and integrity of the business during the pre-
deployment stage. 
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In the scalable video scenario, threats belonging to availability are high priorities that 
need to be protected, because they affect the business integrity of the video servers. DOS 
attacks to the hypervisor are the most common threat. The next highest threats would 
be the confidentiality for the user data paying for the service. Integrity of the service is 
classed below the above two which relate more to the business impact of the video 
server because of the software errors and equipment failure.  
6.7 AUTHENTICATION METHODOLOGY  
The solution is divided into two parts source authentication and source encryption. In 
source authentication, the video is authenticated by the subscribers. The source 
encryption, the video is decrypted. Furthermore, the process of key management will be 
explained for the scenario. 
Figure 15 shows the system architecture with all the entities and their communication 
interactions. 
The system is composed of four different entities – the Video Server, Scalability Servers, 
Subscribers and a Key Distribution Centre (KDC). 
The Video Server is hosted on the IaaS Cloud where the source of the video gets 
encrypted and then broadcasted. A MAC is also appended to encrypted video packets, so 
that they can be authenticated by Subscribers. TESLA will be used to provide 
authentication in the system. The video is then broadcast to the Scalability Servers. The 
Video Server also generates keys that will be used for video encryption. These keys will 
be given to the KDC through a secure channel such as TLS or IPSec.  
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Figure 15: System Architecture Application Scenario  
Scalability Servers role can be taken up the Service Provider from the Cloud computing 
perspective. The Service Provider would use IaaS Cloud infrastructure to host the video. 
The Scalability Server hosted on the Service Provider would receive video from the Video 
Server on the IaaS Cloud. Scalability servers truncate video packets relative to the 
bandwidth requirement of Subscribers to which they will forward the video.  
The Key Distribution Centre plays a pivotal role in the whole system. The KDC can be 
hosted on the Broker, where the Broker ensures that it distributes keys related to 
authentication and decryption keys to all subscribers. It interacts with the Video Server 
to get the keys and also authenticates new incoming subscribers to the network. 
The Subscribers are the end users of the system who receive the video. They also 
authenticate the source of the video using the extended TESLA authentication protocol. 
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6.8 SOURCE AUTHENTICATION AND ENCRYPTION 
Figure 15 describes the process of authentication of broadcast video being carried out. 
Authentication is needed so that end users can verify the identity of the video 
source[157].  
Different steps are required in the overall authentication process carried out by the video 
servers. These include the generation of a first authentication key, generation and 
storage of a key chain using one or more one way functions and use of these keys for the 
authentication of broadcast video data. Key chains are created by following the TESLA 
protocol using suitable time intervals and appropriate one way hash functions. 
6.8.1 AUTHENTICATION OF VIDEO PACKETS 
The process of authenticating video packets originating from a video server is the 
following. 
A first key Ki is generated by the video server. This may be generated randomly and can 
be of a predetermined length. Next, a one way hash function F is used to generate the 
next key Ki-1 where Ki-1=F(Ki). As F is a one way hash function, it is very difficult to 
determine Ki from Ki-1 but it is easy to generate Ki-1 from Ki provided F is known.  
The remainder of the key chain is then generated by further applying the one way hash 
function F until a final key K0 is generated. The function F is applied i times to generate 
K0, so K0=F(K1)=Fi(Ki). Each key can thus be generated from previous keys through 
application of function F an appropriate number of times.  
Consequently, all the keys in a key chain K can be generated from Ki, but Ki cannot be 
calculated from any other key. This is because one-way functions are used. As a result Ki 
will remain secret and unshared until it is revealed.  
Using the properties of key chains it is easy to verify that different keys belong to the 
same key chain e.g. checking that a key Ki -x is indeed the xth key in a key chain can be 
done by checking that Fx(Kx)= K0.  
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6.8.2 INITIAL AUTHENTICATION SETUP 
All the keys in the key chain K, their order and the hash function F are stored in memory 
on the Video Server. The final key K0 is then sent to the Key Distribution Centre using a 
secure path which can be achieved using TLS, IPSec. The video server also determines a 
time scale for using key chain K and determines the time intervals with which it will move 
from using the final key K0 to each further key along the chain. 
The KDC then calculates the maximum time intervals at which recipients should receive 
a video packet from the video source with a given key based on the time periods 
calculated by the video source and adding the expected time delay to reach the recipient. 
The recipient can be scalability servers and/or subscribers depending on the 
implementation.  
Where both scalability servers and subscribers authenticate, different maximum times 
will typically be calculated for each based on any assumed or determined knowledge of 
communication paths. The maximum times for different subscribers can also vary 
depending on network paths with which subscribers are connected. 
The video server also generates a message authentication code (MAC) using symmetric 
encryption and final key K0 to authenticate video packets. This MAC is attached to a base 
video packet and transmitted to scalability servers. A counter is also started for the 
number of keys sent and is set at “n=1”. The final key K0 is sent by or requested from the 
KDC using a secure asymmetric system such as IPSec. The recipient of video packets can 
then check that the KDC and the video server correspond by decrypting the MAC using 
the final key K0 and using the secure asymmetric protocol or authentic channel prevents 
a third party from transmitting this information. The hash function F is also provided to 
the recipient and/or is stored at KDC and requested when needed. The hash function F 
can be provided to the subscriber by saving it or hard coding it into the subscriber end 
devise rather than transmitting it remotely. This option reduces the likelihood of a third 
party gaining access to the hash function. 
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6.8.3 SUBSEQUENT AUTHENTICATION STEPS 
After a period of time, the video server generates a second MAC using the next key along 
the key chain in the “revealing” order which on first application is key K1. This is then 
attached to a scalable video packet and transmitted to recipients. After the 
predetermined length of time which may be time delay d, no video packets from the 
video source will use the first MAC calculated from key K0. The latest key used for 
creating a MAC, in this case K1, is also sent to the recipients by the video server or KDC.  
The recipient then decrypts the MAC using the key - in this case K1, and checks that the 
message is correct. The recipient then applies the hash function F to the latest key K0, 
the appropriate number of times (which in the first case is once) and checks that this 
results in the final key K0. The recipient also checks that the time at which the video 
packet was received was done so within a time from receiving the base packet that is less 
than or equal to the maximum time allowed for that particular recipient calculated and 
stored by the KDC.  
On subsequent times the importance of checking the time delay becomes clear. Once a 
key Kn is revealed to recipients, any third party posing as a recipient, that knows the one 
way hash function can generate all keys below Kn on chain K. In practice a recipient may 
temporary loose contact with the video server by intention or through missed data 
packets. A third party which may have received these packets can then use the keys to 
fool the recipient that packets from the third party using these keys are authentic. This is 
prevented by the time delay check since after a period of time the video source will no 
longer use a key Kn and the KDC will inform the recipient that a given key Kn was received 
outside the maximum time delay and is therefore not to be trusted. Accordingly this 
TESLA chain uses time to produce asymmetry and therefore security, even though the 
keys and encryptions are symmetric. It also has the advantage that when intermediate 
values in the chain are not received, all keys can be authenticated from the final key K0 
and the correct number of applications of function F. 
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6.9 CASE STUDY: GENERATING KEYS FOR USER ACCESS 
In this section we describe a method for generating and updating keys for the encryption 
of video broadcast from a video source in our scalable video scenario. Our method uses 
secret sharing as this prevents a single user or a group of users to know the value of 
encryption keys. This allows the system to be more secure, preventing non-users or 
former users from learning new values of encryption keys when these are updated. 
The process of updating keys will use the method of secret sharing [136]. This will allow 
for the encryption key to be split into a number of shares each of which will be distributed 
over the different subscribers. This is done to ensure the secrecy of the encryption key. 
In the case, the encryption key of the video broadcast needs to be changed, the KDC will 
communicate with each of the subscriber devices about this. The corresponding 
information will also be sent to each of the devices. The new encryption key can then be 
reconstructed by groups of participants interacting between them. 
6.9.1 INITIAL SETUP 
Upon initial setup, the KDC will carry out a grouping of all the subscribers. For each of the 
new subscribers the KDC stores details of the group to which they belong along with a 
hash function specific to the hardware of the subscriber service hardware. The KDC will 
also store the share and hash function each subscriber hardware stores in memory. 
The KDC will then carry out a secret sharing of the encryption key which will be used for 
the encryption of the video to be broadcast. For each of the subscriber groups a different 
secret sharing of the encryption key will be carried out using an n-out-of-n secret sharing 
scheme – with n denoting the number of subscribers in a subscriber group. 
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Subscriber1
KDC
Registration
Address
Phone
Bank Details
Subscriber2
Subscriber3
Subscriber4
Group1Group2
Key Split
Key 1Key 2
Hash Function
Group Membership Assignment
 
Figure 16: Use case diagram for the video encryption using secret sharing 
The Figure 16 explains that various process using the UML format that takes place relating 
to subscriber registration to distribution of hash functions and group membership 
assignment. 
The KDC proceeds to send the following to the broadcast server and each of the 
subscriber hardware in an authenticated manner using digital signatures. 
The KDC informs the broadcast server in an authenticated and encrypted manner the 
value of the encryption key to be used for encrypting the video to be broadcast. 
In parallel, for each subscriber group the KDC sends a single share of the encryption key 
to each of the subscriber hardware (from the corresponding secret sharing of the 
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encryption key) sending each share only once. The KDC also informs each of the 
subscriber hardware the other subscribers which belong in the same subscriber group. 
After this, the subscribers can interact between them (outlined in the next section) in 
their appropriate subscriber groups in order to reconstruct the encryption key which will 
allow for the encrypted video to be decrypted (figure 17). 
The minimum number of subscriber associated with each group should not be less than 
10. We came up with this number because it will be hard (financial perspective) for an 
adversary to find out the keys of each of the subscriber. An adversary would have to 
spend substantial amount of resources in finding the key parts which is not financially 
feasible as it would be better for him to just pay for the service. Moreover, the encryption 
key will be updated every 24 hours even if no subscriber leaves the system. Therefore, it 
would be useless for an adversary to find out the decryption key as it would be useless in 
24 hours when it would be updated. 
Figure 17 demonstrate the process of user registration and assigning of key shares to 
each subscriber.  
Subscriber KDC
Registration details send to KDC (Address, Phone, Bank Details)
Broadcast Video 
Server
Generate Key
Assign Hash Function and Group
Select Hash Function from a group of hash functions  for the Subscriber
Assign group to the subscriber
For each new subscriber
User authentication pass
Send encryption key to broadcast server
Broadcast video using the new key
 
Figure 17: Sequence diagram for the subscriber registration 
126 
 
6.9.2 UPDATING ENCRYPTION KEYS 
Updating of encryption keys occurs when a subscriber leaves the service or when a new 
subscriber enters the service. The encryption key may also change whenever the KDC 
deems that an alteration of the encryption key is necessary, for example when a period 
of time has passed without the encryption key being altered. As explained before, we 
recommend that key should be updated every 24 hour at least. 
When a key needs to be updated, the KDC sends a digitally signed signal to each of the 
subscribers that a key update will be carried out. Each of the subscriber hardware then 
proceeds to carry out a hash of the share (of the previous key) stored in memory. As the 
KDC knows the hash function and share stored on each of the subscriber hardware, the 
KDC can do the same and thus be aware of the result of this hash operation. 
For group sizes where the total number of subscriber are not large (50 or above), it would 
be required to generate hash functions that can be associated with subscribers. We 
understand that dozens of hash functions are readily available like SHA0, SHA1, SHA2, 
MD5, Skein, Keccak, Radiogatun and their extended flavours. For cases where the 
requirement is to have 50 or more hash functions, it would be required to develop a 
function that can produce hash functions. Moreover, for this scheme where scalable 
video is broadcasted, we envision that the group sizes would be limited to geography 
therefore group sizes would be between 10 to 20 subscribers each. Therefore the 
requirement is not there for our current scheme to develop a function that generates 
hash functions. 
The KDC will proceed to select a new encryption key and carry out a n-out-of-n secret 
sharing of the key for each of the subscriber groups (where n denotes the number of 
subscribers in a subscriber group). The KDC also sends in a secure manner the new 
encryption key to the video broadcast server. Figure 18 presents the system setup. 
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Figure 18: System Setup  
 
For each subscriber the KDC calculates the difference between a share si of the new key 
(using each share only once from the corresponding subscriber groups and secret 
sharing) and the result of the hash operation rh corresponding to the subscriber. The KDC 
thus calculates di = si - rh which is authentically sent to the corresponding subscriber. The 
KDC also stores the new share which corresponds to each of the subscriber hardware. 
Upon receiving this value, the subscriber hardware calculates the new share value (si = 
di + rh over a finite field). 
If there have been any changes to the original subscriber groups, the KDC also informs 
the appropriate groups of the alterations. If the key update occurs because a new 
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subscriber enters the system, the new subscriber hardware is primarily sent a random 
value – a hash function will originally be present in the subscriber hardware.  
After the hardware of all subscribers have calculate the new share values, the subscriber 
groups can interact between them so that the new encryption key can be calculated. The 
figure 19 demonstrate the process that is used when a user revocation takes place. 
Old 
Subscriber KDC
Existing 
Subscribers
Send encryption key to broadcast server
Update key shares using hash functions
Subscription no longer valid
Update key shares using hash function assigned to each subscribers
Generate new key based on the hash functions
Broadcast 
Video
Broadcast video using the new key
 
Figure 19: Sequence diagram for user revocation and new key generation 
6.9.3 GROUPING OF SUBSCRIBERS 
A group of subscribers can be anything appropriate to the application setting. A group of 
subscribers could be all the subscribers within a town or neighbourhood for example. As 
the secret sharing of the key is done using an n-out-of-n protocol. This means that the 
shares of all subscribers in a group need to be pooled together to reconstruct the 
encryption key. We thus assume that the set top boxes of all subscribers are always 
available to carry out the appropriate actions for the reconstruction of any new 
encryption keys. 
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As explained before the total number of subscriber for this setup should be no less than 
ten. However, the size of the group is dependent on other issues such as the total number 
of subscribers and total number of subscriber in that geographic location etc. A group 
with only one subscriber cannot exist as this would fail at the registration phase. 
Moreover, groupings are done by the KDC, therefore it has control over who gets in which 
group. 
6.9.4 SECURITY OF VIDEO ENCRYPTION  
The method of updating encryption keys is secure against any non-paying subscribers to 
view content for free. Security here refers to a level of security which to be broken 
requires non-paying subscribers to carry out enough effort (to learn encryption keys) 
equivalent in value to the subscription fee of the service. In this sense, the cost of learning 
the secret encryption key and paying the subscription fee are equivalent. 
There are two different types of non-paying subscribers – the non-subscribers of the 
service and the former subscribers of the service, and prove the security of the system 
for each. 
For the security of the system against non-subscribers, the non-subscribers were never 
part of the service and are not aware of any of the encryption keys or share values. The 
non-subscribers can listen to the communication of subscribers. Due to the key update 
scheme that is used, they only thing that will be learned are corrections sent by the KDC 
upon old shares held by each subscriber. As the secret sharing used is a n-out-of-n 
scheme, this means that such an attacker to the system would have to listen in on the 
traffic of all the subscribers of a particular group.  
Additionally, even if the attacker was able to listen to the traffic of all the subscribers in 
the group this would not permit them to learn the encryption key. This is because the 
attacker is not aware of any of the original share values that are present in the memory 
of subscriber’s set top boxes. Because of this, no matter what information the attacker 
may listen to and as the secret sharing of the key is carried out using a n-out-of-n secret 
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sharing scheme, this stills allows for all the encryption keys to be possible. The encryption 
key is thus kept secret against such kind of attackers. 
For the security of the system against former subscribers of the service, the security is 
guaranteed because of the n-out-of-n secret sharing scheme of the encryption key. Using 
t as the number of former subscribers, that are attacking the system and assuming in the 
worst case that they are working together, the encryption keys when all these former 
subscribers were part of the service were secret shared using a (n+t)-out-of-(n+t). 
Because of this and assuming that these t former subscribers learned the value of the 
encryption key, this means that the set of t attackers know t+1 points (or shares) of the 
polynomials used in the secret sharing of an encryption key. Using this information, the t 
attackers (assuming they have infinite computing power) can find the q(n-1) possible 
polynomials that could have been used in the secret sharing of the encryption key – 
where q denotes the size of the finite field used in the secret sharing schemes.  
For each of these polynomials, the attackers can learn the shares of all the non-attacking 
subscribers. Assuming that the value of q(n-1) is very large and even if the attackers of 
the system were able to listen to all the incoming traffic of the n paying subscribers, this 
would still leave all the possible encryption keys as potential keys when a key update 
occurs. As a result of this, the attackers do not learn the encryption key used and thus 
the system is secure. 
6.9.5 MATHEMATICAL FORMALISATION 
In this section an example is provided of how mathematically a key will be calculated 
using the protocol explained above. The example is for three key shares between three 
subscribers. 
In order to keep the example simple the KDC will make a group key and divide it into 
three parts. The generalized equation for the secret sharing is as follows: 
D(x)=a0+a1x+ a2x2+…+ak-1 x k-1+ akxk---------(1) 
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The KDC will make an equation by which it will calculate the shares, for example the 
equation can be: 
D(x)=a0+a1x+ a2x2    ----------------------------------------------(2) 
The equation will be set by the video server initially. But afterwards it will be calculated 
on the basis of the shares values that come out after applying the hash functions: 
Now using equation 2: 
D(x)=1+2x+ 3x2 -----------------------------------------------(3) 
The above equation is of the second order and it will be made by the KDC. We are taking 
3 here as an example only. 
Now the KDC will calculate the three shares which will be: 
D(0)=1 
D(1)=1+2(1)+ 3(1)2 = 6    
D(2)=1+2(2)+ 3(2)2 = 17    
D(3)=1+2(3)+ 3(3)2 = 34   
 
Now the secret shares will be: 
(1, 6) plus Hash function F1 
(2, 17) plus Hash function F2 
(3, 34) plus Hash function F3 
Whereas D(0)=1 is the group key and if we put all the three shares together, only then 
we will be able to get the group key. The three shares will then be sent to the KDC along 
with the group key. Now the KDC will assign each subscriber with one share of the secret. 
In this case there will be only three subscribers. In order for them to get the secret key 
out they will have to collude together. So two of the subscribers will send their secret to 
the third subscriber who will now know of all the secrets. What it will not know are the 
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hash functions of the other two subscribers which will stop it from generating future keys. 
The following equations will be used by the third subscriber to get the key out, 
a0+a1+ a2  = 6 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------(3) 
a0+2a1+ 4a2  = 17 ----------------------------------------------------------------------(4) 
a0+3a1+ 9a2 = 34  ----------------------------------------------------------------------(5) 
In order to get the group key out the subscriber S3 will 3,4,5  simultaneously 
a0 = 6 - a1+ a2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------(6) 
substituting 6 in 4 ad 5 
we get a2= 3 and a1= 2 
we put the above values back in 6 we get the group key which is  
a0 = 6 – 2 – 3= 1 
So 1 is the group key. 
The third subscriber S3 will then send the group key to all others in the network which in 
this scenario are S1 and S2. 
Now let say that the subscriber S3 leaves the network and a new subscriber comes in the 
network S3` taking its place. But since S3 knew the group key, so it is now needed to 
update the group key. The S3` will get all the information from the KDC. It will be given 
the secret shares which S3 used to have-that were (3, 34) and hash function F3. The KDC 
will send a signal to all the subscribers that the group key needs to be changed so each 
subscriber using its own share of the key and hash function will generate a new share 
secret or part of the key. All the new shares will then be sent to S1, so that it would be 
able to compute the group key.  
We will choose the subscribers sequentially so second in term will be S2 and then S3 so 
on and so forth.  
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The same procedure will be applied at the broadcast server end as well, but since it knows 
all the secret and corresponding hash functions. It has the option of doing all of this in 
advance and then storing them rather than calculating the keys on the fly.  
Now let say that the subscribers passed the old values that were assigned to them to 
their respective hash functions and they get new values, we assume that they will get the 
following values: 
Subscriber S1---------- F1(6)=10 
Subscriber S2---------- F2(17)=18 
Subscriber S3---------- F3(34)=28 
Where ‘F’ is the respective hash functions assigned to subscribers by the KDC. Hash 
function can MD5, SHA1, SHA2 etc. 
Now using the above shares subscriber S1 will calculate the new group key as follows: 
a0+a1+ a2  = 10  ------------------------------------------------------------------------(7) 
a0+2a1+ 4a2  = 18 ----------------------------------------------------------------------(8) 
a0+3a1+ 9a2 = 28  ----------------------------------------------------------------------(9) 
From 7 we get  
a0  = 10– a1– a2 -------------------------------------------------------------------------(10) 
substituting 10 in 8 and 9 we get  
a1 = 5 
a2 = 1 
putting a1 and a2 in 10 
we get the group key which is 
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 a0  = 10– 5– 1=4 
Therefore, 4 is the group key that will be used by the video server to encrypt and the 
subscriber will use to decrypt. The thing to notice here is that without any communication 
between the video server and the subscribers, the key has been changed successfully. 
6.9.6 ‘TABLE 11’ DESCRIPTION 
Table 11 lists the various threats identified along with the stage of the Cloud lifecycle 
these threats may be active. The table also includes the classification of the threats in 
confidentiality, availability and integrity using the information risk rating. 
Table 4 has 5 columns, the threat category column mentions the threat category that is 
being analysed. The threat categories are coming from the IRAM tool that was used to 
do the threat and vulnerability assessments. Columns 2 of the table mentions the threat 
itself like ‘Hacking’. This column also mentions the words AIC where A stands for 
availability, I for Integrity and C for confidentiality. Wherever the abbreviations A is 
mentioned it means that the threat only relates to availability and same is true for 
integrity and confidentiality. The column 3 mentions the stage of the Cloud deployment 
whether it is operation or deployment stage. The column 4 mentions the asset involved 
like ‘customer data’.  
The Cloud deployment scenario is column 5 relates to different scenarios like bursting, 
federation, multi Cloud etc. Column 6 mentions the priority that is linked with the asset. 
Now this priority has been declared in section 5.4.9. The assets relating to confidentiality 
are high priority (4 or 5), assets relating to availability are medium priority (3 or 4) and 
assets relating to integrity would have low priority (1 or 2). Column 5 is relating to 
likelihood which is the possibility of risk materialising. The likelihood rating has been 
added by the researcher himself using his own knowledge of the domain. No metrics exist 
that provide likelihood ratings of Cloud computing scenarios. 
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There would be cases were the priority of an asset would be high because it impacts 
confidentiality but the likelihood of it actually materialising would be low. The risk which 
have high priority and high likelihood are the one which have the highest impact. 
The threat numbers that are mentioned in the table are coming from the IRAM tool and 
therefore would be inconsistent as the researcher has omitted numerous threats which 
are not relevant to the Cloud computing scenarios. 
6.10 CONCLUSION 
This work presents how one can secure a video broadcast subscription service in the 
Cloud computing setup. The scalable video scenario is built on top of an IaaS Cloud and 
shown how the video can be encrypted and authenticated efficiently. We have also 
presented a secure key management protocol for the updating of encryption keys used 
for the encryption of the broadcast video. The key management protocol is efficient and 
secure - preventing a large number of attackers from breaking the security of the system. 
Some of these results were also presented in [157]. A number of threats that need to be 
monitored are identified and the assets they affect to give a risk assessment methodology 
of these threats. Future work will focus on calculating the time delay and efficiency 
affecting the setup of the video broadcasting and predicting how this will affect the 
performance of the video distributions process.  
The above research work has been published in the IEEE International Conference for 
Internet Technology and Secured Transactions (ICITST-2013) [168].  
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Confidentiality (C) 
Integrity (I)} 
t/ 
Operation) 
is 
high) 
Extern
al 
attack
s 
(V1.) Carrying out of 
Dos (Denial of 
Service) attack {A} 
Operation Broadcasting server 5 
 
4 
(V2.) Hacking {I,C} Operation Customer data, 
comprising service, 
company reputation 
3 1 
(V3.) Undertaking 
malicious probes or 
scans {I,C} 
Operation Hypervisor code, virtual 
machine, video server 
4 4 
(V4.) Cracking 
password {A,I,C} 
Operation Customer data or 
service 
3 1 
(V5.) Cracking keys 
{A,I,C} 
Pre-
deployment, 
Operation 
Customer data or 
service 
2 1 
(V6.) Spoofing user 
identities {A,C} 
Pre-
deployment, 
Operation 
Customer data or 
service data, all services 
3 1 
 (V7.) Modifying 
network traffic{I} 
Operation Software, connections, 
service, video streaming 
(runtime) 
2 2 
(V8.) Eavesdropping 
{I,C} 
Operation Software, connections, 
service (runtime), video 
streaming 
4 3 
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(V9.) Distributing 
computer viruses {I} 
Operation Software, connections, 
service, broadcast is 
usually patched with 
security modes 
2 1 
(V10.) Introducing 
Trojan horses {I}  
Operation Software, connections, 
service 
3 1 
(V11.) Introducing 
malicious code  {C} 
Deployment 
and 
Operation 
Software, connections, 
service, not through 
video easy to, broadcast 
is controlled 
2 1 
(V12.) Distributing 
Spam{A} 
Deployment
, Operation 
Mailing lists, server lists 2 1 
Theft (V13.) Gaining 
unauthorized access 
to systems or 
networks {A,I,C} 
Operation Customer data or 
service, extract data 
from the video 
4 3 
(V14.) Theft of 
business information 
{A,C} 
Operation Customer data 4 2 
(V15.) Theft of 
computer equipment 
{A,C} 
Pre-
deployment, 
Operation 
Customer data 1 2 
Syste
m 
(V16.) Malfunction of 
software {I} 
Pre-
deployment, 
Operation 
Toolkit, all services 1 4 
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malfu
nction 
video server, end-user, 
because of the key 
generation 
(V17.) Malfunction of 
computer network 
equipment {I} 
Pre-
deployment, 
Deployment
, 
Operation 
Toolkit, all services, 
video server, 
malfunction during the 
key generation will 
affect the broadcasting 
of the video and the 
server  
1 
 
3 
  
Servic
e 
interru
ption 
(V18.) Natural 
disaster {I} 
Pre-
deployment, 
Deployment
, Operation 
Customer data, video 
server 
4 
 
1 
(V19.) System 
overload {A,C} 
Operation Customer data, video 
server 
1 2 
Huma
n error 
(V20.) User error {C} Pre-
deployment, 
Deployment
, /Operation 
Data 3 3 
Syste
m 
specifi
c 
threat
(V21.) Data Leakage 
{I,C} 
Operation Data, Video data 4 2 
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s and 
abuse 
 (V22.) Data 
ownership {I} 
Pre-
deployment, 
Deployment 
Data relates to video 
rights 
4  2 
(V23.) Data exit rights 
{I,C} 
Pre-
deployment, 
Deployment 
Data, SLA relating to 
copyrights 
4 3 
Table 11: Threats Identified in the Various Use Cases and their Details for Video 
Distributions                     
 
Figure 20: Flowchart  Scenario 
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CHAPTER 7 
ACCESS CONTROL AND DATA 
CONFIDENTIALITY IN CLOUD 
COMPUTING (ACDC3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.1 THE SCHEME 
We propose the scheme Access Control and Data Confidentiality in Cloud Computing 
(ACDC3) which fills the research gaps 1 and 4, the details of the research gaps are present 
in Chapter 4. ACDC3 is a scheme that guarantees confidentiality of data even when it is 
stored on an un-trusted third-party network while being scalable at the same time.  
The fundamental idea is that we decouple the fine grained access control with data 
confidentiality in order to achieve scalability. These two mechanisms are thus considered 
separate requirements.  
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The explanation of the scheme is divided into two parts: (1) how scalable data 
confidentiality is achieved on the Cloud, (2) how we achieve scalable fine grained access 
on the Cloud. Note in particular that the scheme ensures that no re-encryption is required 
when users are revoked. The data confidentiality part is divided into two embodiments 
of the proposed scheme. 
This research work was filed by the BT IP Department in the form of two patents to the 
EU Patent Office and US Patent Office. BT’s reference number for the patent is Europe 
A32311 [169] [170]. 
7.2 BACKGROUND 
With the advent of Cloud computing, issues of data access and data confidentiality are 
becoming of more and more importance. In particular the provision of secure network 
file storage and access control to ensure that the right users can access the right files is 
critical to many organisations. Whilst historically “firewall” type solutions were 
employed, where access control to the actual storage systems themselves was 
implemented, in many Cloud computing scenarios the storage systems themselves are 
untrusted, and it is therefore the ability to access data within such untrusted systems 
that is now of importance.  
As described by G. Ateniese, K. Fu, M. Green, and S. Hohenberger[91] in “Improved proxy 
re-encryption schemes with applications to secure distributed storage,” in Proc. of 
NDSS’05, 2005, proxy re-encryption allows a proxy to transform a ciphertext computed 
under Alice’s public key into one that can be opened by Bob’s secret key. There are many 
useful applications of this primitive. For instance, Alice might wish to temporarily forward 
encrypted email to her colleague Bob, without giving him her secret key. In this case, 
Alice the delegator could designate a proxy to re-encrypt her incoming mail into a format 
that Bob the delegatee can decrypt using his own secret key. Alice could simply provide 
her secret key to the proxy, but this requires an unrealistic level of trust in the proxy. 
Instead, therefore, Alice computes a re-encryption key from Bob’s public key, the re-
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encryption key being a function that converts incoming mail intended for Alice and 
encrypted with her public key into a form that permits decryption by Bob’s private key. 
Alice then provides the re-encryption key to the proxy, which re-encrypts the incoming 
mail, and passes it to Bob. Bob can then decrypt the mail intended for Alice with his 
private key. 
Several proxy re-encryption schemes are described in the Ateniese paper, specifically 
section 3 thereof, any details of which necessary for understanding the present invention 
being incorporated herein by reference. Ateniese et al also comment that proxy re-
encryption has many exciting applications in addition to previous proposals for email 
forwarding, law enforcement, and performing cryptographic operations on storage-
limited devices. In particular, according to Ateniese et al. proxy cryptography has 
application to secure network file storage, and they describe a specific file system which 
uses an untrusted access control server to manage access to encrypted files stored on 
distributed, untrusted block stores, and that uses proxy re-encryption to allow for access 
control without granting full decryption rights to the access control server.  
In the Ateniese file system, end users on client machines wish to obtain access to 
integrity-protected, confidential content. A content owner publishes encrypted content 
in the form of a many-reader, single writer file system. The owner encrypts blocks of 
content with unique, symmetric content keys. A content key is then encrypted with an 
asymmetric master key to form a lockbox. The lockbox resides with the block it protects. 
Untrusted block stores then make the encrypted content available to everyone. Users 
download the encrypted content from a block store, then communicate with an access 
control server to decrypt the lockboxes protecting the content. The content owner 
selects which users should have access to the content and gives the appropriate 
delegation rights to the access control server. 
The content keys used to encrypt files are themselves securely encrypted under a master 
public key, using a unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme of the form described in 
the Ateniese paper. Because the access control server does not possess the 
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corresponding secret key, it cannot be corrupted so as to gain access to the content keys 
necessary to access encrypted files. The secret master secret key remains offline, in the 
care of a content owner who uses it only to generate the re-encryption keys used by the 
access control server. When an authorized user requests access to a file, the access 
control server uses proxy re-encryption to directly re-encrypt the appropriate content 
key(s) from the master public key to the user’s public key. 
Operation of the proxy re-encryption file system of Ateniese is shown further in Figure 
21. Here, the user’s client machine fetches encrypted blocks from the block store. Each 
block includes a lockbox encrypted under the master public key. The client then transmits 
lockboxes to the access control server for re-encryption under the user’s public key. If 
the access control server possesses the necessary re-encryption key, it re-encrypts the 
lockbox and returns the new ciphertext. The client can then decrypt the re-encrypted 
block with the user’s secret key, to obtain the symmetric content key encrypted therein. 
The symmetric content key is then used to decrypt the content of the data block. 
Ateniese et al. therefore provide an access control server storage scheme where much 
of the security relies on the strength of a provably-secure cryptosystem, rather than on 
the trust of a server operator for mediating access control. Because the access control 
server cannot successfully re-encrypt a file key to a user without possessing a valid 
delegation key, the access control server cannot be made to divulge file keys to a user 
who has not been specifically authorized by the content owner, unless this attacker has 
previously stolen a legitimate user’s secret key.  
However, Ateniese et al. take absolutely no account of the issue of revocation of user 
access rights to the data. In their scheme, the symmetric content key that is used to 
encrypt the data stored in the block store is passed to the end user, via the proxy re-
encrypted lock box. Once the end user has obtained the symmetric encryption key, it can 
then continue to access the data in the block store encrypted with this key (because the 
block store itself has no access control). In order to prevent this access it would be 
necessary to re-encrypt the data in the block store. However, in this respect in typical 
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Cloud computing scenarios there would be numerous infrastructure providers all 
providing services to millions of data consumers. It is simply not possible to re-encrypt 
data every-time a user has his or her access revoked. This is because there would be many 
data consumers who would be having their access revoked in a very short span of time, 
and hence there would need to be more than one re-encryption operation taking place 
at once. It would therefore be very hard if not impossible to keep track of which data was 
encrypted with which key.  
In view of the above, there is a still a clear need to provide data access control schemes 
for network stored data which are able to effectively control data access whilst taking 
into account the possibility for user access rights to be revoked. 
 
Figure 21: Prior Art 
7.3 SCENARIO 
The scenario can be better understood by taking into account the example of medical 
records being hosted on the infrastructure provider. In this example a medical centre 
would be the data owner whereas the data consumers are the patients, nurses or doctors 
accessing the data. The medical centre is using the infrastructure provider to host data 
on the Cloud. According to the health insurance and portability act (HIPPA) [53] it is a 
requirement for all medical centres to ensure the confidentiality of data when the data 
is hosted on infrastructure provider. Furthermore commercial offerings such as the 
Amazon S3 and the GoogleDocs cannot be trusted with data that is of commercial or of 
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confidential nature. In this scenario data can only be hosted on these infrastructure 
providers when appropriate confidentiality and authorisation controls are there. 
This section presents the parties involved in the protocol. The system is composed of the 
following parties: 
 Data Owner 
 Data Consumers  
 Infrastructure provider 
 Trusted authority 
The data owner owns the files stored at the infrastructure provider. The Data owner is 
responsible for encrypting these files. The data owner resumes control over the VM or 
the machine that is hosting the trusted authority by control we mean that the data owner 
is the only one that has administrative level access over the operating system. The 
physical infrastructure may be controlled by the provider but as long as the machine that 
is hosting the trusted authority is not compromised then the scheme is secure. The data 
owner has full read and write access on the files stored at the infrastructure provider. 
The scenario has two main parts. The first part is when the data owner wants to transfer 
data to the infrastructure provider. The second part is that of when data consumer wants 
to access data hosted on the infrastructure provider. 
In the first part, the following steps are taken by the data owner, 
1. The data owner encrypts data using keys which are only known to him at that 
time.  
2. The data owner then transfers data to the infrastructure provider. 
3. The encryption that is done by the data owner is one time encryption and there 
is no need for the data owner to update data when keys or users get revoked. 
4. The data owner is also responsible for the issuance of re-encryption keys to the 
trusted authority. 
5. The data owner also sends the final part of the key to the data consumer. 
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In the second part the data consumer takes the following steps, 
1. The data consumer sends a request to the trusted authority that it wants to access 
data on the infrastructure provider. 
2. The infrastructure provider then performs access control checks. 
3. If permission is granted to access the file stored on the infrastructure provider 
then the trusted authority sends request to the infrastructure provider to fetch 
the file. After receiving the encrypted file, the trusted authority then performs re-
encryption of the file using re-encryption keys given to it by the data owner. The 
trusted authority uses a proxy re-encryption scheme (see Ateniese) to achieve the 
objective of data confidentiality on the Cloud. The trusted authority could reside 
at the infrastructure provider where the data is hosted or at another 
infrastructure provider. It could also be an independent entity in the scenario. The 
trusted authority requires substantial computing power as it would perform the 
re-encryption of data.  
4. The trusted authority then forwards the file to the data consumer. 
5. The data consumer then sends request to the data owner to fetch the final part 
of the key.  
6. After receiving the key from the data owner the data consumer then performs 
the decryption of the file. 
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In figure 18, the architecture of the scheme ACDC3 is shown. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Scenario of ACDC3 
7.4 EMBODIMENTS OF THE SCHEME 
Two embodiments of the invention will now be described. In both the embodiments’ 
data is stored in an encrypted form in a network storage facility, by a data owner. In order 
to allow access to the data by a third party for instance the data consumer, it is stored at 
the network storage facility (Infrastructure Provider). The proxy re-encryption of the data 
stored in the network storage facility is done by a trusted authority. This operation 
converts the data into a form where it can eventually be decrypted by the data consumer. 
However, the protocols of each embodiment are such that without the proxy re-
encryption by the trusted authority it would not be possible for the data consumer to 
decrypt data obtained directly from the network storage facility, even if having been 
previously provided with a decryption key from a previous operation. This therefore 
allows for access control to be administered by the trusted authority, and for user access 
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rights to thereby be revoked without the user still being able to access and decrypt to 
plaintext data stored in the network storage facility.  
In more detail, the data stored at the network storage facility is encrypted with one or 
more layers of encryption, one of which is an asymmetric encryption layer using the 
public key of the data owner. In order to allow this layer to be removed, the data owner 
provides a trusted authority with a re-encryption key, to re-encrypt the data so that the 
data owner public key encryption layer may be removed. The target of the re-encryption 
may be the requesting data consumer (for example where the data owner public key 
encryption layer is the only encryption applied to the data) in which case the re-
encrypted data may be passed to the data consumer, who then decrypts it with his 
private key. Alternatively, where more than one encryption layer is used with the data 
(for example, a symmetric encryption, followed by the data owner public key encryption), 
then the target of the re-encryption may be the trusted authority itself, wherein the 
asymmetric public key encryption layer may be removed by the trusted authority by re-
encrypting the data using a re-encryption key generated by the data owner for the 
trusted authority, and then decrypting using the trusted authority’s private key. In both 
cases the data consumer only gets access to the data via the trusted authority, which 
must undertake the re-encryption, without which the data consumer is unable to access 
plaintext data. 
Both embodiments of the invention are based on the same system architecture, shown 
in Figure 22.  
Figure 23 illustrates a typical system configuration of one of the actors in the architecture 
of the embodiments. In this respect, each “actor” will typically be provided with a 
processor based communications device, such as a general purpose computer such as a 
laptop or desktop, or other communications device such as a smartphone, tablet, set-top 
box, games console, or the like. Within Figure 19 any such processor based 
communications device is provided with a CPU, memory, one or more input/output 
interfaces (such as video and audio output controllers, as well as user input device 
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controllers such as any one or more of a keyboard, touchscreen, or mouse controller, for 
example) and one or more network interfaces (such as one or more wired or wireless 
network adapters, for example). In addition it is provided a storage medium such as a 
hard disk, flash drive, or other (usually non-volatile) data storage on which is stored the 
system operating system, as well as a data access control program, that acts to control 
the system to operate according to the communications and security protocols of the 
embodiments of the invention, to be described. Also provided is a web browser program, 
which when run allows the system user to browse the World Wide Web. In this regard, 
the computer system communicates via the network interface with one or more remote 
servers or other devices, via a network such as the Internet or an intranet. Other 
programs and for other purposes may of course also reside on the same computer 
readable medium. 
As noted, the data access control program enables the device to operate according to its 
role in the present architecture as one of the actors, and to implements the security and 
communications protocols to be described in respect of each of the embodiments. 
Therefore, where the device is acting as a data consumer then the program controls the 
device to perform the actions of a data consumer, to be described. Likewise, when the 
device is a data owner, or a trusted authority, the program controls the device to perform 
the respective actions of each actor, as required. Of course, the program need not be a 
single computer program, and may be a suite of programs that work together. Likewise, 
any device which is participating as an actor need only have those programs or part of a 
program that cause it to fulfil its necessary actions under the protocols of the 
embodiments. 
In addition to the above, in both embodiments to be described there are seven main 
security requirements and assumptions involving the following issues: collusion 
resistance, access control, data channels, data confidentiality, read/write requests, 
trusted authority and management of keys. 
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Figure 23: Device Level Architecture of the Scheme 
7.5 ASSUMPTIONS AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS 
In this section, we present the 7 main security requirements and assumptions about the 
following points: collusion resistance, access control, data channels, data confidentiality, 
Read/Write requests, trusted authority, and management of keys. 
Collusion resistance: The scheme should ensure that data consumers should not be able 
to decrypt the encrypted data even when colluding with the infrastructure provider. 
Contrary to the assumption made in other schemes[171], [172] and [92], we do not 
consider that the infrastructure provider is curious but honest because this assumption 
does not hold in the Cloud computing scenario previously presented. In our scheme the 
assumption is that the infrastructure provider does not restrict itself for decrypting data 
or finding information about the access control policies.  
Access Control: The scheme ensures that data consumers bearing the correct attributes 
are able to access the data. Unauthorised data consumers who do not have the right 
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attributes should be prevented from accessing the data. Even if the infrastructure 
provider colludes with the data consumers they should not be able to access data they 
are not allowed to read. 
Data Channel: We assume that all data channels that exist between the actors in the 
scenario are secured. The network level security is outside the scope of this work. 
Data Confidentiality: The scheme should ensure backward and forward secrecy. In 
backward secrecy any data consumer who accesses files should not be able to decrypt 
files exchanged in previous communications with another data consumer. In forward 
secrecy a data consumer should not be able to decrypt files using old credentials to 
decrypt files exchanged in subsequent communication.  
Read/Write Request: In the scheme, we make the assumption that data consumers would 
only make read requests. Any write request would only be made by the data owner or it 
would come via the data owner. 
Trusted Authority: The trusted authority has considerable computational power available 
to process requests coming in. The assumption is that there should not be any bottleneck 
created by the trusted authority by not being able to process incoming requests. We also 
envision that the trusted authority could reside on the premises of the data owner, or on 
the premises of the infrastructure provider. As long as the machines on which the trusted 
authority is running is not compromised then the scheme is secure.  
Management of Keys: The exchange of keys between the actors of the scenario is not 
part of the scheme. We assume that there is a baseline level of trust that exists between 
the actors and they are able to exchange the keys and update them appropriately. 
Local content: We do understand that even a user that has its access revoked would be 
able to access the local copy of the data that he has already downloaded. 
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7.6 SCHEME DESCRIPTION (EMBODIMENT 1) 
The first embodiment comprises two phases, a data storage phase, and a data access 
phase. The actors of the first embodiment are those described previously with respect to 
Figure 23 i.e. a data owner, an infrastructure provider, a trusted authority and a data 
consumer. 
The data storage phase is shown in Figure 24. Here, a data owner first generates the 
public private key pair required for asymmetric encryption. Then, the data owner 
encrypts the data to be stored with his public key i.e. CT = E(DATA, DO-PubK), and uploads 
the encrypted data CT to the infrastructure provider. The infrastructure provider task is 
to store the encrypted data. This concludes the data storage phase, which may be 
repeated as many times as necessary for different files, or different blocks of data. In this 
respect, however, it is not necessary for the data owner to generate a new public-private 
key pair per file or data block, and the same key pair may be used for several files or 
blocks. 
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Figure 24: Environment Setup (Embodiment 1) 
The data access phase is shown in Figure 25. Here, the data consumer (DC) transmits a 
data access request to the trusted authority (TA), identifying himself and specifying which 
data he wishes to access. In addition, in this embodiment the data consumer also passes 
as part of the data access request a request token, comprising the data consumer’s 
private key encrypted with the data owner’s public key. This is required in this 
embodiment for the data owner (DO) to generate a re-encryption key with the target as 
the requesting data consumer, as will become apparent below. 
Data Owner : DO InfrastructureProvider : IP
1) DO-PrivK
2) DO-PubK
E(DATA, DO-PubK)
1 : Generate keys:
2 : Generate :
3 : upload CT
4 : Store_CT()
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Figure 25: Data Access (Embodiment 1) 
The trusted authority (TA) then undertakes an access control procedure, where it 
determines whether the requesting data consumer (DC) is an authorised person to access 
the data, for example by consulting a list or other database containing the identities of 
authorised users. If the trusted authority determines that the data consumer is not 
authorised then an “access denied” message is passed back to the requesting data 
access-granted == FALSEalt
[access-granted == TRUE]
DataConsumer : DC TrustedAuthority : TA DataOwner : DO InfrastructureProvider : IP
1 : data access request
AccessControl
2 : access denied
3 : ReqTOKEN
(ReqTOKEN)
ReqTOKEN = E(DC-PrivK, DO-PubK)
Generate DC-PxyK
(RE-K DO->DC)
4 : E(DC-PxyK, TA-PubK)
5 : fetch CT()
6 : send CT
7 : CT RE-Encryption()
8 : RE-CT
9 : Decrypt RE-CT()
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consumer, and the data access phase then ends. However, if the TA determines that the 
DC has access rights then the request token received from the DC is passed to the data 
owner (DO). The DO then decrypts the request token with his own private key to obtain 
the DC’s private key, and then generates a proxy re-encryption key DC-PxyK for the  data 
consumer, which is a function which transforms data encrypted with the DO’s public key 
into data that can be decrypted with the DC’s private key. The re-encryption key DC-PxyK 
is then encrypted with the TA’s public key, and sent to the TA. 
The TA therefore at this point in time has received a request to access a particular data 
file or block from the DC, and has granted the request. It has also received from the DO 
a proxy re-encryption key which will be able to re-encrypt data encrypted with the DO’s 
public key into data that can be decrypted with the DC’s private key. Afterwards the TA 
requested data CT from the infrastructure provider, which is done by a request-response 
mechanism. The TA therefore receives CT from the infrastructure provider. Recall that CT 
is encrypted with the DO’s public key. 
In order to allow the encryption layer to be removed by the DC, the TA uses the proxy re-
encryption key it received from the DO to re-encrypt CT. After the re-encryption CT 
remains encrypted, as Re-CT, and hence cannot be read by the TA, or any other actor 
other than the DC the target of the re-encryption (including malicious eavesdroppers). 
However, Re-CT can be decrypted by the DC using its private key. Re-CT is sent by the TA 
to the DC, where it is then decrypted using the DC private key. The decryption of Re-CT 
at the DC ends the data access phase. 
7.6.1 ACCESS MATRIX 
In order to analyse the above protocol, in the following Figure, we introduce a symbolic 
3-way representation in order to easily summarize all the information in an access matrix 
developed from the protocol.  The table 12 below explains each block A, B, or C.  
Symbol Meaning Values 
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A 
Can the entity obtain directly this 
information? 
 “◊” : YES because 
the entity generates 
this data 
 “Y” : YES 
 “N” : NO 
B 
If the data is encrypted, what is 
needed to decrypt it ? 
One or more keys 
C Which info can be decrypted ? 
 Data, CT, CT’, CT’’ 
 “-“  : No one 
because is not 
possible to access 
the info in the block 
B 
Table 12: Access Matrix (Embodiment 1) 
Blocks B and C are optional and appear only if block A is “Y”. The access matrix can be 
organized as follows: shown on the rows are the entities involved in the process, and 
shown on the columns are each transactional state of the data. Each entry therefore 
contains a 3-way block, or alternatively only its part A. Figure 26 shows the access matrix 
thus derived for the first embodiment. 
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Figure 26: Access Matrix (Embodiment 1) 
From Figure 22 we can see that in order to access CT then the private key of the data 
owner is always required, whereas for Re-CT the private key of the data consumer is 
required. Therefore, if a malicious eavesdropper intercepts communications between 
the parties they will not be able to access any data, as they will have neither private key. 
Likewise, the data consumer can only ever access re-encrypted data, that has been re-
encrypted so as to be decrypted with the data consumer’s private key. This allows for 
user revocation by controlling access rights of users at the trusted authority, in that the 
trusted authority will only re-encrypt for a user that is authorised. Once authorisation has 
been lost for a user at the trusted authority, then no re-encryption will occur. Even if the 
data consumer then colludes with the infrastructure provider to access the data, he will 
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not be able to decrypt the data because the data the infrastructure provider stores i.e. 
CT requires decryption with the data owner’s private key only. 
One drawback of the first embodiment as described above is that the data consumer 
sends a token in which its private key is encrypted using the public key of the data owner. 
This token is only forwarded to the data owner if the data consumer is given access 
permission by the access control mechanism in the TA. However, sharing of the private 
key is not feasible in many scenarios where the data consumer wants to keep full control 
over its private keys. In order to get around this issue, therefore, we present the second 
embodiment of the scheme. Moreover, the data encryption in this embodiment is done 
using asymmetric encryption. When DO encrypts data and then transfers it to the IP, 
although it is a one off operation but requires significant computational overhead. 
Therefore the requirement is there to develop an embodiment which uses symmetric 
encryption for data encryption rather than asymmetric encryption. Asymmetric 
encryption is 1000 times slower than symmetric encryption[173][174]. 
In order to solve the above two issues we present to you the embodiment 2 of the 
scheme. The embodiment 2 will be used as the standard embodiment for the rest of 
the thesis. 
7.7 SCHEME DESCRIPTION (EMBODIMENT 2)  
In this section we provide the description of the embodiment 2 of the scheme. The 
operations conducted by the embodiment 2 are the following ones: 
Key generation: At the Data owner end it has to generate a symmetric key and 
public/private key pair. Also it is responsible for generating the re-encryption keys for the 
trusted authority. 
At the Data Owner end following keys have to be generated: 
 DOSK  : Data Owner Symmetric key 
 DOPK : Data Owner Public Key 
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 DOPR : Data Owner Private Key 
At the Trusted authority end, the following keys have to be generated: 
 TAPK: Trusted Authority Public Key 
 TAPR: Trusted Authority Private Key 
At the Data Consumer end, the following keys have to be generated: 
 DCPK: Data Consumer Public Key 
 DCPR: Data Consumer Private Key 
Re-encryption key generation: The data owner also generates a re-encryption key per 
trusted authority.  The data owner uses the DOPR and the TAPK to generate the re-
encryption key for each specific trusted authority TA. We use the following symbol for 
the key 
 RKTA: Re-encryption key 
Core Encryption: The core encryption is the process of transforming plain text into cipher 
text by using the DOSK by the data owner. The cipher text is now called DOSK(Text). 
Second level encryption: Second level encryption is done using the DOPK by the data 
owner. This data can only be decrypted using the DOPR of the data owner or the delegates 
re-encryption keys. Now the new cipher text is proxy ready and is also ready to be 
delegated to the trusted authorities. The cipher text here is now called CT’. 
First level encryption: First level encryption is the process of converting CT’ to CT. It 
includes two sub-processes, firstly the trusted authority uses the re-encryption key RKTA 
to convert the CT’ to CT’’. Secondly it uses the TAPR to convert the CT’’ to CT. 
Decryption: Decryption is performed by the data consumer using the symmetric key DOSK 
that the data owner has provided to it. The key is provided to the data consumer by using 
its public key DCPK to decrypt the symmetric key DOSk.  
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a. Environment Setup  
In figure 27, the environment setup of embodiment 2 is presented, following are the 
steps, 
1. The data owner performs the core encryption of data by using DOSK(Text) = CT. 
2. In the second step, the CT is transformed into CT’ = DOPK (DOSK(Text)). 
3. The data is now proxy ready and is now hosted on the infrastructure provider. 
4. The data owner now generates re-encryption key per trusted authority.(TA-1 … 
TA-N) 
 
b. Data Access 
In figure 28, the data access of embodiment 2 is presented, following are the steps, 
1. In the first step the data consumer makes the request to the trusted authority to 
access a file. 
2. At the trusted authority the access control component performs fine grained 
access control on the request. 
3. If the access control component gives permit to the request then the trusted 
authority sends request to the infrastructure provider to fetch the appropriate 
file CT’. 
4. Now the trusted authority data confidentiality component performs re-
encryption of the file using the re-encryption key given to it by the data owner. 
This will transform the CT’ to CT’’. This is the first level encryption refer to section 
5 for more detail.  
5. Now the data confidentiality component performs proxy decryption that 
transforms the CT’’ to CT. 
6. Now the trusted authority forwards the CT to the data consumer. 
7. The data consumer now requests the data owner to send the DOSK. The data 
owner using DCPK encrypts the DOSK and sends it to the data consumer. 
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8. Using the DOSK the data consumer then decrypts CT to plain text. 
DO : DataOwner TA : TrustedAuthority
Environment Setup with Trusted Authority
1) Keys Generation
2) Core Encription
2nd Level 
Encryption
Proxy Key
Generation per TA
Fetch TA-PK
RK-TA
Data → CT
CT → CT’
loop
TA-1
Ta-N
...
 
Figure 27: Environment Setup (Embodiment 2) 
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DO : DataOwner TA : TrustedAuthority
Data Access
Fetch CT'
Key Req
DC : DataConsumer
Data Request
ACCESS
CONTROL
Component
alt
[PolicyResponse == OK]
a) 1st Level
     Encryption
b) Proxy 
    Decryption
CT’ → CT’’
CT’’ → CT 
Send CT
E (DOsk, DCpk)
[ELSE] Access Denied
Core
Decryption CT → Data
IP : InfrastructureProvider
Fetch CT'
 
Figure 28: Data Access (Embodiment 2) 
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7.7.1 MATHEMATICAL FORMALISATION 
The fundamental concept used in developing the Ateniese proxy cryptography scheme is 
that of bilinear maps. In this section the mathematical formalisation are based on the 
Ateniese scheme [23]. 
 Let G1, G2, G3 be cyclic groups of the prime order q. 
Function e:  G1 ×  G2 → G3 is a bilinear map if for all g1 ∈ G1, g2 ∈ G2, a, b ∈ ℤq , that e(g1a, 
g2b) = e(g1, g2)ab  
The algorithm uses bilinear maps of the form of  e:  G1 ×  G1 → G2 where G1 = <g>. e must 
be efficiently computable. Also, e must be non degenerate; that is <e(g,g)> ∈ G2 
The whole process is composed of a tuple of (possibly probabilistic) polynomial time 
algorithms KG, RG, E⃗ , R, D⃗⃗  
Key generation (KG) 
<g> =  G1 of prime order q 
SKa = a ∈  ℤq*  randomly selected.  
SKb = b ∈  ℤq* , randomly selected.  
PKb = gb, PKa = ga, random r ∈  ℤq*  
Z = e(g,g) 
That means on input of a generator g, the KG algorithm outputs a couple 
of tuples (PKa, SKa) and (PKb, SKb). 
Re-encryption Key generation (RG) 
RKA->B = (gb)1/a = gb/a 
On input of (PKa, PKb), the re-encryption key generation algorithm RG 
outputs a key RKA->B for the proxy. 
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Encryption 
 m ∈ G2 
 Ca = (Zr . m, gra) 
On input of PKa and a message m ∈  G2, for all Ei ∈ E⃗  the output is a 
ciphertext Ca 
 
Re-encryption 
 Ca = (Zr . m, gra) 
Cb = (Zr . m, e(gra,RKA->B)) 
     = (Zr . m, e(gra, gb/a)) 
     = (Zr . m, Zrb)  
On input of RKA->B and a ciphertext Ca, the re-encryption function R outputs 
Cb.  
Decryption 
 (Alice) 
 m = 
𝒁𝒓.  𝒎
 e(gra,g
1
a⁄ )
 = 
𝒁𝒓 .  𝒎
𝒁𝒓 
 
On input of SKa and a ciphertext Ca, then exists a Di ∈ D⃗⃗  that outputs the 
message m ∈ G2 
 (Bob) 
 m = 
𝒁𝒓 .  𝒎
(Zrb)
1
b⁄
 
165 
 
On input of SKb and a ciphertext Cb, then exists a Di ∈ D⃗⃗  that outputs the 
message m ∈ G2 
More formally, let key pairs (PKa, SKa) and (PKb, SKb), be generated according to 
KG, belong to parties A and B, respectively, and let RKA->B be generated according 
to RG. Then, for all messages m in the space G2, the following equations hold with 
probably one : 
∀𝐸𝑖 ∈ ?⃗? , ∃𝐷𝑗 ∈ ?⃗? ,   𝐷𝑗(𝑆𝐾𝐴, 𝐸𝑖(𝑃𝐾𝐴, 𝑚)) = 𝑚 for Alice 
∀𝐸𝑖 ∈ ?⃗? , ∃𝐷𝑗 ∈ ?⃗? ,   𝐷𝑗 (𝑆𝐾𝐵, 𝑅(RKA→B, Ei(𝑃𝐾𝐴, 𝑚))) = 𝑚 for Bob 
 In our specific scenario, skipping the key generation process already shown in §4 : 
Core encryption : 𝐶𝑇 = 𝐸 (𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝐷𝑂𝑆𝐾) 
2nd Level Encryption : 𝐶𝑇′ = 𝐸 (𝐶𝑇, 𝐷𝑂𝑃𝐾) 
 
Re-encryption 
 Ca = (Zr . m, gra) 
Cb = (Zr . m, e(gra,RKA->B)) 
     = (Zr . m, e(gra, gb/a)) 
     = (Zr . m, Zrb)  
On input of RKA->B and a ciphertext Ca, the re-encryption function R outputs 
Cb.  
Decryption 
 (Alice) 
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 m = 
𝒁𝒓.  𝒎
 e(gra,g
1
a⁄ )
 = 
𝒁𝒓 .  𝒎
𝒁𝒓 
 
On input of SKa and a ciphertext Ca, then exists a Di ∈ D⃗⃗  that outputs the 
message m ∈ G2 
 (Bob) 
 m = 
𝒁𝒓 .  𝒎
(Zrb)
1
b⁄
 
On input of SKb and a ciphertext Cb, then exists a Di ∈ D⃗⃗  that outputs the 
message m ∈ G2 
More formally, let key pairs (PKa, SKa) and (PKb, SKb), be generated according to 
KG, belong to parties A and B, respectively, and let RKA->B be generated according 
to RG. Then, for all messages m in the space G2, the following equations hold with 
probably one : 
∀𝐸𝑖 ∈ ?⃗? , ∃𝐷𝑗 ∈ ?⃗? ,   𝐷𝑗(𝑆𝐾𝐴, 𝐸𝑖(𝑃𝐾𝐴, 𝑚)) = 𝑚 for Alice 
∀𝐸𝑖 ∈ ?⃗? , ∃𝐷𝑗 ∈ ?⃗? ,   𝐷𝑗 (𝑆𝐾𝐵, 𝑅(RKA→B, Ei(𝑃𝐾𝐴, 𝑚))) = 𝑚 for Bob 
 In our specific scenario, skipping the key generation process already shown in §4 : 
Core encryption : 𝐶𝑇 = 𝐸 (𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎, 𝐷𝑂𝑆𝐾) 
2nd Level Encryption : 𝐶𝑇′ = 𝐸 (𝐶𝑇, 𝐷𝑂𝑃𝐾) 
 
1st Level Encryption : 
 
 
CT’’ = R (CT’, RKTA) 
CT = D (CT’’, TAPR) 
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                      Decryption:   DATA = 
D(CT,D(E(DOSK,DCPK),DCPR)) 
 
7.7.2 ACCESS MATRIX 
In figure 29, the data lifecycle is shown, which is an iterative cascade model. 
 
 
Figure 29: Data life cycle (Embodiment 2) 
In each of these states, the data is represented by the formal statement described in the 
previous section. In order to define the granularity of protection mechanisms, a so called 
Access Matrix can be used as formalization for the static access permission in any step of 
interaction between all the entities of our scenario (Data Owner, Infrastructure Provider, 
Trusted Authority, Data Consumer and a Maliciuos user). 
This simple formalization does not model the rules by which permission are setted in the 
system, but the way each party can access the data, taking into consideration the 
system’s access control security policies. We introduce a symbolic 3-way representation 
in order to easily summarize all this information in each entry of the matrix. 
Data
• Initial state
CT
• Core Encryption
CT'
• 2nd Level Encryption
CT''
CT
• 1st Level Encryption
Data
• Decryption
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A B 
C  
 
Table 13 explains each coloured block.  
 
Symbol Meaning Values 
A Can the entity access the data ? 
 “◊” : YES because 
the entity generates 
this data 
 “Y” : YES 
 “N” : NO 
B 
If the data is encrypted, what is  
needed to decrypt it ? 
One or more keys 
C Which info can be decrypted ? 
 Data, CT, CT’, CT’’ 
 “-“  : No one 
because is not 
possible to access 
the info in the block 
B 
Table 13: Symbol, Meaning and Values 
The access matrix is organized in Table 14. On the rows the entities involved in the 
process, on the columns each transactional state of the data, each entry contains a 3-
way block or only its part A.  
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Entity Data CT CT’ CT’’ 
DO 
(Data Owner) 
◊ ◊ ◊ N 
IP 
(Infrastructure 
Provider) 
N N 
 
Y 
RKTA 
SKTA 
- 
 
 
 
 
N 
TA 
(Trusted 
Authority) 
N 
 
Y 
DOSK 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
Y 
CT’’ 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
 
◊ 
RKTA 
SKTA 
- 
 
 
 
 
DC 
(Data 
Consumer) 
Y 
 
Y 
DOSK 
 
Data 
 
 
 
 
N N 
MA 
(Malicious) 
 
Y DOSK 
 
Y RKTA 
 
Y RKTA 
 
Y RKTA 
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- 
 
 
 
 
SKTA 
- 
 
 
 
 
SKTA 
- 
DOSK 
 
 
 
DOSK 
- 
 
 
 
 
Table 14: Access Matrix (Embodiment 2) 
It’s important to note that each entity can access only a well-known state of the data: 
 IP and TA, which act as semi-trusted entity, cannot access to any kind of data, but 
they can only perform some crypto functionalities on it. 
 DC can access only DATA if it owns the rights to do it. 
 MA, that act as an attacker, even if it can access to all of state of data, is not able 
to perform any operation that leads to obtaining of the original DATA. 
7.8 DIFFERENCE FROM THE STATE OF THE ART  
In Cloud computing there would be numerous infrastructure providers all providing 
services to millions of data consumers. It is simply not possible to re-encrypt data every-
time a user has access revoked. As there would be many data consumers who would be 
having their access revoked in a very short span of time which means that there would 
be more than one re-encryption operation taking place. It is very hard if not impossible 
to keep track of which data is encrypted with which key. Therefore this approach 
presents a very practical and scalable solution to problem of hosting data on un-trusted 
infrastructure provider. Our scheme would scale relative to the state of the art 
schemes[96][97], as there are no lengthy complex re-encryption and key management 
operations that needs to be performed.   
One of the biggest advantages of the scheme is that it requires significantly fewer key 
exchanges compared to the other schemes [171][172]. This feature is built into the 
scheme as it only requires that the data owner and trusted authority initially have a 
baseline level of trust so that their public keys can be shared. Afterwards each domain 
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that uses the trusted authority would provide the public keys of its data consumers itself. 
There are no requirements for distributing session or private keys. 
Caching of frequently accessed files at the domain level would be used to ensure that less 
network level resources are used when a request comes in. If a request for the same file 
comes in from a different user all the domain administrator has to do is to forward the 
file to the user. It then notifies the data owner to release the key for the decryption of 
the file to the data consumer. 
Furthermore, the scheme can be used in a setting where decryption is performed not at 
the data consumer level but at the domain level. For instance, Company A wants all the 
data to be re-encrypted using its private key, and when the Company A receives a file on 
behalf of a data consumer, it then performs decryption and forward it to the respective 
data consumer. The benefit of this approach would be that caching of files would not 
require provisioning of the keys by the data owner or decryption of the files, as if the 
request for the same file comes in, then all the domain administrator has to do is to 
forward that file to the appropriate data consumer without performing decryption. 
7.9 PSEUDOCODE 
What follows is the explanation of the processes of a new user joining and user 
revocation in the scheme ACDC3. 
New User Join: Every time a new data consumer wants to access files stored on the 
infrastructure provider it has to first request the administrator of the domain. The 
domain administrator then ensures that the trusted authority has access to appropriate 
credentials of the data consumer. The domain administrator provides a web based query 
service that provides appropriate credentials (Attributes and Public key relating to an 
identity) of the data consumer to the trusted authority. Trusted authority uses this 
service to check the credentials of data owners who want to access files. This service can 
be an LDAP server or an active directory server. Following is the Pseudo code of the new 
user join operation, 
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//Following function is called by the data consumer to initiate the process of user join 
NewUserJoin(Name, EmployeeNumber) 
{  
If (Name is in LDAPDirectory() and EmployeeNumber is in the 
EmployeeDirectory()) 
Then  
{ 
getAttributes (Name, EmployeeNumber) 
getPublicKey(Name, EmployeeNumber) 
UpdateDirectoryService(Attributes,PublicKey) 
//Updating Directory service that the trusted authority queries 
} 
Else {(Return (Wrong Name or Wrong Employee Number) } 
} 
 
//Following function is called by the trusted authority 
/* Name represents the name of the entity that is calling the function like domain 
administrator, data owner or trusted authority. Authentication is the process by which 
the entity authenticates itself to the directory service and DCName is the name of the 
data consumer to which the query is about.                                                                          
*/ 
DirectoryService(TAName,Authentication,DCName) 
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{ 
If(Authentication Fails) 
Then {Return (Authentication Failed)} 
Else 
{ 
If(DCName is in LDAPDirectory) 
Return (Attributes,PublicKey) 
Else {Return (WrongDCName)} 
} 
} 
User Revocation: The process of user revocation is initiated by the administrator of the 
domain. It notifies the trusted authority that the data consumer has no longer rights to 
access files on the infrastructure provider. The trusted authority then deletes the 
attributes and public key of the data consumer from its records. 
The domain administrator also ensures that web based directory service no longer holds 
the credentials of the data consumer. Once these operations are complete then the data 
consumer access is revoked and he no longer can decrypt files stored at the infrastructure 
provider. Following is the pseudo code for the user revocation process, 
 
/* Following function is called by the domain administrator to delete credentials from 
the web based directory service. */ 
DirectoryService(Name, Authentication,DCName) 
{ 
174 
 
If(Authentication Fails) 
{Return (Authentication Failed)} 
Else 
{ 
//Following function deletes credentials of the data consumer from the directory 
deleteCredential(DCName) 
} 
} 
/* Following function is called by the trusted authority to delete the data consumer 
attributes and public key from its records. */ 
UpdateRecords (DCName, Delete) 
{ 
If (DCName is in Direcotory.Name() ) 
Then  
{ 
deleteAttributes (DCName) 
deletePublicKey(DCName) 
} 
Else { Return (Incorrect DCName) } 
} 
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7.10 FINE GRAINED ACCESS CONTROL  
State of the art schemes use attributes to perform fine grained access control. These 
schemes achieve fine granularity by encrypting files using a keys that have attributes 
embedded in them. Only the data consumers who have the correct key with the 
appropriate attributes are able to decrypt the files [171] [97].  
This approach is cumbersome and it requires user specific encryption to be performed 
per file. In our scheme we have delinked the fine granularity of access control with data 
confidentiality. This approach has enabled the scheme to perform fine grained access 
control at the trusted authority level. The biggest benefit of the approach is that it is less 
complex (computational overhead, time). 
In ACDC3, a centralised access control mechanism is used in which a fine grained access 
control policy is defined with respect to a domain. This approach enables us to update 
the access control policy, without having to re-encrypt all the files. Every domain 
represents an enterprise or collaboration, this domain has specific requirements with 
regards to the access control, using our mechanism it can define rich access control 
policies.  
The mechanism is based on eXtensible Access Control Mark-up Language (XACML) [175], 
which is an access control policy framework based on three aspects.  
Firstly it offers a policy language that can be used to express control rules and conditions. 
Each policy constitutes multiple rules and policies itself can be combined into sets. It 
offers a mechanism that represents the governance framework of an organisation 
(domain).  
Secondly it offers a protocol to represent the request and response. Real world access 
control request can be constructed using the protocol. These request than go to an 
XACML engine for evaluation and the result is then returned which is normally permit, 
deny or in-applicable. 
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The third feature that XACML offers is reference architecture that proposes software 
modules to be deployed to ensure efficient implementation of security policies. The 
modules include, Policy Decision Point (PDP) that evaluates policies against access 
request. Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) which is responsible for providing the access 
requests. Finally the Policy Information Point (PIP) that is queried by PDP and PEP to 
gather information about subjects and the objects. 
The advantage of using XACML is manifold, it offers a standardised approach to 
authorisation by which many different domains can be integrated without a lot of hassle 
and the focus is on the security policies rather than technicalities of the environment. 
Furthermore, XACML follows an attribute and policy based approach which makes it fine 
grained. 
ACDC3 achieves fine grained access control using XACML, but usage of meta-files in this 
scheme has a major drawback. The meta-files are not encrypted and they can be 
potentially read by the infrastructure provider. The infrastructure provider can learn 
some information about which files are accessed but it cannot learn anything about the 
encrypted files themselves. Furthermore, the kind of information that is revealed also 
depends upon the scenario and on the data consumer. A potential solution to this 
problem can be use of abbreviation rather than text in the meta-files. It would limit the 
learning capacity of the infrastructure provider. An implication of this approach is that 
the access control mechanism has to know which abbreviation means what in advance 
in order to interpret them. 
7.11 SECURITY ANALYSIS   
User Revocation: The benefit of ACDC3 scheme is that user revocation is independent of 
data re-encryption by using proxy re-encryption to perform on the fly re-encryption. This 
reduces the computational overhead and simplifies the process of user revocation. The 
process of user revocation ensures that the data consumer who has it’s access revoked 
cannot decrypt any information hosted on the infrastructure provider even if both of 
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them collude. Furthermore, the scheme ensures forward and backward secrecy even 
when a large number of revoked data consumers and infrastructure providers collude. 
Single Point of Failure: The trusted authority represents a single point of failure for the 
whole scheme. In case the trusted authority goes down the whole scheme would no 
longer function. A potential solution to the problem is that the data owner ensures that 
backup of the trusted authority is made so that in case the data relating to security 
policies and keys on trusted authority is lost, it can be recovered.  Furthermore, the data 
owner should also ensure that back up servers come online in case the main server is not 
working.  
Fine-grained Access Control:  ACDC3 enables a data owner to deploy fine grained access 
control policies which are independent of data confidentiality. This ensures that rich 
policies are developed with focus on corporate governance rather than on the 
technicalities of cryptography and software. This setting is very suitable to the Cloud 
computing scenarios as there would be many enterprises (domains) that would be using 
the Cloud while acting as both data owner and data consumer.  
Data Consumer Access Privilege Confidentiality: The major drawback of our scheme that 
we have already mentioned is the use of meta-files. However if we compare our scheme 
with other scheme (that use ABE) such as that of Yu et al [95], only the leaf nodes of the 
access tree are disclosed to the infrastructure providers in this scheme. Therefore, this 
scheme also reveals attribute information relating to data consumers to the 
infrastructure provider. Our scheme achieves similar levels of access privilege 
confidentiality as that of the previous schemes. However, it offers a less complex and 
richer mechanism for fine grained access control. 
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CHAPTER 8 
EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this Chapter we present the experimental results of the ACDC3 scheme and security 
risk framework. The Risk Assessment Framework implementations were validated by 
performing experiments within the OPTIMIS toolkit. The toolkit adopt use cases such as 
multi Cloud and enterprise Cloud broker as explained in Chapter 2.  
8.1 RESEARCH GAPS 
There were five research gaps that were identified as part of this thesis. In this section, 
the research gaps are revisited to link up the experimental validation chapter with the 
research gaps identified earlier.  
RG1 is the gap relating to the confidentiality of data hosted on Cloud platforms. Cloud 
platforms where data is hosted are outside the physical control of the data owner. 
Therefore, ensuring confidentiality of the data is very important. Conventional 
mechanisms available for encryption can be applied to Cloud platforms but they cannot 
scale as they are not developed to handle huge amount of subscribers. Therefore, the 
requirement is to develop a scalable confidentiality scheme that can cater for the Cloud 
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computing scenario. Moreover, providing fine-grained access control and integrity of 
data is also part of this research gap.  
Research gap RG4 highlights the issue of user revocation in Cloud computing scenario. 
When a user gets their access revoked, in conventional schemes, new keys are distributed 
to existing subscribers. The broadcast server then uses the new key to encrypt. This task 
is done to ensure that the revoked user can no longer access the system. The problem 
with this approach is that it is not scalable as a large number of users leaving the system 
regularly would require the scheme to follow the cumbersome process of generation, 
revocation and issuance of new keys.  
To address these two research gaps (RG1, RG4) the scheme of ACDC3 was developed. The 
scheme provides a mechanism to ensure confidentiality of data hosted on Cloud 
platforms whilst also providing user revocation. The results of the experiments with the 
scheme are presented in this Chapter (ACDC3 Scheme).   
Research gap RG5 highlights the problem of mitigating risk associated with Cloud 
computing platforms. An organisation moving to the Cloud needs to understand what 
sorts of risk they are taking. The Cloud-focussed risk framework presented in this thesis 
attempts to address this challenge. 
To address research gap RG5, a framework was developed for risk identification, threat 
assessment and mitigation strategies for Cloud computing scenarios. For this, a risk 
analysis was carried out for four different Cloud settings. In this Chapter we present the 
results of the risk analysis performed using the IRAM toolkit. The results identify the 
categories of risk and their corresponding impact in the form of very high, high, medium 
and low. The prioritisation of identified risks is also performed.  
To fulfil the research gap RG1 and RG4, the ACDC3 scheme was developed. We present 
in this Chapter the results of evaluating the ACDC3 scheme via a set of experiments. For 
the ACDC3 scheme we have developed an experimentation model in which we draw two 
comparisons of the scheme. The first comparison is with symmetric encryption scheme 
AES and the second is when there is no encryption applied.  
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Cloud computing should create the illusion that the configuration relating to encryption, 
decryption, management of security policies and management of keys is done 
seamlessly. This illusion forms the basis of Cloud computing and it differentiates Cloud 
computing from other forms of distributed computing. The research gaps RG2 is to 
address this challenge by coming up with tools and technologies that would enable this 
automatic configuration. RG2 is not tackled as part of this thesis and remains part of the 
future work. 
None of the analysed systems proposes a mechanism by which access control policies 
that are distributed over multiple infrastructure providers are kept synchronised. In 
Cloud computing scenarios, the data may reside and pass from numerous platforms like 
Broker, Service provider and Infrastructure provider (IP). The challenge is to ensure 
synchronisation of access control policies across these multiple domains. This research 
gap RG3 is also part of future work and is not tackled in this thesis. 
8.2 ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION 
The Security Risk Framework was developed in collaboration with University of Leeds as 
part of the OPTIMIS project. The main contribution of the researcher came in the form of 
threat assessment, prioritisation of threats, designing the Security Risk Framework and 
threat inventory development. The implementation and algorithm development was 
done as joint work between the researcher and Mariam Kiran, the implementation was 
primarily led by Mariam whereas the researcher was in a support role. 
For the ACDC3 scheme, from the conception, design all the way to the implementation 
and experimentation is the sole work of the researcher. Franchesco La Torree did 
contribute in verifying the design of the scheme, but these results are not presented in 
this thesis. 
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8.3 SECURITY RISK FRAMEWORK 
The Security Risk Framework described in Chapter 5 was developed as part of the Risk 
Assessment Framework of the OPTIMIS project. This section is presenting results of the 
threat assessment work undertaken in Chapter 5. The threat assessment was done to 
identify the threats relating to Cloud computing scenarios. This work was done using ISF 
IRAM toolkit. This section also presents the prioritisation of the Challenges that were 
identified as a result of the threat assessment and vulnerability assessment. This section 
has two main parts where the results are put forward. Sections are as follows, 
 Threat Assessment 
 Prioritisation of Challenges 
8.3.1 THREAT ASSESSMENT 
The risk assessment framework first requires that the main threats to Cloud computing 
scenarios be identified. For this the Information Security Forum IRAM tool was used. This 
tool comes with standard set of threats along with data relating to historical trends. 
To undertake the threat assessment, following steps were taken 
 Identification of threats relating to the Cloud computing scenario. For this a 
detailed threat assessment was performed for Cloud computing scenarios. As part 
of the threat assessment, the Cloud specific threats were prioritised 
 Following the threat assessment vulnerability assessment was also provided for 
the Cloud use cases 
In figure 30, we present the result of the analysis. Three threats have fallen in the 
category of very high; these are ‘Malfunction of system software’, ‘Malfunction of 
computer/ network equipment’ and ‘Gaining unauthorised access to systems or 
network’. Six threats are classified as high which are  ‘Introducing malicious code’, 
‘Distributing SPAM’, ‘Data leakage’, ‘Usage Control’, ‘Hypervisor level attacks’ and ‘User 
errors’. The rest of the threats fall in the categories of either medium or low. 
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These threats come directly from the threat assessment performed in Chapter 5 section 
5.4. 
 
Figure 30: Results of Threat Analysis 
The identification and the categorisation of the above mentioned threats was 
instrumental in undertaking the risk assessment and also developing the security risk 
framework. This enabled the researcher to understand that main threats and 
vulnerabilities associated with Security Risk Framework. 
8.3.2 PRIORITISATION OF CHALLENGES 
From the threat analysis performed in the Chapter 5, we have shown that the information 
security principles of integrity, confidentiality and availability are most relevant to the 
Cloud related scenarios. The information risk ratings assigned shows that loss of 
confidentiality is rated as the highest level of risk followed by availability and integrity. 
Using this analysis, the challenge of ‘Access control in Cloud Computing’ is linked with 
both availability and confidentiality. For instance, failure to ensure access control would 
mean the loss of availability in case a legitimate user is denied access, whereas 
unauthorised access would lead to the loss of confidentiality. Furthermore, an 
unauthorised user who has write access can update the data as well, therefore it could 
lead the loss of integrity. We have rated the challenge of ‘Access control in Cloud 
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Computing’ as the most important one as it has a direct impact on all of the security 
principles. 
For the challenge ‘Data Leakage Prevention’ confidentiality is the main concern. An 
attacker who is able to leak confidential data by moving it and disclosing it to an 
unauthorised source would mean the loss of confidentiality. We have rated this challenge 
as the second most important as millions of users’ data would be hosted on infrastructure 
providers. Ensuring that data is not leaked (especially of commercial nature) is of utmost 
importance. If this challenge is not addressed customers would lose confidence in 
infrastructure providers and that could potentially make them move away from hosting 
data on the Cloud. 
‘Hypervisor based IDS’ and ‘Hypervisor level Security’ impacts confidentiality and 
integrity of data. We have rated ‘Hypervisor based IDS’ as the third most important 
challenge as it would be highly desirable to detect and delete worms and viruses from 
hypervisor level. This functionality would act as an added on functionality to supplement 
other security functionalities. ‘Hypervisor level Security’ is an added functionality; not 
providing it may not have a similar impact as the first two challenges have. 
The challenge ratings are summarised as follows. 
1. Access control in Cloud Computing (Confidentiality, Availability, Integrity) 
2. Data Leakage Prevention (Confidentiality, Integrity) 
3. Hypervisor based IDS (Confidentiality, Integrity) 
4. Hypervisor level Security (Confidentiality, Integrity) 
 
 
8.4 ACDC3 SCHEME 
The ACDC3 scheme design, architecture and the research problem that it is solving is 
detailed in Chapter 7. In this section we provide the result relating to the experimentation 
and implementation of the scheme using the NICS Crypto Library[176]. For the 
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experimentation the focus of this section remains on the confidentiality, user revocation 
and efficiency perspectives. The experimentation conducted for the ACDC3 scheme are 
designed to compare the scenarios where there is no encryption and there is encryption 
using symmetric keys.  
8.4.1 NICS CRYPTO LIBRARY 
NICS Crypto Library was developed primarily for an OpenID solution. The main 
characteristic of the solution was that it was privacy preserving. The solution enabled 
an Identity Provider to give attributes to other parties without being able to read their 
values[177]. 
The NICS Crypto Library has three main programming modules, which are as follows, 
 Global Parameters 
 Proxy Re-Encryption 
 Main Java File 
The Global Parameters module assumes that all the global parameters are known by all 
the parties involved in the scenario. Effectively, the library hard-codes the parameters 
such that it can present the results required for the OpenID solution. For the Proxy Re-
Encryption module an implementation of the proxy encryption scheme is done. The 
main Java file is used to run the scheme and provide it with initialisation vectors. 
As explained above the library was designed for the OpenID solution therefore, we had 
to write our own Java module for it to work. 
8.4.2 ACDC3 JAVA MODULE 
The code developed for the ACDC3 follows the steps mentioned below, 
1. The program starts by creating global parameters that will be used to create the 
keys. The global parameters are then passed to the initialisation module of the 
library to start the setup stage.  
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2. The second step is to generate keys relating to the data owner, data consumer, 
trusted authority and infrastructure provider.  
3. As the scheme is based on Ateniese Scheme (Embodiment 2) it requires trusted 
authority private key and data owner’s public key for this for the generation of re-
encryption keys. Once this information is provided Re-encryption keys are 
generated.  
4. Encrypt the message m using the core encryption key. 
5. Encrypt m with Data Owner’s public key, at the trusted authority level. 
6. Re-encrypt the tuple with the re-Encryption key at the trusted authority, result 
will be another Cipher text. This is the process of re-encryption through which one 
cipher text transforms into another.  
7. Send the Cipher text to infrastructure provider. This we simulate the serializing of 
the cipher and storing it in a file. 
8. Once the request for access comes in from data consumer, download the cipher 
from the infrastructure provider. 
9. Now using the trusted authority re-encryption key, transform the cipher text from 
CT’’ to CT’. 
10. In the final step, pass the CT’ to the data consumer.  
11. Data consumer at this stage will decrypt the file using the core decryption key. 
Refer to Chapter 7 for a detailed description of the scheme and its design. The code of 
the scheme is present in the annex section of the thesis. For the implementation there 
were numerous issues. For instance, since the NICS crypto library was used the 
implementation scope was stuck with what the library has to offer. Moreover, we were 
also bound to write a single Java application as the library was primarily used to be run 
on single server. This limited our capacity to run experiments on different Cloud 
platforms. The implementation is a simulation as we have all the players of the scenario 
residing on the same platform.   
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8.4.3 DESIGNING THE EXPERIMENTS 
The purpose of the experiments is to demonstrate the efficiency of the ACDC3 scheme 
compared against standard encryption and no encryption. The experiments are designed 
in such a way that the actor Data Owner, Data Consumer, Infrastructure Provider and 
Trusted Authority reside on the same computer. For each of the actor time that is 
recorded for uploading and downloading of the file. The detail of the scheme itself and 
its mathematical formalisation is present in Chapter 7. 
To calculate the efficiency of the scheme the comparison is done between two scenarios. 
One scenario is that when there is no encryption, the other scenario is that when there 
is symmetric encryption. Results are compiled against these two scenarios.  
The experiment run as a simulation, the characteristics of the machine are as follows, 
 Processor: Intel Core i5 1.7 GHZ 
 RAM: 8GB 
 System Type: 64 bit Operating System Windows Enterprise 8.1 
The testing strategy of the scheme was divided into three parts,  
 The first experiment is to do with the uploading and downloading of a file on the 
Cloud. There is no encryption involved in this stage, therefore only the upload and 
download times are recorded. Finally the total time of upload and download is 
also calculated. 
 The second experiment starts by encrypting a file through normal symmetric 
encryption using 128 Bit Key. The algorithm used is AES, padding is PKCS5 and the 
mode of encryption is CBC. CBC mode of encryption is used because its adds 
randomness to the cipher text. The ECB mode of encryption always creates the 
same cipher for the same plain text as it does not add padding. This makes the 
encryption weak. Afterwards the file is uploaded on the Cloud. The upload takes 
place from Data owner to Infrastructure provider. The third step is when a request 
for accessing the file comes from Data Consumer. The file is downloaded from 
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Infrastructure provider to Data consumer. In the last step the file is decrypted by 
the Data consumer. 
 The third experiment encompass the processes of the ACDC3 scheme as explained 
in the previous section. These steps would include initialisation, key generation, 
re-encryption and decryption. 
The three above test cases were developed to find out the performance overhead in 
terms of encryption and decryption for the ACDC3 scheme. 
The data size that is selected for encryption is 200 bytes, 400 bytes, 800 bytes, 1600 bytes 
and 3200 bytes.  The reason we went along with these sizes is because comparatively the 
size difference between them is enough to show us the correlation that exist. Rather than 
taking different sizes our focus was on running the experiment on the same sizes ten 
times. This would enable us to gather the average time taken for each size. Moreover, 
we have limitation from a resource perspective that would require numerous testbed 
machines hosted on different platforms. Furthermore, from an implementation 
perspective we have the limitation that increasing the size of the files was crashing the 
program. The program require recoding and it would have to be deployed on a more 
powerful system for it to work. The variance that existed when running the experiment 
on the same size was significant, therefore it was imperative to run the test many times.  
Figure 33 shows the output of the code as per the experiments, 
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Figure 31: Output of the Experimentation 
Figure 31 presents the time taken by different stages of the simulator. For instance time 
taken to perform core encryption, upload the file to the server, download the file from 
the server, performing decryption. These stages are for symmetric encryption whereas 
other stages are added for the ACDC3 scheme. 
8.4.4 Testing 
The results for the experimentation done is divided as the different file sizes, the tables 
15 and 16 show the results of the experiment for 3.2 KB size only. Similar test were 
conducted for the sizes of 1.6KB. 800 Bytes, 400 Bytes and 200 Bytes. A total of 50 
experiments were conducted in order to determine the average time for encryption, 
decryption and other stages of the ACDC3 scheme with respect to different data size. 
The times are calculated in nanoseconds for all the values apart from total values which 
are recorded in milliseconds. The experiments are conducted for three scenarios, 
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“Without Encryption”, “With Symmetric Encryption” and “With Re-Encryption 
Embodiment 2”. The table 15 comprise of the scenarios of “With Encryption” and “With 
Symmetric Encryption” whereas the table 16 comprise of the scenario of “With Re-
Encryption Embodiment 2”. 
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Table 15: 3.2 KB size, showing time for Without Encryption and with Symmetric 
Encryption 
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Table 16: 3.2 KB size, showing time for ACDC3 scheme 
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Similar test were run for values of 1.6KB, 800 Bytes, 400 Bytes and 200 Bytes. After 
running the test, average time was calculated for each size which is then stored in the 
table 16. 
There is variance in the time values of the different stages of the same operation. This is 
due to the processor of the server performing other processing tasks at the time it is 
undertaking encryption, decryption operations etc. 
8.4.5 Results of the Experiments 
For all the tests that were run, average time was calculated for encryption for each size 
against the three different experiments mentioned in the previous section.  
X-axis represents the size of the file in kilobytes whereas the Y-axis presents the time in 
milliseconds. The results of the experiments are as follows: 
 
Figure 32: Graph for different times recorded for the three scenarios. X-axis showing 
data size in kilobytes, Y-axis showing time in milliseconds for encryption 
The figure 32 show that the time recorded for symmetric encryption and for no 
encryption is very similar. They both fall on the same line; this is because symmetric 
encryption is highly efficient. The time for ACDC3 is changing with the size of the data as 
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shown above. It is pertinent to mention here that we do not include the complexities that 
come with the usage of symmetric encryption. The deployment of PKI infrastructure and 
distribution of keys. However for the ACDC3 these complexities are accounted for. 
Moreover, the encryption process for the ACDC3 scheme is a one off operation. 
Figure 33 below shows the total time taken for re-encryption stage in the ACDC3 scheme 
against data size. The graph shows that the size of the data doesn’t have much impact, 
as the re-encryption operation that is performed is pretty efficient. It depends more on 
the processor time and the number of other jobs running when this experiment is 
conducted. In this experiment the X-axis presents the size of the file in kilobytes whereas 
the Y-axis presents the time in milliseconds.  
The results presented in the figure 33 are very important from the perspective that the 
size of the data has little or no impact on the re-encryption operations. Therefore, this 
experiment validates that the re-encryption process is agnostic to the data size. Also 
validates the claims with regards to the efficiency and scalability of the scheme.  The re-
encryption process would be required for all the data that is being encrypted. Therefore, 
it will be repeated every time file is accessed.  
 
Figure 33: Graph of data size against Re-Encryption time. X-axis showing data size in 
kilobytes, Y-axis showing time in milliseconds for re-encryption 
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Figure 34: Comparing the decryption times against data size X-axis showing data size 
in kilobytes, Y-axis showing time in milliseconds for the performance overhead 
As in the ACDC3 scheme, the encryption is a one off process, it is undertaken by the data 
owner at the start of the scheme. Therefore, the actual performance overhead is 
calculated by comparing the encryption plus decryption (E+D) time of symmetric 
encryption against ACDC3 scheme decryption steps. The decryption steps include re-
encryption, first level decryption and core decryption. Figure 34 shows the performance 
overhead of the ACDC3 scheme when compare against symmetric encryption.  The figure 
34 results show that the performance overhead is on average 1.6 times compare with 
symmetric encryption. In this analysis we are not catering for the time that symmetric 
encryption would take when there is going to be a user revocation. 
As explained before, when a user revocation is done, data re-encryption is required in 
the symmetric encryption setup. As the user leaving the trust domain still have the key 
that it can use to decrypt data. Moreover, the process of re-encrypting the data gets more 
complicated as the number of users go up in the symmetric encryption setup making the 
symmetric encryption non-scalable. 
In the ACDC3 scheme setup, there is no such complication relating to user revocation, the 
data is encrypted once and no re-encryption is required when a user revocation takes 
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place. Therefore, arguably ACDC3 would scale in a Cloud computing environment 
compared with symmetric or asymmetric encryption. The decryption process would be 
required whenever there is a file access and it is not a one off process. 
8.5 CONCLUSION 
As part of this research work the Security Risk Framework was implemented and 
integrated in the OPTIMIS project. Moreover, the threat analysis performed enable the 
identification of risk and their prioritisation as per the OPTIMIS use cases. The Security 
Risk Assessment model was implemented until the deployment phase only and 
presented as part of the risk assessor at deployment stage. At operation stage its 
implementation work is planned for future research issues, with monitoring 
infrastructure providing real-time data for the risk assessor for continuous security risk 
assessment.  
As for the ACDC3 scheme, the implementation of the scheme was done using the NICS 
Crypto library. After the implementation experiments were designed for three scenarios, 
No Encryption, Encryption using Symmetric Cryptography and ACDC3 scheme. Results 
show that ACDC3 is 1.6 times slower than the symmetric encryption in a setting where 
we are not taking into account key management complexity relating to the symmetric 
cryptography in a Cloud environment. The ACDC3 does however, resolve the issue of user 
revocation and provides a scalable solution in the Cloud computing environment.     
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
9.1 SUMMARY 
This thesis has presented research that takes forward the engineering of secure Cloud 
systems. Our review work identified a variety of “research gaps” that drove the 
direction of the actual research conducted. Three specific research contributions were 
made (detailed in chapters 5, 6, and 7). Below we restate what the research gaps were, 
summarise the success of the work carried out, summarise limitations of the work and 
its evaluation, and provide pointers for future work. 
 The aim of the thesis was to undertake research in the area of Cloud computing 
security. From the start of the project, it had two tiers: an industrial one and an 
academic one. The industrial one was focusing on the known challenges that the 
industry was facing whereas from the academic point of view the whole idea of 
Cloud computing was questioned.  
 This thesis starts with highlighting Cloud definitions, differentiation between 
Cloud computing and other forms of computing. From an industrial perspective 
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the evolution of Cloud computing was explained. This is followed by a state of the 
art implementation review of Cloud computing delivery models and their security 
specification. The idea was to develop a solid understanding of the Cloud 
computing products and their limitations. 
 The next logical step was to identify the state of the art from the academic 
perspective. This would mean identifying research gaps. For this, a thorough 
literature review was undertaken where the research gaps of scalability, user 
revocation and security risk management for cloud computing scenarios were 
identified.  
 The research gap of risk management is filled by developing a Security Risk 
Framework, which allows monitoring of threats based on the events being logged 
by the detectors leading to a calculation of the relative risk. The relative risk is a 
barometer that enables a computer administrator to mitigate the risk by taking 
corrective actions or accepting the risk. For the Security Risk Framework a threat 
analysis is performed that leads to the identification of major threats relating to 
Cloud computing. The threats are prioritised and used in subsequent parts of the 
framework.  
 The thesis also presents how one can secure a video broadcast subscription 
service in the Cloud computing setup. The scalable video scenario is built on top 
of an IaaS Cloud and shown how a video can be encrypted and authenticated 
efficiently. 
 To solve the challenge of scalability, user revocation and data confidentiality in 
Cloud computing. We have developed a novel scheme ACDC3, to the best of our 
knowledge it is the only scheme that achieves efficient user revocation, data 
confidentiality and scalability simultaneously for access control scenarios in Cloud 
computing. We have achieved this objective by using Ateniese proxy re-
encryption (PRE) and by decoupling the operations of encryption and access 
control.  
 In the final part of this thesis, the experimental validation for the Security Risk 
Framework and ACDC3 scheme is detailed. The Security Risk Framework was 
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implemented and integrated in the OPTIMIS project. Moreover, the threat 
analysis performed enable the identification of risk and their prioritisation as per 
the OPTIMIS use cases. As for the ACDC3 scheme, the testing showed there is a 
performance overhead of 1.6 times on average in absolute terms. This is in 
comparison with symmetric cryptography. However, the complexity of key 
management and data re-encryption within the symmetric cryptography makes 
it unviable for Cloud platforms due to scalability issue. This problem of scalability 
and user revocation are resolved by the ACDC3 scheme. The ACDC3 scheme would 
fare well in scenarios where the number of subscribers are in the millions and 
there is frequent requirement for joining and leaving of the subscribers. The 
scenarios where the subscribers are relatively small and the joining and leaving 
operations are not frequent the symmetric encryption scheme would be more 
efficient. 
 The research undertaken in the EngD was published in four research papers. From 
an industrial perspective two patents were developed from the research work. 
Furthermore, the research work made direct contributions towards the Cloud 
strategy of BT through numerous papers and deliverables. 
9.2 LIMITATIONS 
For the security risk framework the experiments were conducted using the OPTIMIS 
testbed. The OPTIMIS project came to end two years ago. There is a major limitation as 
far as testing is concerned for the security risk framework as there is no testbed where 
further testing can be done.  
The testing of the security risk framework was confined to the deployment stage and not 
to the operational stage. The testing during the operational stage would have potentially 
highlighted further issues with the scheme. 
For ACDC3 a major limitation was that of testing the scheme on numerous cloud 
platforms while it is providing a service widely consumed. The testing was carried out via 
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a simulation on a single machine of users accessing services via the scheme. In practice, 
of course, the scheme would be implemented across platforms and clients and various 
server agents would not be co-located. A more realistic deployment would likely raise 
practical integration issues associated with the scheme. The testing was done on data 
size which ranges from 200 bytes to 3200 bytes. The program was not able to handle 
larger size of data sets as it crashed. This was due to hardware limitation and also the 
implementation requires re-coding. We do believe that larger data sets should be tested 
to better understand the robustness of the scheme. 
The fine granularity part of the ACDC3 scheme was not developed. Therefore it would be 
required to take an already existing implementation of XACML and integrate with ACDC3 
or to implement a new module within the ACDC3 scheme. The testing was largely aimed 
at evaluating the confidentiality and availability features of the scheme and not the fine 
granularity ones.  
User revocation for ACDC3 scheme was not experimentally validated. For this validation 
it would be required to setup large number of users on Cloud infrastructure. These users 
would consume the cloud services using the communication protocols laid out in the 
ACDC3 scheme. A program monitoring the scheme would have to be developed which 
can then record the metrics of efficiency and confidentiality. This program would also 
validate that the user revocation functionality of the scheme is working as per the 
mathematical formalisation mentioned in Chapter 7. 
9.3 FUTURE WORK 
The future work for Security Risk Framework includes testing the system on a Cloud 
platform with monitoring agents installed which will log certain threats when they occur. 
This will then be extended to work on determine threats which may be eventually seen 
based on the data being collected and difficult to determine directly from the events. 
Finally the results from the testing and evaluation, advocate that the risk model does 
correctly assess and prioritize the risk.  
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The Security Risk Assessment model implementation needs to be extended to encompass 
the Operational Phase, where run-time monitoring agents could be deployed to enable 
continuous security risk assessment. It is envisioned that the security risk framework 
should be an open source code that could be integrated with other Cloud adoption 
toolkits. It would enable the decision makers to make sound decisions on Cloud adoption 
from an information security perspective. 
For the Scalable video scenario future work would be focused on calculating the time 
delay and efficiency affecting the setup of the video broadcasting and predicting how this 
will affect the performance of the distributions. 
The future work for the ACDC3 scheme is around the development of prototype that sits 
on different Cloud platforms (Amazon, Google) and ensures user revocation and 
scalability while ensuring confidentiality of data. It would be desirable for the future work 
to expand the experiments that we have done for the ACDC3 scheme by enhancing the 
size of the files that were used and also by having a larger number of simultaneous users 
of the scheme.  Moreover, the implementation and integration of the fine granular part 
of the scheme is required. This would enable the testing of not only the scalability part 
of the scheme but also the fine granular part as well. Once this implementation and 
integration is complete the scheme would be in a suitable state to release commercially. 
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APPENDICES 
SECURITY RISK FRAMEWORK CODE AND LOGS 
This sections details the code written for the Security Risk Framework. Furthermore the logs 
section show a sample experimentation for the security risk framework. 
 
RISK MODEL FOR THE SECURITY RISK FRAMEWORK 
package securityriskjavamodel; 
 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import java.util.Iterator; 
import java.util.List; 
import java.util.Random; 
 
public class RiskModel { 
     
     
    public RiskModel() { 
        System.out.println("hello from security risk model"); 
        // EvaluationMatrix matrix=new EvaluationMatrix(); 
 
    } 
     
    
 
    public double getsecurity_risk(int ausecase, List threatList) throws Exception //returns the 
total number of threats identified 
    { 
 
        int t_count = 0; 
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        //connect to database and get the list of threats 
 
       //Iterator collectedthreatListIterator = threatList.iterator(); 
 
        
      System.out.println("Total number of threats found"+threatList.size()); 
 
  
 
        //parse list 
        
        double prob_likelihood, prob_priority; 
        double prob_threat; 
        double sum_prob_threat = 0.0; 
        double prob_inverse; 
        double prob_b; 
 
        int i; 
        //EvaluationMatrix matrix=new EvaluationMatrix(); 
        for (i = 0; i < threatList.size(); i++) { 
            ThreatData tdz=new ThreatData(); 
               tdz=(ThreatData)threatList.get(i); 
                
        
        
              if (((tdz.get_usecase() == ausecase) || (tdz.get_usecase() == 0)) && ((tdz.get_stage() == 
0) || (tdz.get_stage() == 2))) { 
                
                
//matrix.setEvaluationMatrixValue(ts,reference[i].get_likelihood(),reference[i].get_priority()); 
                prob_likelihood = (double) tdz.get_likelihood() / 5.0; 
                prob_priority = (double) tdz.get_priority() / 5.0; 
                prob_inverse = 1.0 - prob_priority; 
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                prob_b = (prob_likelihood * prob_priority) + prob_inverse; 
                prob_threat = (prob_likelihood * prob_priority) / prob_b; 
                sum_prob_threat += prob_threat; 
                t_count++; 
            } 
        } 
 
 
 
        //printout the matrix 
      
        System.out.println("Total number of threats found " + t_count); 
        sum_prob_threat = sum_prob_threat / (double) t_count; 
        System.out.println("prod=" + sum_prob_threat); 
        return sum_prob_threat; 
 
         
    } 
 
    // function 6 
     
    public double getsecurity_risk_operation(int ausecase, double total_prob, List threatList) 
throws Exception { 
        int t_count = 0; 
        //connect to database and get the list of threats 
        int i; 
        for (i = 0; i < threatList.size(); i++) { 
            ThreatData tdz=new ThreatData(); 
               tdz=(ThreatData)threatList.get(i); 
        } 
        Random var = new Random(); 
        double number = 0.0; 
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        //now traverse the list to form matrix 
 
        double prob_likelihood, prob_priority; 
        double prob_threat; 
        double sum_prob_threat = 0.0; 
        double prob_inverse; 
        double prob_b; 
        double relative_risk = 0.0, total_event_rate = 0.0; 
        //EvaluationMatrix matrix=new EvaluationMatrix(); 
        for (i = 0; i < threatList.size(); i++) { 
            ThreatData tdz=new ThreatData(); 
               tdz=(ThreatData)threatList.get(i); 
            if (((tdz.get_usecase() == ausecase) || (tdz.get_usecase() == 0)) && ((tdz.get_stage() == 
1) || (tdz.get_stage() == 2))) { 
                //Integer ti= reference[i].get_threat_id(); 
                //String ts=ti.toString(); 
                
//matrix.setEvaluationMatrixValue(ts,reference[i].get_likelihood(),reference[i].get_priority()); 
                prob_likelihood = (double) tdz.get_likelihood() / 5.0; 
                prob_priority = (double) tdz.get_priority()/ 5.0; 
                prob_inverse = 1.0 - prob_priority; 
                prob_b = (prob_likelihood * prob_priority) + prob_inverse; 
                prob_threat = (prob_likelihood * prob_priority) / prob_b; 
                sum_prob_threat += prob_threat; 
                t_count++; 
                System.out.println("Total number of threats found threat: " + tdz.get_name()); 
 
 
 
                //check monitoring inputs 
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            } 
        } 
 
 
 
        System.out.println("Total number of threats found "+ t_count); 
        sum_prob_threat = sum_prob_threat / (double) t_count; 
        //System.out.println("Security risk monitored for usecase function 6  is " + 
sum_prob_threat); 
        // add monitoring loop 
        int count = 0; 
        for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) { 
            number = var.nextDouble(); 
            if (number > 0.5) { 
                count++; 
            } 
        } 
 
        //System.out.println("Number of events recorded "+ count); 
        total_event_rate = (double) count / 10.0; //assumption last 10 counts for service 
        relative_risk = total_event_rate / sum_prob_threat; 
        //System.out.println("Total event rate is in the last 10 counts "+ total_event_rate ); 
        //System.out.println("Relative risk calculated is "+ relative_risk ); 
        //System.out.println("If RR=1 do nothing, RR<1 accept risk, If RR>1 apply mitigation 
strategy"); 
        return sum_prob_threat; 
 
 
    } 
     
} 
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JAVA SECURITY RISK PACKAGE 
package securityriskjavamodel; 
 
 
import java.io.File; 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import java.util.List; 
import org.w3c.dom.Document; 
import org.w3c.dom.*; 
 
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory; 
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder; 
import org.xml.sax.SAXException; 
import org.xml.sax.SAXParseException; 
 
import securityriskjavamodel.ThreatData; 
 
public class SecurityRiskJavaModel { 
 
    /** 
     * @param args the command line arguments 
     */ 
    public static void main(String[] args) { 
        // TODO code application logic here 
         
        //read the xml and create a list 
           List<ThreatData> threatList=new ArrayList<ThreatData>(); 
             
            
        try 
        { 
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            DocumentBuilderFactory docBuilderFactory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance(); 
            DocumentBuilder docBuilder = docBuilderFactory.newDocumentBuilder(); 
            Document doc = docBuilder.parse (new File("src/resources/threatdatabase.xml")); 
             
             // normalize text representation 
            doc.getDocumentElement ().normalize (); 
            System.out.println ("Root element of the doc is " +  
                 doc.getDocumentElement().getNodeName()); 
 
 
            NodeList listOfThreats = doc.getElementsByTagName("threat"); 
            int totalThreats = listOfThreats.getLength(); 
            System.out.println("Total no of threats : " + totalThreats); 
             
          
            int threat_id=0; 
            String name=" "; 
            int usecase=0 ; 
            int stage= 0; 
            String asset= " "; 
            int priority=0; 
            int likelihood=0;  
             
            for(int s=0; s<listOfThreats.getLength() ; s++){ 
 
 
                Node firstThreatNode = listOfThreats.item(s); 
                if(firstThreatNode.getNodeType() == Node.ELEMENT_NODE){ 
                    String t=null; 
 
                    Element firstThreatElement = (Element)firstThreatNode; 
 
                    //------- 
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                    NodeList firstthreadIDList = 
firstThreatElement.getElementsByTagName("threat_id"); 
                    Element firstthreadIDElement = (Element)firstthreadIDList.item(0); 
 
                    NodeList textthreadIDList = firstthreadIDElement.getChildNodes(); 
                    System.out.println("ThreatID : " +  
                           ((Node)textthreadIDList.item(0)).getNodeValue().trim()); 
                    t=((Node)textthreadIDList.item(0)).getNodeValue().trim(); 
                    threat_id=Integer.valueOf(t); 
                     
                    //------- 
                    NodeList tnameList = firstThreatElement.getElementsByTagName("name"); 
                    Element tnameElement = (Element)tnameList.item(0); 
 
                    NodeList texttnameList = tnameElement.getChildNodes(); 
                    System.out.println("Last Name : " +  
                           ((Node)texttnameList.item(0)).getNodeValue().trim()); 
                    name=((Node)texttnameList.item(0)).getNodeValue().trim(); 
                     
                    //---- 
                    NodeList usecaseList = firstThreatElement.getElementsByTagName("usecase"); 
                    Element usecaseElement = (Element)usecaseList.item(0); 
 
                    NodeList textusecaseList = usecaseElement.getChildNodes(); 
                    System.out.println("Age : " +  
                           ((Node)textusecaseList.item(0)).getNodeValue().trim()); 
                    t=((Node)textusecaseList.item(0)).getNodeValue().trim(); 
                    usecase=Integer.valueOf(t); 
                     
                    //------ 
                     
                      NodeList stageList = firstThreatElement.getElementsByTagName("stage"); 
                    Element stageElement = (Element)stageList.item(0); 
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                    NodeList textstageList = stageElement.getChildNodes(); 
                    System.out.println("stage : " +  
                           ((Node)textstageList.item(0)).getNodeValue().trim()); 
                    t=((Node)textstageList.item(0)).getNodeValue().trim(); 
                    stage=Integer.valueOf(t); 
 
                    //------ 
                     
                      NodeList assetList = firstThreatElement.getElementsByTagName("asset"); 
                    Element assetElement = (Element)assetList.item(0); 
 
                    NodeList textassetList = assetElement.getChildNodes(); 
                    System.out.println("asset: " +  
                           ((Node)textassetList.item(0)).getNodeValue().trim()); 
                    asset=((Node)textassetList.item(0)).getNodeValue().trim(); 
                     
                     //------ 
                     
                      NodeList priorityList = firstThreatElement.getElementsByTagName("priority"); 
                    Element priorityElement = (Element)priorityList.item(0); 
 
                    NodeList textpriorityList =priorityElement.getChildNodes(); 
                    System.out.println("priority : " +  
                           ((Node)textpriorityList.item(0)).getNodeValue().trim()); 
                    t=((Node)textpriorityList.item(0)).getNodeValue().trim(); 
                    priority=Integer.valueOf(t); 
 
                      //------ 
                     
                      NodeList likelihoodList = firstThreatElement.getElementsByTagName("likelihood"); 
                    Element likelihoodElement = (Element)likelihoodList.item(0); 
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                    NodeList textlikelihoodList =likelihoodElement.getChildNodes(); 
                    System.out.println("likelihood : " +  
                           ((Node)textlikelihoodList.item(0)).getNodeValue().trim()); 
                    t=((Node)textlikelihoodList.item(0)).getNodeValue().trim(); 
                    likelihood=Integer.valueOf(t); 
                     
                    ThreatData ntd=new ThreatData(threat_id, name, usecase, stage, asset, 
priority,likelihood); 
                    threatList.add(ntd); 
                     
 
                }//end of if clause 
 
 
            }//end of for loop with s var 
             
        } 
        catch (SAXParseException err) { 
        System.out.println ("** Parsing error" + ", line "  
             + err.getLineNumber () + ", uri " + err.getSystemId ()); 
        System.out.println(" " + err.getMessage ()); 
 
        } 
        catch (SAXException e) { 
        Exception x = e.getException (); 
        ((x == null) ? e : x).printStackTrace (); 
 
        } 
        catch (Throwable t) { 
        t.printStackTrace (); 
        } 
         
        System.out.println("Size of threat list" +  threatList.size()); 
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        RiskModel rm=new RiskModel(); 
         
        //calculate security risk at deployment 
        double dep=0.0; 
        int u= 2; 
        try 
        { 
        dep= rm.getsecurity_risk(u, threatList); 
         System.out.println("Security risk for usecase Private is " + dep);  
        } 
        catch(Exception e) 
        { 
        } 
        
 
 
     try{  
         double stagesix=rm.getsecurity_risk_operation(u,dep, threatList); 
         System.out.println("Security risk for usecase function 6 is " + stagesix);  
     }  
     catch(Exception e)  
     {  
         System.out.println("print "+ e);  
     } 
         
 
    } 
     
    
} 
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THREAT DATA JAVA CODE 
/* 
 * To change this template, choose Tools | Templates 
 * and open the template in the editor. 
 */ 
package securityriskjavamodel; 
 
public class ThreatData { 
     
    int threat_id=0; 
        String name=" "; 
        int usecase=0 ; 
        int stage= 0; 
        String asset= " "; 
        int priority=0; 
        int likelihood=0; 
         
        public ThreatData() 
        { 
        } 
     
    public ThreatData(int athreat_id, String aname, int ausecase, int astage, String aasset, int 
apriority, int alikelihood) 
    { 
        threat_id=athreat_id; 
        name=aname; 
        usecase=ausecase; 
        stage= astage; 
        asset= aasset; 
        priority=apriority; 
        likelihood=alikelihood; 
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    } 
     
    public int get_threat_id() 
    { 
        return threat_id; 
    } 
     
    public String get_name() 
    { 
        return name; 
    } 
     
     
    public int get_usecase() 
    { 
    return usecase; 
    } 
     
    public int get_stage() 
    { 
        return stage; 
         
    } 
         
    public String get_asset() 
    { 
        return asset; 
    } 
         
     
    public int get_priority() 
    { 
        return priority; 
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    } 
     
    public int get_likelihood() 
    { 
        return likelihood; 
    } 
     
     
     public void set_threat_id(int athreat_id) 
    { 
        threat_id=athreat_id; 
    } 
     
    public void set_name(String aname) 
    { 
        name=aname; 
    } 
     
     
    public void set_usecase(int ausecase) 
    { 
        usecase=ausecase; 
    } 
     
    public void set_stage(int astage) 
    { 
        stage=astage; 
         
    } 
         
    public void set_asset(String aasset) 
    { 
        asset=aasset; 
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    } 
         
     
    public void set_priority(int apriority) 
    { 
        priority=apriority; 
    } 
     
    public void set_likelihood(int alikelihood) 
    { 
        likelihood=alikelihood; 
    } 
     
} 
LOGS FOR SECURITY RISK FRAMEWORK EXPERIMENTATION 
Monitoring logs used for experimentation are as follows, 
Extract from log: 
104 01/23/1998 16:59:09 00:00:02 http 1879 80 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.40 0 - 
105 01/23/1998 16:59:12 00:00:02 http 1880 80 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.40 0 - 
107 01/23/1998 16:59:15 00:00:01 http 1881 80 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.40 0 - 
108 01/23/1998 16:59:18 00:00:01 http 1882 80 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.40 0 - 
109 01/23/1998 16:59:21 00:00:01 http 1883 80 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.40 0 - 
110 01/23/1998 16:59:23 00:00:24 telnet 1884 23 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.20 1 guess 
111 01/23/1998 16:59:24 00:00:01 http 1885 80 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.40 0 - 
112 01/23/1998 16:59:26 00:00:02 http 1886 80 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.40 0 - 
113 01/23/1998 16:59:29 00:00:02 http 1887 80 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.40 0 - 
115 01/23/1998 16:59:33 00:00:02 http 1889 80 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.40 0 - 
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116 01/23/1998 16:59:33 00:01:41 telnet 1890 23 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.20 0 - 
117 01/23/1998 16:59:36 00:00:02 http 1891 80 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.40 0 - 
118 01/23/1998 16:59:36 00:00:12 ftp 1892 21 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.20 0 - 
119 01/23/1998 16:59:42 00:00:00 ftp-data 20 1893 192.168.0.20 192.168.1.30 0 - 
120 01/23/1998 16:59:45 00:00:01 ftp-data 20 1894 192.168.0.20 192.168.1.30 0 - 
121 01/23/1998 16:59:47 00:00:00 ftp-data 20 1895 192.168.0.20 192.168.1.30 0 - 
122 01/23/1998 16:59:53 00:00:01 smtp 1900 25 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.20 0 - 
123 01/23/1998 16:59:57 00:00:16 ftp 43546 21 192.168.0.40 192.168.1.30 0 - 
124 01/23/1998 17:00:01 00:00:00 ftp-data 20 43548 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.40 0 - 
125 01/23/1998 17:00:02 00:00:02 rsh 1023 514 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.20 1 rcp 
126 01/23/1998 17:00:03 00:00:22 telnet 1906 23 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.20 1 guess 
127 01/23/1998 17:00:04 00:00:01 ftp-data 20 43550 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.40 0 - 
128 01/23/1998 17:00:05 00:00:14 rlogin 1022 513 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.20 1 rlogin 
129 01/23/1998 17:00:07 00:00:00 ftp-data 20 43552 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.40 0 - 
130 01/23/1998 17:00:09 00:00:00 ftp-data 20 43554 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.40 0 - 
131 01/23/1998 17:00:10 00:00:11 ftp 43555 21 192.168.0.40 192.168.1.30 0 - 
132 01/23/1998 17:00:12 00:00:00 ftp-data 20 43558 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.40 0 - 
133 01/23/1998 17:00:16 00:00:00 ftp-data 20 43562 192.168.1.30 192.168.0.40 0 - 
 
The logs have been collected from DARPA's test run for intrusion detection systems. The 
sample contains simple attacks which are included to illustrate how intrusion detection 
systems will be scored.  A session is labelled as containing an attack if it contains any 
component of an attack. Attacks include instances where a remote user illegally obtains 
local user-level privileges or local root-level privileges on a target machine and also 
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instances where a remote user surveys a potential target for weaknesses or searches for 
potential targets. Attacks in the sample data include the following: 
 
Name  Description 
guess  Remote user guesses many passwords to log into a target machine 
ping-sweep Low level ICMP ping sweep to identify target machines 
port-scan Determine which services on a target machine are active 
phf  Run Unix command line on a web server 
rlogin  Rlogin to target machine without a password 
rsh  Execute a command on the target machine without a password 
rcp  Remotely copy a file to/from target machine without a password 
 
Another kind of parsing can be done to see if any changes to the database have been received. In that case, 
the following keywords are parsed for "DPI Rule: 1000608 - Generic SQL Injection Prevention". 
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PROXY ENCRYPTION LIBRARY 
The proxy encryption library called the Nics Crypto Library was developed by David Nunez. This 
library was used by the ACDC3 scheme. 
The library has three main parts 
 AFGHGlobalParameters.java 
 AFGHProxyReEncryption.java 
 ProxyMain.java 
 
AFGHGLOBALPARAMETERS.JAVA 
/* 
 * To change this template, choose Tools | Templates 
 * and open the template in the editor. 
 */ 
package nics.crypto.proxy.afgh; 
 
import it.unisa.dia.gas.jpbc.CurveGenerator; 
import it.unisa.dia.gas.jpbc.CurveParameters; 
import it.unisa.dia.gas.jpbc.Element; 
import it.unisa.dia.gas.jpbc.ElementPowPreProcessing; 
import it.unisa.dia.gas.jpbc.Field; 
import it.unisa.dia.gas.jpbc.Pairing; 
import it.unisa.dia.gas.plaf.jpbc.field.curve.CurveField; 
import it.unisa.dia.gas.plaf.jpbc.pairing.DefaultCurveParameters; 
import it.unisa.dia.gas.plaf.jpbc.pairing.a.TypeACurveGenerator; 
import it.unisa.dia.gas.plaf.jpbc.pairing.a.TypeAPairing; 
import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream; 
import java.io.File; 
import java.io.FileInputStream; 
import java.io.FileNotFoundException; 
import java.io.InputStream; 
import java.util.Random; 
import java.util.logging.Level; 
import java.util.logging.Logger; 
 
/** 
 * 
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 * @author david 
 */ 
public class AFGHGlobalParameters { 
 
    private int rBits, qBits; 
    private Pairing e; 
    private Field G1, G2, Zq; 
    private Element g, Z; 
    private ElementPowPreProcessing g_ppp, Z_ppp; 
 
    private CurveParameters curveParams; 
    private Random random; 
 
    public AFGHGlobalParameters(DefaultCurveParameters curveParameters){ 
        initialize(curveParameters); 
    } 
 
    public AFGHGlobalParameters(int r, int q) { 
        rBits = r; 
        qBits = q; 
         
 
        random = new Random(0); 
        boolean generateCurveFieldGen = false; 
         
        // Init the generator... 
        CurveGenerator curveGenerator = new TypeACurveGenerator(random, rBits, qBits, generateCurveFieldGen); 
 
        // Generate the parameters... 
        curveParams = curveGenerator.generate(); 
        initialize(curveParams); 
    } 
 
    public AFGHGlobalParameters(InputStream is){ 
        curveParams = new DefaultCurveParameters(); 
        ((DefaultCurveParameters) curveParams).load(is); 
        initialize(curveParams); 
    } 
 
    public AFGHGlobalParameters(File f) throws FileNotFoundException{ 
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        this(new FileInputStream(f)); 
    } 
 
    public AFGHGlobalParameters(byte[] b){ 
        this(new String(b)); 
    } 
 
    public AFGHGlobalParameters(String cp){ 
        try { 
            curveParams = new DefaultCurveParameters(); 
             
            ByteArrayInputStream is = new ByteArrayInputStream(cp.getBytes()); 
            ((DefaultCurveParameters) curveParams).load(is); 
            initialize(curveParams); 
        } catch (Exception ex) { 
            Logger.getLogger(AFGHGlobalParameters.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, null, ex); 
        } 
    } 
 
    private void initialize(CurveParameters cp){ 
        random = new Random(0); 
        //e = PairingFactory.getPairing(cp); 
 
        e = new TypeAPairing(random, cp); 
 
        // Groups G1 and G2 of prime order q 
        G1 = e.getG1(); 
        G2 = e.getGT(); 
 
         
 
        // Field Zq 
        Zq = e.getZr(); 
         
 
 
        // Global system parameters: g \in G1, Z = e(g,g) \in G2 
        g = ((CurveField) G1).getGen().getImmutable(); 
//        if(g.isZero()){ 
//            System.out.println("g es 0!! :("); 
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//            System.exit(-1); 
//        } 
//        g = G1.newRandomElement().getImmutable(); 
        //System.out.println("g = " + ProxyMain.elementToString(g)); 
 
 
        Z = e.pairing(g, g).getImmutable(); 
 
        Z_ppp = Z.pow(); 
        g_ppp = g.pow(); 
 
         
 
        /* 
        System.out.println(G1.getClass()); 
        System.out.println(G2.getClass()); 
        System.out.println(Zq.getClass()); 
        System.out.println(e.getClass()); 
        System.out.println(g.getClass()); 
        System.out.println(g.toBytes()[0]); 
        System.out.println(Z.getClass());*/ 
         
    } 
 
    public Field getG1() { 
        return G1; 
    } 
 
    public Field getG2() { 
        return G2; 
    } 
 
    public Element getZ() { 
        return Z; 
    } 
 
    public Field getZq() { 
        return Zq; 
    } 
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    public Pairing getE() { 
        return e; 
    } 
 
    public Element getG() { 
        return g; 
    } 
 
    public ElementPowPreProcessing getZ_ppp() { 
        return Z_ppp; 
    } 
 
    public ElementPowPreProcessing getG_ppp() { 
        return g_ppp; 
    } 
 
    @Override 
    public String toString() { 
        return curveParams.toString(); 
 
        /*try { 
            ByteArrayOutputStream os = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); 
 
            ObjectOutput oo = new ObjectOutputStream(os); 
            curveParams.writeExternal(oo); 
 
            os.close(); 
            return os.toString(); 
        } catch (IOException ex) { 
            Logger.getLogger(GlobalParameters.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, null, ex); 
            return ""; 
        }*/ 
    } 
 
    public byte[] toBytes() { 
        return toString().getBytes(); 
 
        /*try { 
            ByteArrayOutputStream os = new ByteArrayOutputStream(); 
 
223 
 
            ObjectOutput oo = new ObjectOutputStream(os); 
            curveParams.writeExternal(oo); 
 
            os.close(); 
            return os.toString(); 
        } catch (IOException ex) { 
            Logger.getLogger(GlobalParameters.class.getName()).log(Level.SEVERE, null, ex); 
            return ""; 
        }*/ 
    } 
 
 
     
} 
 
 
AFGHPROXYREENCRYPTION.JAVA 
/* 
 * To change this template, choose Tools | Templates 
 * and open the template in the editor. 
 */ 
package nics.crypto.proxy.afgh; 
 
import it.unisa.dia.gas.jpbc.Element; 
import it.unisa.dia.gas.jpbc.ElementPowPreProcessing; 
import it.unisa.dia.gas.jpbc.Field; 
import it.unisa.dia.gas.jpbc.Pairing; 
import it.unisa.dia.gas.jpbc.PairingPreProcessing; 
import java.util.Arrays; 
import nics.crypto.Tuple; 
 
/** 
 * 
 * @author david 
 */ 
public class AFGHProxyReEncryption { 
 
    public static Element generateSecretKey(AFGHGlobalParameters global) { 
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        Field Zq = global.getZq(); 
 
        /* 
         * KEY GENERATION 
         */ 
 
        // sk = a \in Zq 
        return Zq.newRandomElement().getImmutable(); 
    } 
 
//    public static byte[] generateSecretKey(GlobalParameters global) { 
//        return generateSecretKey(global).toBytes(); 
//    } 
    public static Element generatePublicKey(Element sk, AFGHGlobalParameters global) { 
 
        ElementPowPreProcessing g = global.getG_ppp(); 
 
        // pk = g^sk 
        return g.powZn(sk).getImmutable(); 
    } 
 
    public static byte[] generatePublicKey(byte[] sk_bytes, AFGHGlobalParameters global) { 
 
        Element sk = bytesToElement(sk_bytes, global.getZq()); 
 
        return generatePublicKey(sk, global).toBytes(); 
    } 
 
    public static Element generateReEncryptionKey(Element pk_b, Element sk_a) { 
 
        /* 
         * Re-Encryption Key Generation 
         */ 
 
        // RK(a->b) = pk_b ^(1/sk_a) = g^(b/a) 
        Element rk_a_b = pk_b.powZn(sk_a.invert()); 
        return rk_a_b.getImmutable(); 
 
    } 
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    public static byte[] generateReEncryptionKey(byte[] pk_bytes, byte[] sk_bytes, AFGHGlobalParameters global) { 
        return generateReEncryptionKey( 
                bytesToElement(pk_bytes, global.getG1()), 
                bytesToElement(sk_bytes, global.getZq())).toBytes(); 
    } 
 
    public static byte[] firstLevelEncryption(byte[] message, byte[] pk_a, AFGHGlobalParameters global) { 
 
        Field G2 = global.getG2(); 
        Field G1 = global.getG1(); 
 
        // message = m \in G2 
        Element m = bytesToElement(message, G2); 
 
        // pk_a \in G1 
        Element pk = bytesToElement(pk_a, G1); 
 
        Tuple c = firstLevelEncryption(m, pk, global); 
 
        return mergeByteArrays(c.get(1).toBytes(), c.get(2).toBytes()); 
 
    } 
 
    public static Tuple firstLevelEncryption(Element m, Element pk_a, AFGHGlobalParameters global) { 
 
        /* 
         * First Level Encryption 
         * c = (c1, c2)     c1, c2 \in G2 
         *      c1 = Z^ak = e(g,g)^ak = e(g^a,g^k) = e(pk_a, g^k) 
         *      c2 = m·Z^k 
         */ 
 
        Field G2 = global.getG2(); 
        Field Zq = global.getZq(); 
 
        Pairing e = global.getE(); 
 
        Element Z = global.getZ(); 
        Element g = global.getG(); 
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        // random k \in Zq 
        Element k = Zq.newRandomElement().getImmutable(); 
 
        // g^k 
        Element g_k = g.powZn(k); 
 
        // c1 = Z^ak = e(g,g)^ak = e(g^a,g^k) = e(pk_a, g^k) 
        Element c1 = e.pairing(pk_a, g_k); 
 
 
        // c2 = m·Z^k 
        Element c2 = m.mul(Z.powZn(k)); 
 
 
        // c = (c1, c2) 
 
        Tuple c = new Tuple(c1, c2); 
 
        return c; 
 
    } 
 
    public static byte[] secondLevelEncryption(byte[] message, byte[] pk_a, AFGHGlobalParameters global) { 
 
        Field G2 = global.getG2(); 
        Field G1 = global.getG1(); 
 
        System.out.println(G2.getClass()); 
 
        System.out.println("G2: " + G2.getLengthInBytes()); 
        // message = m \in G2 
        Element m = bytesToElement(message, G2); 
//        System.out.println("M : " + Arrays.toString(m.toBytes())); 
        // pk_a \in G1 
        Element pk = bytesToElement(pk_a, G1); 
 
 
 
        Tuple c = secondLevelEncryption(m, pk, global); 
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        return mergeByteArrays(c.get(1).toBytes(), c.get(2).toBytes()); 
 
    } 
 
    public static Tuple secondLevelEncryption(Element m, Element pk_a, AFGHGlobalParameters global) { 
 
        /* 
         * Second Level Encryption 
         * c = (c1, c2)     c1 \in G1, c2 \in G2 
         *      c1 = g^ak = pk_a^k 
         *      c2 = m·Z^k 
         */ 
 
        //Field G2 = global.getG2(); 
        Field Zq = global.getZq(); 
 
        Pairing e = global.getE(); 
 
        Element Z = global.getZ(); 
 
         
 
        // random k \in Zq 
        Element k = Zq.newRandomElement().getImmutable(); 
        //System.out.println("k = " + elementToString(k)); 
 
        // c1 = pk_a^k 
        Element c1 = pk_a.powZn(k).getImmutable(); 
 
 
        // c2 = m·Z^k 
        Element c2 = m.mul(Z.powZn(k)).getImmutable(); 
 
         
 
        // c = (c1, c2) 
        Tuple c = new Tuple(c1, c2); 
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        return c; 
 
    } 
 
 
    public static Tuple secondLevelEncryption(Element m, ElementPowPreProcessing pk_a_PPP, 
AFGHGlobalParameters global) { 
 
        /* 
         * Second Level Encryption 
         * c = (c1, c2)     c1 \in G1, c2 \in G2 
         *      c1 = g^ak = pk_a^k 
         *      c2 = m·Z^k 
         */ 
 
        //Field G2 = global.getG2(); 
        Field Zq = global.getZq(); 
 
        Pairing e = global.getE(); 
 
        //Element Z = global.getZ(); 
 
        ElementPowPreProcessing Z_PPP = global.getZ_ppp(); 
 
         
 
        // random k \in Zq 
        Element k = Zq.newRandomElement().getImmutable(); 
        //System.out.println("k = " + elementToString(k)); 
 
        // c1 = pk_a^k 
        Element c1 = pk_a_PPP.powZn(k).getImmutable(); 
 
 
        // c2 = m·Z^k 
        Element c2 = m.mul(Z_PPP.powZn(k)).getImmutable(); 
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        // c = (c1, c2) 
        Tuple c = new Tuple(c1, c2); 
 
        return c; 
 
    } 
 
    public static Tuple reEncryption(Tuple c, Element rk, AFGHGlobalParameters global) { 
 
        /* 
         * Re-Encryption 
         * c' = ( e(c1, rk) , c2)   \in G2 x G2 
         */ 
 
        Pairing e = global.getE(); 
 
 
 
        return new Tuple(e.pairing(c.get(1), rk), c.get(2)); 
 
    } 
 
     public static Tuple reEncryption(Tuple c, Element rk, PairingPreProcessing e_ppp) { 
 
        /* 
         * Re-Encryption 
         * c' = ( e(c1, rk) , c2)   \in G2 x G2 
         */ 
 
        return new Tuple(e_ppp.pairing(c.get(1)), c.get(2)); 
 
    } 
 
    public static byte[] reEncryption(byte[] c, byte[] rk, AFGHGlobalParameters global) { 
        //System.out.println("R: " + Arrays.toString(c)); 
        // c1 \in G1, c2 \in G2 
        Field G1 = global.getG1(); 
        Field G2 = global.getG2(); 
 
        Element c1 = G1.newElement(); 
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        int offset = bytesToElement(c, c1, 0); 
        c1 = c1.getImmutable(); 
 
        Element c2 = G2.newElement(); 
        bytesToElement(c, c2, offset); 
        c2 = c2.getImmutable(); 
 
 
        Tuple t = reEncryption(new Tuple(c1, c2), bytesToElement(rk, G1), global); 
 
        return mergeByteArrays(t.get(1).toBytes(), t.get(2).toBytes()); 
 
    } 
 
    public static Element firstLevelDecryption(Tuple c, Element sk, AFGHGlobalParameters global) { 
        // c1, c2 \in G2 
        Element alpha = c.get(1); 
        Element beta = c.get(2); 
 
        Element sk_inverse = sk.invert(); 
 
        Element m = beta.div(alpha.powZn(sk_inverse)); 
 
        return m; 
    } 
 
    public static Element firstLevelDecryptionPreProcessing(Tuple c, Element sk_inverse, AFGHGlobalParameters 
global) { 
        // c1, c2 \in G2 
        Element alpha = c.get(1); 
        Element beta = c.get(2); 
 
        Element m = beta.div(alpha.powZn(sk_inverse)); 
 
        return m; 
    } 
 
    public static byte[] firstLevelDecryption(byte[] b, byte[] sk, AFGHGlobalParameters global) { 
        //System.out.println(Arrays.toString(b)); 
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        // c1, c2 \in G2 
        Field G2 = global.getG2(); 
 
        Element alpha = G2.newElement(); 
        int offset = bytesToElement(b, alpha, 0); 
        alpha = alpha.getImmutable(); 
 
        Element beta = G2.newElement(); 
        bytesToElement(b, beta, offset); 
        beta = beta.getImmutable(); 
 
        //System.out.println(Arrays.toString(beta.toBytes())); 
 
 
 
        Element key = bytesToElement(sk, global.getZq()); 
 
//        key.invert(); 
//        System.out.println(Arrays.toString(key.invert().toBytes())); 
 
        Element m = firstLevelDecryption(new Tuple(alpha, beta), key, global); 
 
        return m.toBytes(); 
    } 
 
    public static byte[] secondLevelDecryption(byte[] b, byte[] sk, AFGHGlobalParameters global) { 
        // c1 \in G1, c2 \in G2 
        Field G1 = global.getG1(); 
        Field G2 = global.getG2(); 
 
        Element alpha = G1.newElement(); 
        int offset = bytesToElement(b, alpha, 0); 
        alpha = alpha.getImmutable(); 
 
        Element beta = G2.newElement(); 
        bytesToElement(b, beta, offset); 
        beta = beta.getImmutable(); 
 
        Element key = bytesToElement(sk, global.getZq()); 
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        Element m = secondLevelDecryption(new Tuple(alpha, beta), key, global); 
 
        return m.toBytes(); 
 
    } 
 
    public static Element secondLevelDecryption(Tuple c, Element sk, AFGHGlobalParameters global) { 
 
        Element alpha = c.get(1); 
        Element beta = c.get(2); 
 
        Pairing e = global.getE(); 
        Element g = global.getG(); 
 
        Element m = beta.div(e.pairing(alpha, g).powZn(sk.invert())); 
 
        return m; 
    } 
 
    public static Element decryption(Tuple c, Element sk, AFGHGlobalParameters global) { 
        Field G2 = global.getG2(); 
 
        // if c1 \in G2 then First-Level 
        if (c.get(1).getField().equals(G2)) { 
            return firstLevelDecryption(c, sk, global); 
        } else { 
            return secondLevelDecryption(c, sk, global); 
        } 
    } 
 
    public static Element stringToElement(String s, Field G) { 
        //System.out.println(s + " = " + Arrays.toString(s.getBytes())); 
        //return bytesToElement(Base64.decode(s), G); 
        return bytesToElement(s.getBytes(), G); 
    } 
 
    public static Element bytesToElement(byte[] b, Field G) { 
        int maxLengthBytes = G.getLengthInBytes(); 
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        //System.out.println("maxLengthBytes = " + maxLengthBytes); 
        if (b.length > maxLengthBytes) { 
            throw new IllegalArgumentException("Input must be less than " + maxLengthBytes + " bytes"); 
        } 
        //System.out.println(Arrays.asList(b)); 
 
        Element x = G.newElement(); 
        x.setFromBytes(b); 
 
        //Element x = G.newElement(new BigInteger(1, b)); 
        return x.getImmutable(); 
    } 
 
    public static int bytesToElement(byte[] b, Element x, int offset) { 
 
         
 
        offset += x.setFromBytes(b, offset); 
 
        return offset; 
    } 
 
    public static String elementToString(Element x) { 
        //return Base64.encodeBytes(x.toBytes()); 
        return new String(x.toBytes()).trim(); 
    } 
 
    public static byte[] mergeByteArrays(byte[]... bs) { 
        int newLength = 0; 
        for (byte[] b : bs) { 
            newLength += b.length; 
        } 
 
        byte[] merge = new byte[newLength]; 
 
        int from = 0; 
        for (byte[] b : bs) { 
            System.arraycopy(b, 0, merge, from, b.length); 
            from += b.length; 
        } 
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        return merge; 
    } 
} 
 
PROXYMAIN.JAVA 
* 
 * To change this template, choose Tools | Templates 
 * and open the template in the editor. 
 */ 
package nics.crypto.proxy.afgh; 
 
import nics.crypto.Tuple; 
import it.unisa.dia.gas.jpbc.*; 
/** 
 * 
 * @author david 
 */ 
public class ProxyMain { 
 
    static long cpuTime; 
    static long time[] = new long[20]; 
    static int i = 0; 
    /** 
     * @param args the command line arguments 
     */ 
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception { 
 
 
 
        //java.security. 
 
        cpuTime = System.nanoTime(); 
 
        // 80 bits seg: r = 160, q = 512 
        // 128 bits seg: r = 256, q = 1536 
        // 256 bits seg: r = 512, q = 7680 
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        int rBits = 256; //160;    // 20 bytes 
        int qBits = 1536; //512;    // 64 bytes 
 
        AFGHGlobalParameters global = new AFGHGlobalParameters(rBits, qBits); 
 
        medirTiempoMicroSegundos(); 
 
//        // Secret keys 
// 
//        byte[] sk_a = AFGH.generateSecretKey(global).toBytes(); 
// 
//        System.out.println(medirTiempo()); 
// 
//        byte[] sk_b = AFGH.generateSecretKey(global).toBytes(); 
// 
//        System.out.println(medirTiempo()); 
// 
//        // Public keys 
// 
//        byte[] pk_a = AFGH.generatePublicKey(sk_a, global); 
// 
//        System.out.println(medirTiempo()); 
// 
//        byte[] pk_b = AFGH.generatePublicKey(sk_b, global); 
// 
//        System.out.println(medirTiempo()); 
// 
//        // Re-Encryption Key 
// 
//        byte[] rk_a_b = AFGH.generateReEncryptionKey(pk_b, sk_a, global); 
// 
//        System.out.println(medirTiempo()); 
// 
//        String message = "David"; 
//        byte[] m = message.getBytes(); 
// 
//        System.out.println(medirTiempo()); 
// 
//        byte[] c_a = AFGH.secondLevelEncryption(m, pk_a, global); 
// 
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//        System.out.println(medirTiempo()); 
// 
//        String c_a_base64 = Base64.encodeBase64URLSafeString(c_a); 
//        //System.out.println("c_a_base64 = " + c_a_base64); 
// 
//        System.out.println(medirTiempo()); 
// 
//        String rk_base64 = Base64.encodeBase64URLSafeString(rk_a_b); 
//        //System.out.println("rk_base64 = " + rk_base64); 
//        System.out.println(medirTiempo()); 
// 
//        byte[] c, rk; 
//        rk = Base64.decodeBase64(rk_base64); 
// 
//        System.out.println(medirTiempo()); 
// 
//        c = Base64.decodeBase64(c_a_base64); 
// 
//        System.out.println(medirTiempo()); 
// 
//        byte[] c_b = AFGH.reEncryption(c, rk, global); 
//        //System.out.println("cb: " + Arrays.toString(c_b)); 
//        System.out.println(medirTiempo()); 
// 
//        String c_b_base64 = Base64.encodeBase64URLSafeString(c_b); 
//        //System.out.println("c_b_base64 = " + c_b_base64); 
// 
//        System.out.println(medirTiempo()); 
// 
//        c = Base64.decodeBase64(c_b_base64); 
// 
//        System.out.println(medirTiempo()); 
// 
//        byte[] m2 = AFGH.firstLevelDecryption(c_b, sk_b, global); 
//        //System.out.println("m2:" + new String(m2)); 
// 
//        System.out.println(medirTiempo()); 
// 
//        assert message.equals(new String(m2).trim()); 
// 
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//        System.out.println(); 
//        System.out.println(global.toBytes().length); 
//        System.out.println(sk_a.length); 
//        System.out.println(sk_b.length); 
//        System.out.println(pk_a.length); 
//        System.out.println(pk_b.length); 
//        System.out.println(rk_a_b.length); 
//        System.out.println(m.length); 
//        System.out.println(c_a.length); 
//        System.out.println(c_b.length); 
// 
//        // 
//        Map<String, byte[]> map = new HashMap<String, byte[]>(); 
//        map.put("sk_a", sk_a); 
//        map.put("sk_b", sk_b); 
//        map.put("pk_a", pk_a); 
//        map.put("pk_b", pk_b); 
//        map.put("rk_a_b", rk_a_b); 
//        map.put("global", global.toBytes()); 
//        map.put("c_a_base64", c_a_base64.getBytes()); 
// 
//        ObjectOutputStream fos = new ObjectOutputStream(new 
FileOutputStream("/Users/david/Desktop/pre.object")); 
//        fos.writeObject(map); 
//        fos.close(); 
        // 
 
        // Secret keys 
 
        Element sk_a = AFGHProxyReEncryption.generateSecretKey(global); 
 
        medirTiempoMicroSegundos(); 
 
        Element sk_b = AFGHProxyReEncryption.generateSecretKey(global); 
 
        medirTiempoMicroSegundos(); 
 
        Element sk_b_inverse = sk_b.invert(); 
 
        medirTiempoMicroSegundos(); 
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        // Public keys 
 
        Element pk_a = AFGHProxyReEncryption.generatePublicKey(sk_a, global); 
 
        medirTiempoMicroSegundos(); 
 
        Element pk_b = AFGHProxyReEncryption.generatePublicKey(sk_b, global); 
 
        medirTiempoMicroSegundos(); 
 
        ElementPowPreProcessing pk_a_ppp = pk_a.pow(); 
 
        medirTiempoMicroSegundos(); 
 
        // Re-Encryption Key 
 
        Element rk_a_b = AFGHProxyReEncryption.generateReEncryptionKey(pk_b, sk_a); 
 
        medirTiempoMicroSegundos(); 
 
        String message = "12345678901234567890123456789012"; 
        Element m = AFGHProxyReEncryption.stringToElement(message, global.getG2()); 
 
        medirTiempoMicroSegundos(); 
 
        Tuple c_a = AFGHProxyReEncryption.secondLevelEncryption(m, pk_a_ppp, global); 
 
        medirTiempoMicroSegundos(); 
 
        PairingPreProcessing e_ppp = global.getE().pairing(rk_a_b); 
 
        medirTiempoMicroSegundos(); 
 
        Tuple c_b = AFGHProxyReEncryption.reEncryption(c_a, rk_a_b, e_ppp); 
 
        medirTiempoMicroSegundos(); 
 
        Element m2 = AFGHProxyReEncryption.firstLevelDecryptionPreProcessing(c_b, sk_b_inverse, global); 
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        medirTiempoMicroSegundos(); 
 
        assert message.equals(new String(m2.toBytes()).trim()); 
 
        for(int j = 0; j < i; j++){ 
            System.out.println(time[j]); 
        } 
 
//        System.out.println("m string : " + message.getBytes().length); 
//        System.out.println("m in G2 : " + m.toBytes().length); 
//        System.out.println("c_a_1 in G2: " + c_a.get(1).toBytes().length); 
//        System.out.println("c_a_2 in G1: " + c_a.get(2).toBytes().length); 
//        System.out.println("c_b_1 in G2: " + c_b.get(1).toBytes().length); 
//        System.out.println("c_b_2 in G2: " + c_b.get(2).toBytes().length); 
//        System.out.println("m2 in G2 : " + m2.toBytes().length); 
        //System.out.println(AFGH.elementToString(m2)); 
 
        //System.out.println(medirTiempo()); 
 
    } 
 
 
 
    public static long medirTiempoMicroSegundos() { 
        time[i] = (System.nanoTime() - cpuTime)/1000; 
        i++; 
        cpuTime = System.nanoTime(); 
        return time[i]; 
    } 
} 
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CODE FOR THE ACDC3 SCHEME 
The following code was developed for testing the ACDC3 scheme.  
 
package nics.crypto.proxy.afgh; 
import nics.crypto.Tuple; 
import it.unisa.dia.gas.jpbc.*; 
import java.io.File; 
import java.io.FileInputStream; 
import java.io.FileOutputStream; 
import java.io.IOException; 
import java.io.ObjectInputStream; 
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream; 
import java.util.ArrayList; 
import org.apache.commons.io.FileUtils; 
 
public class Main { 
 
 public static final int rBits = 256; //160;    // 20 bytes 
 public static final int qBits = 1536; //512;    // 64 bytes 
 public static final GlobalParameters global = new GlobalParameters(rBits, qBits); 
 
 public static void main(String[] args) throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException  
 { 
  // Secret keys 
 
        Element sk_a = AFGH.generateSecretKey(global); 
 
        Element sk_b = AFGH.generateSecretKey(global); 
 
        // Public keys 
 
        Element pk_a = AFGH.generatePublicKey(sk_a, global); 
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        Element pk_b = AFGH.generatePublicKey(sk_b, global); 
 
        ElementPowPreProcessing pk_a_ppp = pk_a.pow(); 
         
        // Re-Encryption Key 
         
        Element rk_a_b = AFGH.generateReEncryptionKey(pk_b, sk_a); 
 
        // Plain Text 
         
        File plainText = new File("sheffieldlogosmall.png"); 
         
        log(plainText.getAbsolutePath()); 
         
        byte[] b = FileUtils.readFileToByteArray(plainText); 
   
        Element m = AFGH.bytesToElement(b, global.getG2()); 
         
        Tuple CT = AFGH.secondLevelEncryption(m, pk_a_ppp, global); 
 
        PairingPreProcessing e_ppp = global.getE().pairing(rk_a_b); 
         
        // Re-Encryption into ciphertext CT 
         
        Tuple CTT = AFGH.reEncryption(CT, rk_a_b, e_ppp); 
         
         
        // Send to TTP 
         
        sendToTTP(CTT); 
 
        // Decryption by Bob 
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        Tuple CTTT = readFromTTP("CTT.ser"); 
         
        Element sk_b_inverse = sk_b.invert(); 
         
        Element mResult = AFGH.firstLevelDecryptionPreProcessing(CTTT, sk_b_inverse, global); 
         
        FileUtils.writeByteArrayToFile(new File("result.txt"), mResult.toBytes()); 
 } 
  
 private static void log(String str) 
 { 
  System.out.println(str); 
 } 
  
 private static void sendToTTP(Tuple t) throws IOException 
 { 
  ArrayList<byte[]> res = t.toBytes(); 
  FileOutputStream fout = new FileOutputStream("CTT.ser"); 
        ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(fout); 
        oos.writeObject(res); 
        oos.flush(); 
        oos.close(); 
        fout.flush(); 
        fout.close(); 
 } 
  
 private static Tuple readFromTTP(String file) throws IOException, 
ClassNotFoundException 
 { 
  FileInputStream fin = new FileInputStream(file); 
        ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(fin); 
        @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") 
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  ArrayList<byte[]> CTTList = new ArrayList<byte[]>( (ArrayList<byte[]>) 
ois.readObject()); 
        ois.close(); 
        fin.close(); 
         
        Element[] elements = new Element[CTTList.size()]; 
         
        for (int i = 0; i < CTTList.size(); i++) 
        { 
         elements[i] = AFGH.bytesToElement(CTTList.get(i), global.getG2()); 
        } 
        return new Tuple(elements); 
 } 
} 
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RESEARCH PLAN TIMELINE AND MILESTONES 
A Gantt chart shown in figure 35 entails the major milestones and timeline of the project. 
 
ID Task Name Start Finish Duration
20122011 2013
Q4Q3 Q1Q1 Q2Q2Q3 Q4 Q3
1 65d28/10/201101/08/2011
Development of new scheme (RG1 
and RG4)
2 67d01/02/201201/11/2011ACDC3 Scheme (RG1 and RG4)
5 71d11/05/201203/02/2012
Developing Risk Assessment Scheme 
6 45d13/07/201214/05/2012
Design Scheme ACDC3 (RG1 and 
RG4)
8 45d14/09/201216/07/2012
Using Corus methodology for risk 
assessment scheme 
11 43d14/11/201217/09/2012
Secure Scalable Video Paper (1st 
Draft)
18 44d21/08/201423/06/2014Thesis Submission First Draft
13
12 21d14/12/201216/11/2012
Deployment on OPTIMIS testbed (Risk 
Assessment Scheme)
75d27/03/201313/12/2012
Implementing ACDC3 Scheme (RG1 
and RG4)
16 42d24/05/201328/03/2013
Integration with OPTIMIS toolkit 
Security Risk Framework
17 198d20/06/201418/09/2013
Publishing of Scalable Video Research 
Paper
3 81d31/01/201211/10/2011
Progress Report Submission 
(Milestone)
9 108d29/06/201201/02/2012Thesis outline (Milestone)
15 40d28/12/201205/11/2012Thesis Audit (Milestone)
20 88d31/07/201301/04/2013Thesis Seminar (Milestone)
21 23d31/10/201301/10/2013Final Thesis Submission (Milestone)
4 82d01/02/201211/10/2011
Redesigning ACDC3 Scheme and 
countering shortcomings
7 43d13/04/201215/02/2012
Access Control and Data 
Confidentiality in Cloud Computing 
(EU Patent Filed)
10 88d30/11/201201/08/2012
Security Threat Analysis (Research 
Paper, Cloudcom 2012)
14 21d01/03/201301/02/2013
Secure Scalable Video Research 
paper writeup
19 52d03/11/201422/08/2014Thesis Submission Second Draft 
 
Figure 35: Gantt chart of the project 
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CLAIMS AND ABSTRACT OF THE PATENT (ACDC3) 
The above research work was filed by the BT IP Department in the form of two patents 
to the EU Patent Office and US Patent Office. BT’s reference number for the patent is 
Europe A32311 [169] [170]. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Embodiments of the invention provide a method and system which allow for ready 
revocation of end user access rights by virtue of storing data in an encrypted form in a 
network environment, and using a trusted proxy server to re-encrypt the data itself to 
permit eventual decryption of the data by an authorised end user. However, if the end 
user’s access rights are revoked then the trusted proxy does not perform the re-
encryption of the data, and the end user is not then able to subsequently decrypt data 
stored in the network environment, even if it is able to access the data without 
permission. Embodiments therefore have advantages that access control is decoupled 
from data confidentiality to provide scalability, and revocation of user access rights can 
be accomplished without requiring re-encryption of the stored data. 
CLAIMS 
Following are the claims of the patent, 
1. A method for use in accessing data from network data storage, the data being 
encrypted with one or more layers of encryption including a first encryption layer applied 
by the data owner, the method comprising: 
 receiving a request from a data consumer for access to data stored in the network 
data storage; 
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 determining whether to grant the request in dependence on whether the data 
consumer has access rights to the requested data; 
 obtaining a proxy re-encryption key generated by the data owner; and 
 if it is determined that the data consumer may access the data, obtaining the 
requested data from the network data storage and proxy re-encrypting the data to 
enable subsequent decryption of the first encryption layer applied by the data owner 
whereby to enable eventual access to the data. 
2. A method according to claim 1, wherein the re-encryption key re-encrypts the 
data so that the first encryption layer may be decrypted by the data consumer, the 
method further comprising sending the re-encrypted data to the data consumer. 
3. A method according to claim 2, wherein the data has a single layer of encryption 
being the first layer, wherein the data consumer is able to decrypt the re-encrypted data 
to plaintext data to access the data. 
4. A method according to claim 1, wherein the re-encryption key re-encrypts the 
data so that the first encryption layer may be decrypted by the trusted authority, the 
method further comprising, at the trusted authority, decrypting the first encryption layer. 
5. A method according to claim 4, wherein the data has at least two layers of 
encryption, being one or more other layers and the first layer, the decryption resulting in 
the data encrypted with the one or more other layers. 
6. A method according to claims 4 or 5, and further comprising sending the proxy 
decrypted data to the data consumer, the data consumer then obtaining the decryption 
key to decrypt the one or more first layers to obtain plaintext data from the data owner. 
7. A method according to claim 6, wherein the trusted authority requests the 
decryption key to decrypt the one or more first layers from the data owner, and forwards 
the decryption key to the data consumer. 
8. A method for use in storing data in network data storage, the method comprising: 
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 encrypting data to be stored in the network data storage with one or more layers 
of encryption, including at least a first encryption layer; 
 storing the encrypted data in the network data storage; 
 generating a proxy re-encryption key to allow a trusted authority to re-encrypt 
data encrypted with the first encryption layer so that the first encryption layer may be 
decrypted by a third party; and 
 sending the proxy re-encryption key to the trusted authority. 
9. A method according to claim 8, wherein the re-encryption key is generated so as 
to be able to re-encrypt the data such that the first encryption layer may be decrypted 
by the data consumer. 
10. A method according to claim 9, wherein the data has a single layer of encryption 
being the first layer, wherein the data consumer is able to decrypt the re-encrypted data 
to plaintext data to access the data. 
11. A method according to claim 8, wherein the re-encryption key re-encrypts the 
data so that the first encryption layer may be decrypted by the trusted authority. 
12. A method according to claim 10, wherein the data has at least two layers of 
encryption, being one or more other layers and the first layer, the method further 
comprising, receiving a request for the decryption key or keys for the one or more other 
layers, and sending the keys in response to the request. 
13. A computer program or suite of computer programs so arranged such that when 
executed by a computer system it/they cause(s) the computer system to operate in 
accordance with the method of any of the preceding claims. 
14. A computer readable medium storing a computer program or at least one of a 
suite of computer programs according to claim 13. 
15. A system, comprising: 
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 at least one processor; 
 memory; and 
 at least one computer readable medium storing a computer program or suite of 
computer programs so arranged such that when loaded into memory and executed by 
the processor they cause the system to operate in accordance with the method of any of 
claims 1 to 12. 
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